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Abstract 
This thesis uses conflicts over the role of rural hospitals in the Southern 
region as a means to explore how the health system created by the 1991 
'Green and White Paper' works in practice. A combination of 'new 
institutionalist' and Alford's 'structural interests' approaches provide the 
conceptual tools. The thesis argues that the goals of the 1991 health 
reforms included an intention to redesign the institutional structure of 
the health system to reduce what was seen as the disproportionate power 
of local communities and providers, and privilege the fiscal interests of 
central government. But, as the thesis demonstrates, rural communities 
in alliance with providers, were sometimes able to overcome their lack of 
formal power and, however briefly, become significant actors in the 
health system. The case also points to the larger forces that made the 
Regional Health Authorities vulnerable to abolition in the Coalition 
Agreement of December 1996. The thesis also, shows that the power of 
actors to influence the context and course of debates in the health system 
is not solely dependent on their, formal institutional position, but is 
affected by informal relations and political pressures. 
Chapter One: The Politics of Rural Hospitals 
Introduction 
There is nothing new about intense debate in the health sector over the 
role of rural hospitals. In recent years, however, these debates have 
become increasingly contentious as advances in medicine and surgery 
have undermined the need for the type of services provided by rural 
hospitals. As these technologies encourage the rationalisation and 
centralisation of high-tech and in-patient hospital services, rural 
communities fear their acces~ to services will be reduced. This fear not 
only increases local attachment to rural hospitals, but reinforces the 
hospital's symbolic role within the community. 
As the drive to rationalise and centralise services gathered momentum 
with the introduction of the health reforms in 1991, debates over rural 
hospitals escalated. Throughout the country, angry rural communities 
J 
have entered into passionate debates with Regional Health Authorities 
(RHAs) and Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs) as they seek to defend 
their local hospitals. Repeatedly, rural communities have turned out in 
large numbers to 'save our hospital', and to protest against what they see 
as another factor in the gradual erosion of rural society. 1 Although 
RHA and CHE officials often view this attachment as more emotional 
than reasoned, rural communities argue these officials do not 
understand the needs of rural areas. The result is a "politics of power 
and conflict, of repeated trials of strength, with each side resisting what 
1 For more insight into this, see David Tranter, Community or Chaos?: The Social Crisis in Rural New 
Zealand, Unpublished monograph, New Zealand, 1995. 
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they see as the impositions of the other."2 The issues, however, are not 
confined to rural hospitals, but raise broader and more serious questions 
about the health reforms. Ultimately, these questions have weakened 
the reforms' "fragile and uneven legitimacy," and contributed towards 
further restructuring of the system. 3 
The Controversy over Rural Hospitals 
The Government's Perspective: Advancing Medical Technology and the 
Dilemma of Ensuring Access to High Quality Services. 
At the heart of the debates over rural hospitals are the conflicting needs 
and perceptions of the key actors. For rural communities, their local 
hospital is not only ,a vital source of locally accessible health services but 
an integral part of the community itself. To central government, rural 
hospitals are inefficient, pot~:ntially unsafe, and historical legacies which 
have little value in a sector which emphasises health services rather than 
institutions. Behind these differences, however, lie much broader issues 
of how to maintain access for rural people to high technology services 
when the increasing sophistication of diagnostic, surgical and medical 
procedures favours their centralisation. 
For central government, developing solutions to these dilemmas is not 
easy. On one hand, the increasing specialisation and sophistication of 
diagnostic, medical and surgical procedures offer dfamatic improvements 
in the quality of care that can be offered to patients. However, it is 
impossible to provide all of these services in every locality because of 
2Geoff Fougere, "What Is the Core Business ofVote:Health?" in Symposium on the DelivelY of Health 
Services to Smaller Communities, Wellington: National Advisory Committee on Core Health and 
Disability Support Services (NACCHDSS), 1995, p. 19. 
3Ibid. 
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financial cost and the shortage of skilled staff. From the government's 
perspective, the solution is to centralise these services in a few «centres of 
excellence. "4 Although people would have to travel to access these 
services, the government argues that this system would allow the 
maximum benefit to be gained from them. Notwithstanding this, the 
government also foresees that the need to travel could be reduced by 
allowing providers throughout the country to access these services by 
"[plugging] in to the centres through telemedicine."5 Centralising 
high technology services, however, has serious implications for rural 
hospitals. As Fougere identifies, it "sharpens the differences between 
large hospitals serving major population concentrations and small 
hospitals serving local populations."6 This contrast does not reflect 
favourably on rural hospitals as it can make them appear inefficient, as 
well as posing greater risks to patients because of the smaller throughput 
of cases.? 
However, the traditional role of both rural and urban hospitals as 
providers of health care is also being undermined by other changes in the 
practice of medicine. The increasing sophistication of medical 
technology and advances in surgical procedures have decreased the need 
for in-patient hospital beds, and reduced the length of time that patients 
need to remain in hospital. Developments in fibre optics, imaging 
technology and pharmaceuticals, for example, mean that many surgical 
operations are less invasive or able to be performed on a day stay basis. 
4Jenny Shipley, "Health Services into the Future", Speech by the Minister of Health to the New Zealand 
Medical Assodation Conference, 19 April 1994, p. 7. 
5Jenny Shipley, Advancing Health in New Zealand, Wellington: Government Printer, 1996, p. 5. 
6Fougere, "What Is the Core Business ofVote:Health?", op. cit., p. 19. For a discussion on the use of 
telemedicine and teleradiology in rural areas, see Chris Feltham, "The Role of Newer Technologies" in 
Symposium on the Delivery of Health Services to Smaller Communities, Wellington: NACCHDSS, 1995, 
pp.90-102. 
7For the impact of changes in surgery on smaller hospitals, see Richard Stewart and Kenneth Menzies, 
"Surgical Standards and Peripheral Surgical Units", New Zealand MedicalJoumal, vol. 101, no. 852, 
1988, pp. 556-557. 
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Complementing this trend is the increasing number of medical 
procedures which are able to be performed by general practitioners, 
midwives and other non-hospital based providers in community settings. 8 
These trends not only coincide with, but also reinforce the development 
of community based care. With increased community based services 
providing this care, more conditions can be treated in the patient's own 
home, and earlier discharges from hospital are possible. Current 
government policy promotes the greater use of community based 
services, as from the state's perspective these services reduce costly hospital 
stays and eliminate the need to spend resources on maintaining hospital 
facilities. They also allow people to recover in their own home, which is 
often seen as more desirable than going to hospita1. 9 For the 
government, the choice between increasing community based services or 
maintaining rural hospitals i~ clear: devoting resources to rural hospitals 
will deny communities the opportunity to use those same resources to 
increase their community based services. As the then Minister of Health, 
Jenny Shipley commented, "if communities wish to lock up resources 
in inefficient and sometimes unsafe hospitals then they must face up to 
the fact that this will be at the expense of other health services within 
their communities."lO 
The government recoglllses that changing the focus towards serVices 
"will challenge communities' parochial attitudes towards their local 
8Fougere, "What Is the Core Business ofVote:Health?", op. dt., p.19. 
9For a discussion of the issues for rural communities and volunteer organisations of increasing 
community care, see Carole Searle, "What are the Consequences of Increasing Emphasis on Community 
Care?" in Symposium on the Delivery o/Health Services to Smaller Communities, Wellington: 
NACCHDSS, 1995, pp. 130-136. 
lOJenny Shipley, "Health Services of the Future", Speech by the Minister of Health to the 
Otago/Southland National Party Divisional Conference, 28 May 1994, p. 8. 
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hospitals."ll The government dearly perceives that the public's view of 
hospitals is out of date, and still tends to defines access to health care 
through the presence of a hospital. This view was dearly seen in a speech 
by Jenny Shipley in early 1994, in which she stated: 
Successive ministers of health have struggled to counter quite 
outmoded attitudes to our public hospitals, attitudes which 
have been fostered by a small but very vocal group of 
professionals. The outmoded view has promoted the notion 
that hospitals are the 'be all and end all' of our health system. 
It has encouraged the public to believe that health services 
must be delivered in a traditional hospital setting - often 
referred to as the 'bricks and mortar' syndrome. Access to 
services is defined in terms of the presence or absence of a 
hospital. 12 
The government, however, is committed to shifting the focus away from 
hospitals as the main organisational unit of the health sector. As 
medicine gradually moves '~way from lengthy hospital stays, it is no 
longer desirable or practical for the government to commit resources to 
the maintenance of large numbers of hospitals. 
The shift towards an emphasis on health services rather than institutions 
also allows government to reconfigure and rationalise resources more 
effectively. As medical technology continues to expand at incredible 
rates, it increases the medical profession's ability to treat illnesses, but 
places greater pressure on the government to balance a finite health 
budget with the seemingly limitless public demand for this new 
technology. Accordingly, this drives the government to seek to control 
not only the budget of the health sector, but the sector itself. 13 This 
111bid., p. 9. 
12Jenny Shipley, "Health Services into the Future", Speech by the Minister of Health to the New Zealand 
Medical A'>sociation 19 April 1994, p. 5. 
13Fougere, "What Is the Core Business of Vote: Health?", op. cit., p.20. See also Geoff Fougere, 
"Restructuring the Health Sector: Bringing Politics Back In", Discussant paper for Health Services 
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control is aimed directly at making government better able to shift 
under-utilised or inappropriately located resources to balance these 
competing pressures. Unfortunately for rural communities, the 
government sees rural hospitals as representing a poor use of resources, 
which could be more advantageously devoted to primary care. Shifting 
resources from secondary to primary care, with its emphasis on 
prevention and early treatment, offers a way for government to 
ameliorate some of the public demand for new medical technology and 
achieve a greater return for the same resources. 
The Perspective of Rural Communities: The Need for Local Services and the 
Symbolism of Hospitals 
To rural COmmUllltleS, local hospitals are treasured as ulllque and 
precious community assets. Rural communities vigorously contest the 
, . 
government's claims that their hospitals are inefficient, inappropriate 
and anachronistic. Instead, they argue that a rural hospital is a vital 
source of locally accessible health services and an essential part of the 
community's infrastructure. However, rural communities value their 
hospitals not only for their role in: delivering health services, but because 
they also perform a wide range of social and symbolic functions, 
considered by the community, although not the government, to be 
crucial. This symbolism exists on multiple levels, and as such is central to 
understanding the controversy over rural hospitals. 
There is little doubt that rural communities value their hospitals as 
symbols of health and security. The perception of the hospital as a 
symbol of health is as much due to the historical role of the hospital as it 
Research Centre Conference 'EmergIng Themes In New Zealand Health Care', Wellington, November 
291994. 
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is to the ability of the hospital to allow individuals to remaIn In the 
community when they fall ill, and hence to be "properly healed."14 To 
rural communities, 'health' is not just the provision of discrete services, 
but rather is about having an environment where sick people can be cared 
for and nurtured. This is particularly important for the elderly, who 
find larger urban hospitals intimidating, unfriendly, and difficult for 
family and friends to access. In comparison, being nursed in the local 
hospital offers more personal care, has easy access for friends and relatives, 
and allows individuals to remain within the supportive confines of their 
own community. 
Equally importantly to rural communities is the sense of security 
provided by the hospital. The hospital is staffed for twenty-four hours, 
and consequently is seen as an important source of assistance when the 
general practitioner is not av<;tilable. In times of emergency, rural people 
know they can always contact the hospital to get advice and reassurance 
from the staff on duty. This sense of security also extends to other 
health services in the locality. Rural communities consider that the 
presence of the hospital encourages the retention of other health services 
in the community, such as general practitioner and pharmaceutical 
services, as well as voluntary services like a local ambulance. 
Consequently, proposals to close rural hospitals incite fear in rural 
communities, which see the loss of the hospital as initiating a domino 
effect resulting in the loss of a much wider set of health services. 
However, rural hospitals are not only symbols of health and security, but 
integral parts of the community's identity. This sense of identity can be 
traced back to the hospitals' origins. In the early twentieth century, 
14Interview with DarfleJd community member 22 January 1996. 
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many rural hospitals were built as a result of the efforts of their local 
communities. These communities not only extensively lobbied their 
local Hospital Board to obtain the hospital, but in many cases also raised 
money or donated land to facilitate its construction. 15 Once the hospital 
was built, it became an important symbol of pride and status. Particularly 
for new communities in a relatively young country, the hospital was 
perceived as an asset that, along with the local school and church, 
defined the identity of the community. 
These efforts also fostered a strong sense of ownership on the part of 
rural communities towards their hospital, which in turn, have seen the 
hospital become a focal point for the community. Supporting the 
hospital through fundraising and voluntary work provides an important 
opportunity for social contact, particularly for people who live in isolated 
areas. The hospital, therefore, not only allows people to feel they are 
contributing to the community, but brings the community together in 
a common purpose. 
One final factor that also accounts for the strong attachment of rural 
communities to their hospital is. the economic recession and rural 
downturn of the mid to late 1980s. During that time, rural 
communitIes experienced a significant decrease in . serVIces as 
organisations like the Post Office, banks and transport companies 
centralised and rationalised services, and retail businesses closed with the 
fall in the spending power of rural families. ~he legacy of that 
experience, however, has been to make the hospital even more highly 
valued because it is perceived to be one of the few remaining services in 
15See W Norris, Historical Notes: Country Hospitals and City Hospitals and Institutions other than 
Christchurch Hospital, North Canterbury Hospital Board, 1942, and F 0 Bennett, Hospitals On The 
Plains: Being An Historical Survey of the Origins of the Subsidiary Hospitals and Institutions of the North 
Canterbury Hospital Board, Unpublished manuscript, 1975. 
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the community. Ultimately, threats to rural hospitals signify a loss that 
extends far beyond just the closure of an aging building. 
The Perspective of the Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) and the Crown 
Health Enterprises (CHEs) 
Situated between the opposIng alms of the government and rural 
communities are the RHAs and CHEs. For the RHAs in particular, the 
issue of rural hospitals has been problematic and demanding. In general, 
the RHAs have found themselves at the centre of the conflicts over rural 
hospitals, because of their dual responsibilities to both central 
government and local communities. Under the reforms, the RHAs were 
to take account of government policy in their purchasing strategies, but 
were also required to work with individual communities to identify their 
health needs. Accordingly, as their purchasing decisions have aimed to 
, ' 
increase community based ;ervices and not support institutions such as 
rural hospitals, the RHAs have found themselves subject to the anger of 
local communities. The RHAs, however, are less concerned with 
individual communities than with how to allocate health resources to 
gain the maximum benefit for all communities within the region. 
Unfortunately for the RHAs, achieving a more equitable allocation of 
scarce resources is extremely contentious because making gains in the 
areas of greatest need frequently demands removing resources from the 
'over-provided' localities. 16 Any attempt to take resources away from 
communities to redress inequities has only drawn the RHAs into 
multiple political controversies that has seen them being criticised by 
communities and central government alike. 
16See, Southern Regional Health Authority, 1995196 Draft Purchase Plan, Dunedin: Southern Regional 
HealthAuthority, 1995, and Southern Regional Health Authority, Planning For The South: Access To 
Health and Disability Services in The Southern Region, Dunedin: Southern Regional Health Authority, 
1994. 
The Politics of Rural Hospitals 10 
CHEs are drawn into these issues because as the owner of the hospitals, it 
is in part up to them to decide if services will continue to be delivered 
from those locations. For the CHEs to provide the services, however, 
they must receive a price from the RHA that will cover the costs of the 
service, or subsidise the service themselves. As the RHAs seek to extract 
the lowest price from providers, this often creates a financial shortfall 
which brings the RHAs and CHEs into conflict. As these disputes 
remam unresolved, this inevitably draws central government in to 
mediate a resolution. CHEs are also required to make a return for 
their shareholding Ministers, and this was intended to allow them to 
exit from unprofitable services. Accordingly, CHEs have strong 
incentives to close rural hospitals, as these services struggle to break even. 
However, some CHEs have also fostered dose relationships with many 
rural communities, and are asked by those communities not to withdraw 
from their hospital. As a result, the institutional positioning of the 
RHAs and CHEs sees them enmeshed in the battles between central 
government and local communities, where each side attempts to use the 
RHAs and CHEs to further its oWl). objectives. 
Institutional Reform of the Health Sector and Debates over Rural 
Hospitals 
Controversy over rural hospitals is not new in the health sector, as rural 
communities have a history of opposing repeated attempts by Hospital 
Boards and Area Health Boards to dose rural hospitals as a means of 
reducing expenditure in times of fiscal constraint. I7 These debates are 
more than just disputes over specific facilities: they represent much 
17Por a recent example, see Canterbury Area Health Board, Secondary Care Division, Report of the Rural 
Hospitals and Rural Health Needs Review (Akaroa, Darfie/d, Ellesmere, Lincoln, Rangiora, Waikari), 
Christchurch: Canterbury Area Health Board, 1991. 
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deeper conflicts over power and control of resources that are endemic to 
health sectors throughout the world. Crucially, these controversies are 
shaped by the institutional settings in which they occur. These settings 
regulate the actions of the contending parties, structure their goals and 
strategies for achieving those goals, and critically, privilege some actors 
while disadvantaging others. IS Changes in such institutional settings 
can therefore be immediately consequential for the constitution of 
actors involved in the controversies, and for their degree of control over 
events. 
The implications of alterations to institutional structures are particularly 
relevant to New Zealand, because in the last five years, the institutional 
configuration of the health system has been the subject of radical 
change. 19 In 1991, the National government abolished the existing Area 
Health Boards and placed responsibility for the purchase and provision of 
health services with the new RHAs and CHEs. This was in an attempt 
to introduce a 'managed markee into the health sector, where it was 
hoped competition between providers would drive innovation into the 
sector, and facilitate a more efficient allocation of health resources. 
This institutional reform was aimed at increasing the relative power of 
central government to realise its aims vis a vis RHAs, CHEs and provider 
organisations and local communities. Specifically, the reformers argued 
that the then current institutional structure allowed providers and local 
communities too much power to allocate resources to meet their own 
specific needs and wants. In the case of the rural hospitals in Canterbury 
18See, for example, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics" in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen 
Thelen and Frank Longstreth (eds), Structuring Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 
pp.I-32. 
19See Simon Upton, Your Health and the Public Healtll, Wellington: Government Print, 1991. 
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considered here, the Area Health Board system allowed individual 
representatives and small coalitions of representatives from rural areas a 
high degree of influence over the Board's decisions. As the elected 
nature of these Boards also created opportunities for communities to use 
public opposition as a means of blocking unpopular proposals, rural 
communities were often able to defend their hospitals from attempts at 
closure. 
The reformers contended the Area Health Board system 'privileged' 
these communities with the result that inappropriate and inefficient 
uses of resources were perpetuated. Consequently, this thesis argues 
that among the objectives of the reformers was the weakening of local 
communities' control over decisions concerning the allocation of 
resources. The reformers hoped to undercut communities' political 
influence by abolishing th~ir directly elected representation on the 
regional health boards. Instead, the boards of the new RHAs and CHEs 
would be directly appointed by central government, and RHAs would be 
required only to 'consult' with local communities. This move would 
insulate the RHAs from communi.ty 'capture', and hence position them 
to make difficult rationing decisions in the sector. 20 It has therefore 
been the central focus of this thesis to examine how successfully the new 
institutional structure has been able to fulfil the original intentions of 
the reformers. This thesis has also sought to examine how informal 
relations and political pressures can influence the formal institutional 
power of different actors in the health sector so that the actors' true 
degree of power to control allocation decisions and other actors is either 
undermined or increased. 
20Pougere, "What Is the Core Business ofVote:Health?", gp. cit., p. 21. 
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Methodology 
The collection and analysis of data for this thesis has been an evolving 
process. As the focus of the research was refined, and more was 
understood about the topic at large, new research questions and issues 
emerged. Inevitably this involved some reconsideration of how the 
research was conducted. For example, an initial focus on the Canterbury 
region and on the cases of three hospitals within it was replaced by a focus 
that was at once wider and narrower. The focus expanded to include the 
whole of the SRHA's region, and specifically Otago and Southland as 
well as Canterbury. Yet the research also narrowed to concentrate 'on one 
particular hospital in Canterbury, Darfield, where there had been a co-
ordinated community response to the latest threat to the hospital. 
Darfield has provided a key site for gathering detailed information 
about the relationship betw:,~en local communities, RHAs, CHEs and 
central government. In addition to this, the thesis examines the cases of 
similar hospitals in Otago, as well as events at provincial hospitals such as 
Ashburton. Multiple research strategies were used to compile these 
accounts. These included unstructured interviews with key informants; 
analysis of documents produced by the government, the SRHA and 
Canterbury Health; analysis of other relevant documents such as 
community submissions, minutes of community meetings, and local 
newspaper articles; and the use of direct observation.21 
21 This use of multiple research strategies represents a version of triangulation: the process of bringing 
different kinds of data to bear on a particular social phenomenon. For more detail, see among others, 
Norman Denzin, The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods, 2nd ed., New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1978, and Valerie Janesick, 'The Dance of Qualitative Research Design", in Norman 
Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research, Thousand Oal<s: Sage, 1994, pp. 
209-219. 
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Selection of Data Sites 
Following a brief overview of the literature on rural hospitals, it was 
initially decided to conduct a comparative case study of three rural 
hospitals in Canterbury: Lincoln, Darfield and Ellesmere. 22 These 
hospitals were chosen firstly because they all fell outside of the SRHA's 
criteria for the purchase of in-patient hospital services, that is, they were 
located within sixty minutes of Christchurch, and hence the SRHA 
would not pay a premium to purchase their services.23 In essence, this 
meant the SRHA had decided that in-patient services were not required 
in those locations, and unless Healthlink South or Canterbury Health 
were willing to continue with the services, the hospitals would most 
likely close, or be the subject of a community trust. In addition to this, 
these hospitals were also chosen because Lincoln Hospital was owned by 
Healthlink South, whereas<, Darfield and Ellesmere were owned by 
Canterbury Health. At the time, Healthlink South had initially agreed 
to continue funding services at Lincoln, whereas Canterbury Health was 
undecided. Accordingly, this presented the opportunity for this thesis to 
contrast the approaches of the two CHEs. 
As the research progressed, and the issue of access to services became more 
prominent, it was decided to change the case studies by including Waikari 
Hospital and eliminating Lincoln and Ellesmere. The decision to leave 
out Lincoln was made because it did not share many of the key 
characteristics of the other rural hospitals. As a solely maternity 
hospital, it did not have the range of services of the other hospitals, and 
22These hospitals differed in the mix of services each provided. Darfield provided a mix of general 
medical and maternity services, Ellesmere provided general medical, long stay elderly, and post natal 
maternity services, whereas Lincoln solely provided maternity services. However, these differences were 
seen to be less important than the fact they fell outside of the SRHA's criteria. 
23This criteria was set out in the SRHA's planning document Planningfor the South released in june 
1994. 
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hence was not as intimately connected to its community. Ellesmere was 
excluded because its strong similarity with Darfield meant that it was not 
adding anything to the research that was not already being obtained 
from Darfield. The decision to replace these 'hospitals with Waikari was 
firstly due to the similarity of functions provided by Waikari and 
Darfield, but secondly, was because Waikari fell within the SRHA's 
criteria for the payment of a premium. This contrast seemed more 
appropriate to highlight the validity of the SRHA's access criteria, and 
to examine the implications of those criteria for two rural communities. 
As the research continued, the focus narrowed to issues of power, and 
how the ability and means available to rural communities to influence 
decisions had been altered by the health reforms. As a result, the 
contrasting strategies of the CHEs in Canterbury where rural hospitals 
have been sustained, and Ot~go where they have been closed, became an 
important point to investigate. However, this change in focus meant 
the comparison with Waikari was no longer as worthwhile as it had 
initially appeared. Precisely because they fell within the SRHA's criteria 
for a premium, the Waikari community· had had very little need to 
mobilise against the SRHA, whereas the Darfield community had been 
actively engaged in a consultation process with both the SRHA and 
Canterbury Health to determine the future of its hospital. It was 
therefore decided to focus detailed analysis of community action on a 
single case study' where there had been a co-ordinated effort by a local 
community to preserve their hospital. 
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Data Collection 
One of the principal methods of date collection was unstructured 
interviews with key informants. 24 Unstructured interviews were used 
because they were the best method of allowing the participants to relate 
their own experience and understanding of the situation. The 
interviews were organised around broad questions that related to key 
themes, and were designed to allow the participants to discuss what they 
perceived to be the pertinent issues. 
As the research required that the perceptions and perspectives of all the 
key actors be obtained, an interview program was developed that consisted 
of five main groups of participants. These were SRHA and CHE staff, 
general practitioners and staff at the hospitals, community members, 
former Canterbury Area Health Board staff and finally, additional key 
informants such as the Minister of Health. The participants from the 
community were chosen on the recommendations of the local general 
practitioners, the principal nurses, and other community members. 
Those from the SRHA and Canterbury Health were chosen because they 
had played a particular role in the process, or because they could 
authoritatively comment on the role of their organisation in the case 
study. 
Contact with the rural hospitals was initially made through attending 
the Rural General Practitioners Conference in early 1995 .. This 
facilitated introductions to a number of rural general practitioners, who 
24For more detail on the process of interviewing, see for example, Raymond Gorden, Interviewing: 
Strategies, Techniques and Tactics, 3rd ed., Homewood IIlinios: Dorsey Press, 1980; John Lofland and 
Lyn Lofland, Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis, 2nd ed., 
Belmont, California: Wadsworth Incorporated, 1984, and Andrea Fontana and James Frey, 
"Interviewing: The Art of Science" in Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (eds), Handbook of 
Qualitative Research, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994, pp. 361-376. 
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In turn supplied the names of the principal nurses of the hospitals, as 
well as other community members who had a strong association with the 
hospitaL These people then recommended the names of others within 
the community whom they thought would be helpful for the research. 
The participants from the community also gave the names of the ex 
Canterbury Area Health Board members who had played a crucial role 
with the hospitals. 
Contact with the Southern Regional Health Authority was made 
through contacting Janice Donaldson, who was responsible for requests 
made by the public for information. Ms Donaldson willingly supplied 
the names of staff who were involved with the rural hospitals in 
Canterbury, as well as the staff in the Dunedin branch who had been 
involved with issues concerning rural hospitals. Letters were sent to all 
participants indicating the fl.-ature of the research, and outlining what 
the interview would be about. These were then followed up with 
telephone calls, which allowed the participants to ask further questions, 
and their permission to use interview material to be sought. Of all the 
people who were contacted for -this research, only one declined to 
participate. 
Group A: SRHA and Canterbury Health Staff 
The first group -of participants comprised Board members, general 
managers and staff of both the Southern Regional Health Authority 
and Canterbury Health. Within the SRHA, there were three broad 
subcategories of participants. Firstly, there were those staff who had 
worked directly with the Darfield community through the consultation 
process. These consisted of the SRHA's community liaison officers, as 
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well as the staff member most directly involved with the consultation 
group and the negotiations with Canterbury Health. The second 
category was those staff who had worked with the rural hospitals in 
Otago, had direct contact with the community and had worked closely 
with the fledgling community trusts. The third group consisted of those 
staff who were involved with the issues on a more general level. Rather 
than their specific knowledge of Darfield, these participants were chosen 
b~cause they had particular areas of expertise that were relevant to the 
research. These included a Board member who could present the issues 
from the SRHA Board's perspective, but who also had experience in 
establishing and running a community trust, as well as staff involved 
with the specific policy sections of the SRHA. 
Within Canterbury Health, three key informants were chosen. These 
were the Chief Executive Officer, the general manager of Ashburton 
and Community Health Services and the chairman of the Canterbury 
Health Board of Directors. Two of these were chosen because they had 
both regularly attended the community's sub-committee, but were also 
able to comment on the issues as Canterbury Health perceived them. 
The Board member was selected because he was able to comment on the 
Board's perspective, and also because he had been closely involved with 
the establishment of the CHEs, and the placement of the rural hospitals 
into the new organisations. 
These interviews were all conducted at the place of work of these staff 
members, with the exception of two interviews which were held at the 
participant's private homes. In general, the interviews were very formal, 
and were focused on the research questions. This was particularly the case 
with the SRHA, where the heavy workload of the staff meant the 
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interviews needed to be conducted with little wastage of time. The 
interviews lasted between thirty minutes and ninety minutes. The 
interview questions for both the SRHA and Canterbury Health broadly 
followed a similar pattern. Where appropriate, each participant was 
asked about the sequence of events relating to Darfleld's, or Otago's, 
interaction with the SRHA over the application of the new purchasing 
criteria, and about their own role in the process. Participants were also 
asked about their organisation's relationship to the other key actors such 
as the community and central government. In addition to this, many of 
the staff had also been employed with the Canterbury Area Health 
Board. As a result, it was often possible to discuss issues that extended 
beyond their current role, and in particular, the way that the issue of 
rural hospitals had been addressed under the Area Health Board system. 
Group B: General Practitio.q.ers and Staff of the Hospitals 
' .. 
The second group of people interviewed comprised local health 
professionals. These included the principal nurses of Ellesmere, Darfleld 
and Waikari Hospitals, and one existing and one past staff member from 
Darfleld. The local general practitioners from Waikari, Ellesmere and 
Darfleld, who also acted as the Medical Superintendents of the hospitals, 
were also interviewed. 
These interviews were conducted either at the private homes of the 
participants or at the hospitals. When the interviews were conducted at 
the hospitals, the principal nurse would often offer a tour of the facility. 
This provided an excellent opportunity for informal conversations to be 
held with staff, patients and other community people visiting or 
working at the hospital. It also allowed for observations to be made of 
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the hospital, and these often revealed the depth of the community's 
support. For example, many items had donation plaques attached to 
them, from both individuals and local organisations. At Waikari 
Hospital, the kitchen staff maintained a record of donations of goods by 
the community. Interviews were less formal than with the SRHA and 
Canterbuty Health staff, and lasted between one hour and two hours. 
For this group of participants, the interviews were organised around 
specific questions which were designed to elicit their interpretation of 
the events concerning their hospital, as well as more factual data on the 
services provided by the hospital. Some broader questions were also asked 
that sought interviewees' perception of the role of the hospital in the 
community, and about responses to past threats to the hospital. As some 
participants had also been present under the Canterbury Area Health 
Board, they were asked how\they felt the hospital's position had altered 
with the health reforms. 
Group C: Community Members 
Interviews with the community members can be divided into two broad 
categories: those with individuals who were members of the Sub 
Committee of the Selwyn-Waimakariri District Health Group, and 
those with individuals who were not members, but had an interest in the 
hospita1.25 In this group, one had a formal role, being President of the 
<Friends of the Darfield Hospital,' while the other had no formal 
affiliation to the hospital or health organisations, but was identified as 
being interested in the hospital and health issues in the district. Not all 
25The Sub Committee of the Selwyn Waimakariri District Health Group was a sub-committee of the 
Southern Regional Health Authority's consultation committee. It was established by the Darfield 
community to provide a means where the community, the SRHA and Canterbury Health could meet to 
discuss the issues concerning Darfield Hospital. 
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members of the sub-committee were interviewed, as constraints on time 
made this impossible. Rather, the chairperson was selected, and three 
others were chosen on the basis of their involvement with other groups 
such as the SRHA's consultation committee, and the Malvern Health 
and Community Welfare Trust. 26 From the Darfield community, the 
President of the Friends of the Hospital was chosen as she had an 
intimate knowledge of the role of the hospital in the community, and 
one additional community member was chosen, again on the 
recommendations of others. 
All interviews with community members from Ellesmere, Darfield and 
Waikari were conducted in the participant's private home, except two 
which were held at the participant's place of work. On the whole, the 
interviews were conducted in a relaxed manner, and this was often aided 
by the sharing of a cup of teGror lunch. On some of these occasions, other 
relatives of the participants would also be able to offer additional 
comments on the hospital or on the perceptions and composition of the 
commumty. As with the medical staff, the interviews were organised 
around discovering the reasons·.for the community's support of the 
hospital, what past threats to the hospital had occurred and how they had 
been resisted, the effect on the community of the rural downturn, and 
the suitability of a community trust. With the members of the sub-
committee, questions were also asked concerning the formation of the 
commIttee, and the consultation process that occurred with the SRHA 
and Canterbury Health. Two community members were also members 
of the SRHA's consultation committee, and they were asked for their 
perceptions of the consultation process. 
26This is a community trust that was established by the local community to operate the district nursing 
and home aid services in the Malvern area when the services were no longer going to be run by the local 
general practitioners. 
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Group D: Former Canterbury Area Health Board (CAHB) Staff 
The fourth group of people interviewed consisted of previous employees 
of the Canterbury Area Health Board, all of whom had some experience 
of the issues surrounding rural hospitals. Of this group, two were chosen 
because they occupied key positions of the AHB and were the local 
elected representatives from their communities. Their importance to 
the rural hospitals was also reinforced by the community members and 
hospital staff who were interviewed. Another participant was chosen 
because she was the former assistant-medical-superintendent-in-chief, 
country hospitals, and had been closely involved with the Board's review 
of rural hospitals in 1991. Two staff were chosen because they had 
written reports on the rural1l:ospitals in Canterbury, including the 1991 
review; one was selected because of her involvement with the CAHB's 
consultation groups; while the final staff member had been involved 
with developing the CHE structure and placing the rural hospitals 
within that structure. 
All but two of these interviews were conducted at the participant's place 
of work. The interviews were organised around the participants" 
individual areas of expertise. In general, they involved gaining a mix of 
data on the issues presented by rural hospitals to the CAHB, as well as 
the participant's perceptions of the processes by which those issues were 
addressed. 
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Group E: Additional Key Informants 
The final group of people interviewed consists of those individuals who 
did not fit into any of the aforementioned categories. Hence, this group 
involved people who either played a specific role in the case of Darfield, 
or who had a specialist knowledge of rural health or the health reforms. 
This group consisted of an interview with the Hon Jenny Shipley, who 
was the Minister of Health during the period of this case study, as well as 
the local Member of ,Parliament for the Selwyn, then Rakaia electorate. 
It also included David Tranter, who has travelled New Zealand 
specifically looking at rural communities, and the issues concerning their 
schools and hospitals. Professor Laurence Malcolm was also interviewed 
on the health reforms, and the latest round of restructuring. 
One key issue that was p,revalent during some interviews was the 
sensitivity of information. Particularly with the SRHA and eHE staff 
and some community members, concern was expressed about who else 
would have access to the information they were imparting. This was 
overcome by reassuring the participants that their names would not be 
attributed to any of their comments "if they so wished. All the interviews 
were taped, and were transcribed after the interview However, during 
some interviews, the participants would ask for the dictaphone to be 
turned off, when they wanted to talk about sensitive issues. This request 
was always honoured, as the research was occurring in an situation that 
was ongoing, and where the participants had to continue working with 
one another. Information that was given during these times was only 
used in the most general of terms, or was not used at all, out of respect to 
the wishes of the participants. 
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Altogether, approximately 45 formal interviews were conducted. In 
addition, these formal interviews were also supplemented by further 
informal discussions. These included follow-up telephone conversations 
when additional information was required, and meetings with people at 
conferences and other events. During the course of this research, a 
number of events took place which allowed this researcher to meet 
people involved with the issues of rural health both at the national and 
local level. These included the Symposium on the Delivery of Health 
Services to Smaller Communities organised by the National Advisory 
Committee on Core Health and Disability Support Services in May 
1995, and the SRHA's release of its locality profiles in June 1996. At 
both of these functions, a variety of people were present who were all 
associated with rural health and rural hospitals, and this allowed for 
additional insights and data to be gained from different areas of the 
country. , ' \ 
The second major research strategy utilised by this thesis was the analysis 
of documents produced by central government, the SRHA, Canterbury 
Health, and the local community., These included a range of materials, 
including media releases, Ministerial speeches, published reports by the 
Ministry of Health and the SRHA, internal reports from Canterbury 
Health, minutes of the meetings from the sub-committee and the public 
meeting organised by the community, and a submission made to 
Canterbury Health by the Darfield communi,ty on the hospital. This 
contemporary material was supplemented by reports from the 
Canterbury Area Health Board, and archival material from the private 
collection of two former Board members. Notable amongst this material 
was the Canterbury Area Health Board's review of six of its rural 
hospitals in 1991. This review had extensively profiled these hospitals, 
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and was the starting point for understanding the issues raised by rural 
hospitals in a New Zealand context. This material was used to augment, 
support and cross check the data gained from the interviews. These 
documents were also supplemented by international publications on 
rural hospitals and rural hospital closure, showing that the issues in New 
Zealand are endemic to health systems elsewhere.27 
Data Analysis 
Analysis of the data from the interviews and relevant documents was 
performed according to the method outlined in Neuman's work on 
analysis of qualitative data. 28 The data was firstly organised into 
chronological order, and a sequence of key events was established. 
During the first open phase of coding, critical terms and themes were 
identified from the specific ,needs and priorities as expressed by each of 
" . 
the different actors. Once these general themes were identified, the 
second stage of axial coding involved reviewing these themes to identify 
the underlying causes and explanations for the behaviour of each of the 
27For examples of international literature on the ciosure of rural hospitals, see Simonetti Samuels, James 
Cunningham and Christina Choi, "The Impact of Hospital Closures on Travel Time to Hospitals", 
Inquiry, vol. 28,1991, pp. 194-199; Marsha Lillie-Blanton, Suzanne Felt, Patrick Redmon, Steven Renn, 
Steve Machlin and Elizabeth Wennar, "Rural and Urban Hospital Closures, 1985-1988: Operating and 
Environmental Characteristics that Affect Risk", Inquiry, vol. 29, 1992, pp. 332-344; Jonathon Mayer, 
Elizabeth Kohlenberg, G. Sieferman and Roger Rosenblatt, "Patterns of Rural Hospital Closure in the 
United States", Social Science and Medicine, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 327-334, 1987; Sara Mclafferty, "The 
Geographical Restructuring of Urban Hospitals: Spatial Dimensions of Corporate Strategy", Social 
Science and Medicine, vol. 23, no. 10, 1986, pp. 1079-1086; R. M. Mullner, "Rural Hospital Survival: An 
Analysis of Facilities and Services Correlated With Risk of Closure", Hospital and Health Services 
Administration, vol. 35, no. 1, 1990, pp. 121-137; Andrew Bindman, Dennis Keane and Nicole Lurie, "A 
Public Hospital Closes", Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 264, no. 22, 1990, pp. 2899-
2904; Thomas Chapman, "Hospital Viab ility and Closures" ,Journal of Health Care for the Poor and 
Underserved, vol. 1, no. 1, 1990, pp. 96-102; Niccie McKay and John Coventry, "Access Implications of 
Rural Hospital Closures and Conversions", Hospital and Health Services Administration, vol. 40, no. 2, 
1995, pp. 227-246; David Berry and John Seavey, "Assuring Access to Rural Health Services: The Case for 
Revitalising Small Rural Hospitals", Health Care Management Review, vol. 19, no. 2, 1994, pp. 32-42; 
Kyle Muss, Richard Ludtke and Brad Gibbens, "Community Perceptions of Rural Hospital Closure", 
Journal of Community Health, vol. 20, no. 1, 1995, pp. 65-73; Steven Fleming, Harold Williamson, and 
Lanis Hicks, "Rural Hospital Closures and Access to Services", Hospital and Health Services 
Administration, vol. 40, no. 2, 1995, pp. 247-262. . 
28W. Lawrence Neuman, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Qualitative Approaches, 2nd ed., 
Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1994. 
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actors. This review also sought to examine the interactions of the actors, 
the different strategies they employed, and where the key areas of 
divergence between the needs of each of the actors occurred. The final 
stage of selective coding comprised compiling evidence for the patterns 
and explanations that had been identified, and analysing in depth the 
different relationships between each of the actors. 
Outline 
The central aims of this study are twofold. First, it seeks to investigate 
why controversies over rural hospitals are so rancorous, arguing that at 
the heart of the debate is a deep conflict between the needs and 
perceptions of the central actors. Second, this study explores the 
implications of the institutional changes made by the health reforms for 
the course of these debates" .explaining how the power of actors in the 
'. . 
health system is affected by the intertwining of formal institutional 
position, informal relationships and political pressures. 
Chapter Two explores the attachment of rural communities to their 
local hospitals in more depth, and shows how the institutional structure 
of the Area Health Board system allowed rural communities to resist 
attempts at closure of their hospitals. Chapter Three then outlines the 
new institutionalist literature and places the origins of the health 
reforms, and their aims in the context of Alford's theory on power 
relations between the different interests produced by modern health 
systems. Chapter Four then examines the implementation of the 
reforms, and how their ideological basis was sacrificed to the needs of 
political expediency. It shows how rural hospitals were placed into the 
new RHA and CHE structure, and how it was hoped that this new 
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institutional setting would allow the RHAs and CHEs to redistribute 
resources away from smaller hospitals. Finally, Chapter Five explores 
how the reformed health system altered the power relationships between 
RHAs, CHEs, central government and local communities. It focuses on 
accounting for why the outcomes were not as the reformers had 
anticipated or desired. Chapter Six concludes with a discussion on the 
latest restructuring, and what lessons policy makers can learn from these 
latest rounds of conflicts over rural hospitals. 
Chapter Two: Rural Hospitals in Canterbury 
Introduction 
From the early twentieth century, rural communities 1ll Canterbury 
have, viewed their local hospitals as a critical element in the network of 
\ 
health services available in their localities. Since the hospitals' origins, 
however, this view has rarely been shared by urban health planners in the 
cities. As the utilisation of the hospitals has fluctuated, these planners 
have seen rural hospitals as inefficient and uneconomic. As a result, the 
history of rural hospitals in Canterbury is punctuated by repeated 
struggles between city administrators wishing to close them, and local 
communities not wanting to lose a valued community asset.' In general, 
these struggles have been won by rural communities working 1ll 
conjunction with small coalitions of Board members. The success of 
these groups, however, only contributed to the perception of the new 
National government in 1991 that the institutional stru.cture of the 
health system was flawed. Area Health Boards clearly found it very 
difficult to make unpopular rationing decisions such as the shifting of 
resources away from rural hospitals, and ultimately this led to the Boards' 
demise in the redesign of the health system. This chapter analyses the 
reasons behind rural communities' attachment to their hospitals, and 
argues that their devotion is not just emotional or parochial, but rather 
is support given to an institution that has from its inception been an 
important symbol for the community. The ways in which the 
institutional structure of the Hospital and Area Health Boards allowed 
the communities' effective defence of the hospitals is also examined. 
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Rural Hospitals in CanterbUlJ 25) 
Establishment in the Community: 1915-1960 
The origins of the rural hospitals in Canterbury can be traced back to the 
early 1920s. At that time, there was a national campaign to reduce New 
Zealand's high rate of maternal mortality and improve the standard of 
obstetric care. 1 These efforts at reform embraced a number of measures 
including the provision of ante-natal care and the introduction of aseptic 
procedures in hospitals, but crucially, they encouraged the building of 
small, public maternity hospitals. In Canterbury, this saw hospitals 
opened in Oxford, Waikari, Amuri, Cheviot, Ellesmere, Rangiora, 
Lincoln and Darfield by 1927. Although these hospitals were primarily 
intended to be maternity homes, many were also designed to 
accommodate some general patients, and were built with small operating 
theatres to perform minor s,lugery.2 
, 
In many cases, the hospitals were established largely as a result of the 
efforts of the local county councils. In general, when a council desired a 
hospital, it would send a deputation to wait on the Hospital Board. This 
deputation would argue the community's case and would frequently 
bolster its application by offering to subsidise the construction costs 
through money or donations of land.3 Hospital Board approval for 
new hospitals was virtually assured, because half of the Board's members 
came from rural areas.4 Moreover, once the Hospital Board had granted 
1 New Zealand's maternal mortality rate had been steadily rising from a low point 00.58 per 1,000 live 
births to 6.48 in 1920, and was considered to be arriong the worst in the world. The motivation to address 
the problem, however, did not come until a few years later when the deaths of five women at the Kelvin 
Hospital prompted the government to support the Health Department's efforts at reform. For more 
detail on this, and on the cultural, racial and political factors underlying the government's efforts to 
improve the maternal mortality rate, see Philippa Lyn Mein Smith, The State and Maternity Care in 
New Zealand 15)20-15)35, Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Canterbury, 1982. 
2Norris, Historical Notes, op. cit. 
3p 0 Bennett, Hospitals On The Plaim, op. cit., p. 75. 
4Ibid, pp. 75-76. 
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one district's application for a hospital, it was extremely difficult to 
refuse new applications. 5 
Although individual counties could argue a need for a maternity 
hospital, their desire for a hospital was also fuelled by the consideration 
that other districts were also getting maternity hospitals.6 For small, 
isolated communities in a relatively young country, having a local 
hospital was a status symbol, an important sign of civilisation which 
showed that the community was established and thriving. The prestige 
associated with having a hospital led to their proliferation, as they 
became increasingly desirable to other districts in the area. The result 
was that too many hospitals were built for the needs of the region, and 
this over-supply has contributed to the consistent problems of utilisation 
and funding experienced by the hospitals.? 
Even when the hospitals were opened, they were used far less than 
anticipated. Bennett argues that this was because "as soon as the hospital 
was erected to fulfil a public need, the need ceased to exist."8 For some 
patients, this was due to an individual preference to remain at home or 
to travel to Christchurch rather than use the local hospital. In other 
instances it was because people had little confidence in either the doctor 
or the nursing staff. In other cases, "it was a mistrust of something new 
5Ibid. 
6Ibid, p.99. 
7 Once the hospital was built, the Hospital Board appointed the local doctor to control the hospital, while 
nursing and domestic staff were supplied from Christchurch Hospital. In reality, the Hospital Board had 
little choice in appointing the doctor to control the hospital. This was because even if the Board did not 
approve of the doctor, it was unable to take any action because the doctor was in the district by right of 
having purchased a private practice. Although the hospitals were funded through a mixture of Hospital 
Board subsidies and local rates, historical records differ on whether the doctor was able to charge patients. 
Bennet claims the doctor was not allowed to charge fees to hospital patients, but was paid a small salary 
from the Hospital Board as compensation. Norris, however, states the doctor was permitted to mal<e his 
own arrangements with the patients who could afford to pay his charges, and was paid a salary from the 
Hospital Board to treat those patients unable to pay, see Bennett, Hospitals On The Plains, op. cit., and 
Norris, Historical Notes, op. cit. 
8Bennett) Hospitals On The Plains p.76. 
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or an obstinate preference for something 01d."9 The consequence of this 
"was that the big white building was, in the beginning, something like a 
big white elephant."l0 As time passed, however, the local prejudice faded 
and the hospitals became central to the community. 
Despite this initial low utilisation, the hospitals did provide a valuable 
and essential service to their communities, and as such, became powerful 
symbols of health. The hospitals were all built at a time when medicine 
was less sophisticated, the modern drugs of today did not exist, and 
ambulance services were limited. Transport, roading and 
communication presented much greater barriers to receiving health 
care, especially in times of emergency. Patient survival, particularly after 
childbirth, was also much more uncertain. So when a doctor could be 
many hours away, the hospitals were seen as providing locally accessible 
medical attention, offering 'security and reassurance to local people in 
times of need. Some hospitals also performed minor surgery and 
provided beds for patients to convalesce after illness or accidents, and 
were valued because they allowed patients to remain in the community, 
where they could be near to familY,and friends. 
These origins of the hospitals are significant because they shed light on 
why rural communities feel such a strong attachment to them. From 
the beginning, the hospitals were an important source of security, pride 
and community identity, which helped to fulfil the needs of the people 
living and working in those small and isolated communities. The 
community initiative which resulted in the hospitals being built also 
meant that from the beginning, the community was entwined with the 
9Ibid, p. 76. 
lOIbid. 
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establishment and maintenance of the hospitals. This forged a very 
strong sense among rural communities that the hospital was 'theirs', and 
this feeling still exists today. 
The first significant threat to all the country hospitals came with the 
onset of the Depression. At that time, all the country hospitals were in 
danger of being seen as luxuries, and the government strongly endorsed 
their closure. ll For rural communities, the possibility of losing their 
local hospital initiated a vigorous defence of them. In Waikari, for 
example, the Department of Health issued a report that recommended 
either Waikari or Amuri Hospital be closed, as they provided similar 
services, and were located within thirty minutes of each other, with a 
good road connecting them. However, this suggestion was vigorously 
opposed by the Waipara County Council, the general practitioner and 
the local Plunket Society who all strongly protested to the Hospital 
Board against any attempt by the Department to close either hospital. 12 
These efforts were successful, and neither hospital closed. 
The hospitals were again threatened at the outbreak of World War II, as 
the Department of Health saw their closure as a means of economising 
on nurses, but community efforts prevented any closures from 
occurring. 13 These early threats and the successful community responses 
to them are very significant because they formed an important precedent 
within rural communities. Through organising a co-ordinated and vocal 
response to proposals to close their hospitals, rural communities learnt 
they could generate political pressure which would stave off these 
proposals. These defences also formed a proud tradition which became 
11 Ibid, p. 77. 
12Norris, Historical Notes, op. cit. 
13Bennett, Hospitals On The Plains op cit, p. 77. 
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part of the hospital and the community's history. In turn, this pride has 
been passed on to future generations and continues to shape the way that 
these communities respond when their hospitals are threatened. 
During the 1950s, the rural hospitals in Canterbury were at their 
highest levels of utilisation, and they also returned to being. solely 
maternity hospitals. Helped by the post World War II baby boom, the 
.. hospitals were nearly always full, but several outbreaks of the H-Bug 
(staphylococcus aureus) resulted in the implementation of Obstetric 
Regulations that forbade the hospitals from caring for both maternity 
and general patients. 14 Although this was not immediately significant, 
later decreases in. the birth rate meant that these Regulations would 
severely undermine the existence of the hospitals. 
In essence, this early period represented the heyday of the hospitals. They 
were well utilised, and there was very little argument that they were 
providing an essential service. They enjoyed a reasonably secure position, 
and community efforts were easily able to oppose the few threats that 
they did experience. In a time of greater financial prosperity, they were 
allowed to be symbols of pride, and communities were able to exercise a 
far greater influence over them. Hence, the period to 1960 offered 
years of relative stability in contrast to the turbulence the next three 
decades would bring. 
14It;terview, former Canterbury Area Health Board staff member, 9 July 1996. 
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Hospital Utilisation and the Rural Downturn: 1960-1988 
Over the next thirty years, the rural hospitals experienced a series of 
increasingly stronger threats which developed as a result of wider changes 
within society, and more specifically within the practice of. obstetrics. In 
the early part of this period, as the prosperity of the early 1960s 
declined, the hospitals remained reasonably secure. In part, this was aided 
by the strength of the farming sector which gave rural areas considerable 
political power. Rural members on the Hospital Board were able to 
argue that rural hospital services should be retained because rural areas 
made such a strong contribution to. the national economy, and therefore, 
were equally entitled to services as the urban centres. However, with the 
onset of the 1980s, and a further decline in the usage of the hospitals, 
the ever burgeoning financial pressure on health spending meant that 
this previous security began to diminish rapidly. Communities were 
able to overcome successive crises by lobbying Hospital Board members, 
and through the actions of key rural members of the Hospital Board. 
From these repeated threats, rural communities developed a pattern of 
actions and responses that was generally effective until the health 
reforms of 1991. 
From 1960, rural hospitals began to be surrounded by an increasing 
climate of uncertainty. In that year, the North Canterbury Hospital 
Board considered recommendations by its Institutions Committee to 
close country hospitals for financial reasons. It was proposed to shut 
Amuri Hospi tal temporarily and retain Waikari, and a year later this 
went ahead. In spite of strong community opposition to the closure, the 
Amuri hospital did not re-open, and was permanently closed in 1967.15 
15InteIYiew, former Canterbury Area Health Board member, 16 February 1996. 
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Three other hospitals, Lyttelton, Cheviot and Kaiapoi, were also closed 
during this time. 16 Significant improvements in communication, 
roading, and transportation had reduced the traditional isolation of 
many rural people, but nonetheless, these closures fostered an 
atmosphere of uncertainty and apprehension about the remaining 
hospitals. This sense of anxiety has lingered in rural communities, and 
has contributed to the feelings of beleaguerment, and the sense that 
"we've been through this all before" that exists in rural communities 
today. 
From the late 1960s, the number of deliveries performed at the country 
hospitals began to decline significantly. This impacted on the hospitals 
severely, because it dramatically reduced their utilisation, and hence 
struck at the core of their business. Initially, it was the introduction and 
widespread use of the female.,'contraceptive pill that accounted for a large 
drop in the birth rate. This fall was embedded in changing social patterns 
which resulted in women having fewer children and delaying their 
childbearing until later in life. Although these factors also resulted in a 
national decline in the birth rate,·.it was particularly hard for the rural 
hospitals as they were solely maternity facilities, and did not have a range 
of services to supplement their utilisation. 
By the mid 1970s, the hospitals were starting to be harmed by changes in 
the discipline of obstetrics which began to favour the use of base hospitals 
over smaller, rural facilities. At this time, trends in obstetrics began to 
encourage greater medical intervention in pregnancy and childbirth. 
Hence women were encouraged to have their pregnancies regularly 
16John Holmes, A Report on the Use of Hospital Services by the Rural Population of Canterbury, 
Community Health Care North Canterbuty Hospital Board, May 1986. 
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monitored, and to deliver in major centres with the advanced facilities 
of a city hospital. This manifested itself most notably with first births, as 
these have the greatest potential for unforeseen complications, and 
heavy emphasis was placed on all first deliveries being conducted at a base 
hospital. At the same time Canterbury had more doctors who had 
trained since the early 1970s, and expected that women would birth in 
the larger centres. I ? The result was that rural hospitals lost a lot of 
business. As one rural GP commented: 
All of a sudden instead of obstetrics being something that GPs did . .. we were 
being trained to reftr more, and get more care when things started going 
wrong. . . . When 1 came out here, 1 made a decision 1 wasn't going to deliver 
first babies . .. but that was indicative of the sort of attitudes that were starting 
to come into obstetric practice at that time, which meant not as many deliveries 
would be done in these sort of places. 18 
Not only did this change difuinish the utilisation of the hospital, it also 
seriously damaged the attitudes that both the local general practitioners 
and the women of the community held towards the hospital. Many 
clinicians now considered it to' be potentially dangerous to birth in a 
smaller centre, and gradually these' perceptions were also adopted by the 
women themselves. As one former staff member recalled: 
Up until the late seventies, everyone was born at Darfield if the mother chose .. 
. .In the late seventies and early eighties . .. there was a huge push towards 
state hospitals for birthing . . . [and} 1 perceived women were being shoved 
towards the city for childbirth because it was saftr. And therefore all of the 
community or country hospitals were losing business because it was very 
unfashionable and very unsaft to birth in a community hospital. So this 
thriving little hospital of the fifties) where twins were born and all sorts of 
17Ibid., p.G. 
18Interview, rural General Practitioner, 3 December 1995. 
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things happened, slowly and surely it was run down to the point where there 
was very low occupancy.19 
Clinical safety has always been a major issue for rural hospitals)20 and 
these concerns over the isolation of the hospitals meant that policies were 
developed which indicated that hospitals should not deliver first babies, 
but should instead deliver only those women who had previously had 
normal deliveries. Again, this severely reduced the potential market of 
the hospitals. As a former Canterbury Area Health Board member 
commented: 
... especially for the first baby when they don't really know what's going to 
happen . .. if things start to go wrong, to get them into an ambulance and take 
. them to Christchurch, that's when you can get a damaged child, and the 
average family size is two children, and you want two healthy children, you 
don't want handicapped children, and that was the argument really, to say 
no first babies and then only ''Ones that had had no problems with their first 
ones. But that's cutting out a big percentage of your births in your area. 21 
The position of the hospitals was also affected in the 1970s by the rural 
doctor crisis.22 At this time there, was a severe shortage of doctors, and 
this was particularly acute in rural areas, chiefly because of the high 
demands placed on doctors by a solo rural practice.23 The implications of 
19Interview, former Darfield Hospital staff member, 26 April 1996. 
20See, for example, Roger Rosenblatt, Judith Reinken and Phil Shoemack, "Is Obstetrics Safe in Small 
Hospitals?", The Lancet, vol. 2,1985, pp. 429-431. 
21 Interview, former Canterbury Area Health Board member, 2 May 1996. 
22For more detail, see the Medical Association of New Zealand, Central General Practitioners 
Committee Final Report on Rural Practice, Wellington, February 1969, and "Rural Doctor Crisis: A 
Matter of Life and Death", Straight Furrow, 20 October 1971, pp. 4-5. Por fUrther information on the 
distribution of doctors in New Zealand since the early 1970s, see J R Barnett, "Where Have All the 
Doctors Gone? Changes in the Geographic Distribution of General Practitioners in New Zealand Since 
1975.1: Regional and Urban-Rural Differences", New ZealandMedicaljournal, vol. 104, pp. 314-316. 
23Por more detail on this, see among others, J. Fountain, "The Needs of the Rural Doctor", Paper 
presented at the Twenty Eighth Lincoln College Farmer's Conference, Lincoln College, 8-10 May 1978; 
Martin London, "Rural General Practice in New Zealand: Pernicious Goal or Prestigious Goal?", The 
New Zealand Family Physician, Summer 1991, pp. 19-21; Sanya Baker, "Patients Not Safe When Rural 
GPs Are Isolated", New Zealand Doctor, 15 September 1994, p. 27. 
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this for rural hospitals were twofold. First, it meant that doctors saw 
rural hospitals as an incentive to live and work in a rural area. As a 
former Canterbury Area Health Board staff member pointed out: 
... in the 1970s and early 80s, when getting doctors for rural communities 
was dreadfolly difficult. . . hospitals were seen as a carrot. If you could say 
there was a hospital there, they could feel much more supported, and its much 
more interesting to have a hospital to admit your own patients to.24 
However, the second implication of this attitude was to create a very 
strong belief in rural communities that a local hospital was important in 
order to retain a general practitioner. Rural general practitioners and 
rural hospitals have a very interdependent relationship, where the 
hospital acts as a source of professional support to the general 
practitioner, and can ameliorate some of the hardships of solo. rural 
practice. During the time of the rural doctor crisis, especially in North 
Canterbury, many of the practices remained vacant for quite some time, 
or else general practitioners who did come stayed only briefly. Hence this 
has created a fear amongst many rural communities that if the hospital 
is closed, then there is a strong pos,sibility the local doctor will no longer 
wish to stay in the district, as one community member commented: 
... my [ather was Chairman of a county, and during his time as Chairman, 
their hospital was closed. And the trouble that they then had to get a GP into 
the area because it was a slightly isolated area, and there weren't any GPs 
who wanted to go 'and work up there. And the thought to me of closing the 
hospital would bring back the same scenario that if we lost our hospital we 
would lose the incentive for GPs to be in the district. It was really quite 
concerning.2S 
24Interview, former Canterbury Area Health Board staff member, 9 July 1996. 
25Interview, Darfield community member, 31 January 1996. 
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This fear is still very prevalent today, with many community members 
mentioning it in my interviews with them. 
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Hospital Board was once more 
under pressure to justify the existence of rural hospitals, given their low 
utilisation. As had happened in the past, the possibility of closure was 
raised, again because rural hospitals were not seen as being cost effective 
for the services they provided: 
. .. they weren't being used enough as maternity to justify spending that sort 
of money on them. 26 
To address this issue, the Hospital Board sought to reintroduce general 
patients back into the hospitals. This became known as the policy of 
greater utilisation, and was explicitly targeted at expanding the role of 
the rural hospitals. As a former member of the Hospital Board 
explained: 
... if you had a hospital there, which was quite costly to run, using a lot of 
staff resources. . . it was uneconomic to attempt to run it unless you got the 
greatest utilisation you could. Its no good having it half empty all the time. 27 
However, for general patients to be once again present in rural hospitals, 
the Obstetric Regulations that existed had to be changed, as these 
prevented general patients and maternity patients from being cared for 
in the same facility unless there was a complete separation of the two. 
Sources vary on the exact details of the process by which this problem was 
overcome, but the predominant account states that the then Medical 
Superintendent-in-Chief wrote to the Department of Health seeking a 
261nterview, Former Canterbury Area Health Board member, 2 May 1996. 
27]nterview, Former Canterbury Area Health Board member, 16 February 1996. 
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specific departure from the Obstetric Regulations for the rural hospitals. 
Although a variety of reasons was given for this request, the central 
reason was the poor cost-effectiveness of the rural hospitals because of 
their low occupancy rates. To aid in its request, the North Canterbury 
Hospital Board invited the Deputy Director-General and the Assistant 
Director, Hospitals Division, from the Health Department to visit 
selected rural hospitals in July 1980.28 
After this visit, correspondence from the time appears to indicate that 
the Department was w1lling to sanction general patients being admitted 
into some of the hospitals, although official approval was never granted. 
As a local general practitioner commented: 
.. . after [the visit}} although the regulations weren}t changed, we started using 
it for general patients. Which strictly speaking we weren)t supposed to) 
although it was sort of indicat~d a blind eye would be turned if we kept the 
general patients at one end and the obstetric patients at the other.29 
Although the Hospital Board tried repeatedly for official approval, the 
Department would not push for a change in the legislation, as it was not 
willing to accept responsibility for the actions of the Hospital Board.3D 
However, the implementation of this policy by the Board is very 
significant because if it had not been for the presence of key individuals 
on the Board who were able to initiate and support this policy, then it is 
possible that a different outcome would have occurred. Yet these 
individuals were able to be as effective as they were only because of the 
institutional structure within which they operated. Essentially, because 
28Interview, former Canterbury Area Health Board staff member, 9 July 1996. 
29Interview, rural General Practitioner, 3 December 1995. 
30 Interview, former Canterbury Area Health Board staff member, 9 July 1996. 
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the Hospital Board was constituted wholly of popularly elected members, 
this closely linked them with the people they represented, and it meant 
the Board members were predisposed to making decisions that were 
consistent with community demands. In the case of the rural hospitals 
in Canterbury, and particularly for Darfield and Waikari, they were 
represented by Tom Grigg, who was the Chairman of the Board, and by 
Mrs June Gardiner, wh<? would later become the Deputy Chairman. 
Both of these individuals were extremely committed to the hospitals 
in their areas, occupied powerful positions within the Board hierarchy, 
and were generally recognised as being highly politically skilled. So 
despite being outnumbered on the Board, these members could marshal 
arguments for why the hospitals should be retained, and could then 
successfully lobby the other Board members. Their arguments would 
often focus on the need for the services the hospitals were providing, the 
good they were doing in their communities, and the extra cost that 
would be involved to provide the services in an alternative way if the 
hospitals were to shut. Hence, as Tom Grigg stated: 
... between Mrs Gardiner and myself, we convinced the other Board members 
and the administration that there really wasn't a case. 31 
The presence of key individuals on the Board who were able to defend 
the hospitals successfully had a powerful impact on the expectations of 
communities concerning the role of health administrators. The 
existence of a popularly elected Board meant communities had a very 
visible representative to whom they could express their opinions and 
needs, and because the Board consisted of elected members, it was seen to 
31 Interview, Former Canterbury Area Health Board member, Tom Grigg, 2 May 1996. 
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be very accountable to the community. As a former Canterbury Area 
Health Board member commented: 
.. . it was the elected Boards who were speaking for their communities, and 
justifjingfor their communities that won the day.32 
With the presence of powerfully positioned rural members on the Board, 
community lobbying was very successful in resisting moves by the Board 
to reduce the services or close rural hospitals. This meant that 
communities had quite a strong sense of controL 
When the rural hospitals in Canterbury began to care for both 
maternity and general patients in the early 1980s, it improved their 
utilisation, but the effectiveness of the policy was weakened by the 
development of specialist services in the major hospitals. As medical 
technology improved, this r~inforced the trend for people to be referred 
to specialists in the city, and away from being managed by their GP in 
the local hospitaL 
Not only did this change the r~le of the general practitioner to a 
referrer rather than a patient manager, it also created perceptions in 
rural people that the city hospital was best. As this was also a time when 
patients would often have lengthy stays in hospitals for relatively minor 
surgical procedures, rural people were encouraged to see their local 
facilities as being less important or necessary. These same perceptions 
were also adopted by the health professionals. Ultimately, this meant 
that the hospital increasingly began to be seen as a centre for post-natal 
and convalescent care rather than as a hospital able to meet all the 
32Interview, Former Canterbury Area Health Board member, 2 May 1996. 
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health needs of its patients. The local feeling for the hospital remained, 
but people perceived it as not being as necessary as it once was. As a 
former staff member of Darfield Hospital commented: 
you went off to see the specialist, and you had your operation, and you 
stayed in the big city hospital with all the mod cons until you had your sutures 
out, and then you went home, and . .. while the health dollar was uncapped, 
I believe a series of conceptions were taken on board by consumers, to the 
detriment of the little hospital, because people perceived that they didn't need 
it quite the same, and so it perhaps wasn't as utilised. 33 
In 1984, the election of the Labour government marked the beginning 
of a period of rapid and difficult change for rural New Zealand. Under 
the previous National and Labour governments, New Zealand had 
developed a highly protected economy which was uncompetitive by 
international standards. Upon entering office, the new government 
embarked on a program'''of radical reform designed to generate 
sustainable economic growth, and to reduce the level of state 
involvement in both the public sector and in local government. To 
achieve this, the government immediately removed the existing subsidies 
on fertilisers, and the supplementary minimum prices for stock that had 
previously protected the agricultural sector and given farmers good 
returns for their products despite low market prices. At the same time, 
farmers in Europe were being given generous subsidies as the 
international prices for agricultural goods fell. An increase in the New 
Zealand exchange rate and a dramatic rise in interest rates also 
exacerbated this situation.34 In Canterbury, these changes coincided 
33Interview, former Darfleld Hospital staff member, 26 Apri11996. 
34For more detail on this see, Ron Sandrey and Russell Reynolds (eds), Farming Without Subsidies: New 
Zealand's Recent Experience, Upper Hutt: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 1990, and Robert 
Bremer, "Federated Farmers and the State" in Brian Roper and Chris Rudd (eds), State and Economy in 
New Zealand, Auckland: Oxford Universiry Press, 1993, pp. 108-127. 
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with a severe drought, and increasing levels of debt as more and more 
farmers borrowed to survive. 
The social and economic costs of these events were devastating to rural 
communities. Many farmers went bankrupt, and lost not only their 
properties, but also their livelihoods. Marriages broke up, domestic 
violence became more prevalent, and suicide became an ever present 
threat. The stress on families was huge, and this was compounded by 
women needing to take on additional paid employment to support the 
family. As one community leader in Darfield described it: 
The carpet was pulled out very quickly. There was very little 
warning .... The stress took its toll. Marriages began to crack 
and farms began to sell .... Bankruptcy ceased to discriminate 
between good and bad farmers; in the end survival seemed a 
matter of luck. Rural New Zealand became a catastrophe. 
Established families whp had farmed the land for generations, 
and which were the foundation for the communities, were not 
spared. The human cost was enormous. We had 10 marriages 
break down in 2 months. The gun that I removed from one 
farmer lay under our bath for a week until I found a safer 
place,35 
As a result of these changes to the farming sector, and to wider 
restructuring that was occurring in the state sector, numerous services to 
rural areas were withdrawn, with the loss of many local post offices and 
banking services,' railway stations, public transport services, and many 
retail outlets that dosed because of reduced spending power within rural 
communities. In addition to this, many rural schools were also in danger 
of dosing as pupil numbers dedined.36 This loss of services has been 
35Louise Deans, Perspectives On Land. Unpublished monograph, 1990. 
36Por further information on the loss of services endured by rural communities, see, Penny O'Leary, 
"Social Influences on the Health of the Rural Population in New Zealand", Nursing Praxis in New 
Zealand, vol. 6, no. 1, 1990, pp. 15-21, and Canterbury Area Health Board, Secondary Care Division, 
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keenly felt in rural areas, with virtually all of the people interviewed 
commenting on how much the rural areas have lost in recent years: 
In the last ten years you have seen your local power board disappear, you 
have seen your Post Offices close down to the point where there is now no Post 
Office in Selwyn District. . . . Your banking with the Post office, vehicle 
registration, electoral office has gone. The councils have provided reduced 
levels of service at Darfield because of amalgamation. All these public service 
type activities which you were quite justified in thinking you paid your taxes 
for, have all disappeared on you. 37 
The legacy of these major changes to the rural communities has been to 
make the remaining services in the community even more highly 
valued, and to damage seriously the perceptions rural communities have 
about their own importance. In the aftermath of the rural downturn, 
rural communities have felt themselves to be undervalued, and to be 
victims of harsh government ideologies. Despite being major 
contributors to the national economy, they saw themselves as losing 
services which people in urban areas did not have to sacrifice, and this 
created feelings of anger and insecurity. Accordingly, when the 
transition to an Area Health Board'in 1988 saw yet another threat to the 
rural hospitals in Canterbury, this meant local communities would 
adopt an aggressive stance. As a community member declared: 
We will fight tooth and nail, - we will go through hell and high water to keep 
it . ... It's that thing of losing everythingfrom the country. 38 
Report o/the RU1'al Hospitals and Rural Health Needs Review (Akaroa, Darfield, Ellesmere, Lincoln, 
Rangiora, Waikari), Christchurch: Canterbury Area Health Board, 1991, For a discussion of the impact 
of the 'rural downturn' on rural families and the role of rural hospitals, see Heather McCrostie Little and 
Nick Taylor, Means o/Survival? A Study o/Off-Farm Employment, Christchurch: Taylor Baines 
Associates, 1995. 
37Interview, Ellesmere community member, 15 December 1995. 
38Interview, Darfield community member, 31 January 1996. 
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Impact of the Rural Downturn: The Increasing Importance of Rural 
Hospitals as Symbols' of Community Identity and Security 
Against this context of loss of rural serVIces, the attachment of rural 
communities to their remaining serVIces was heightened, and 
community perception of the hospitals as symbols of identity, security 
and health was intensified. The strongest manifestation of this 
symbolism can be seen in the sense of community ownership towards the 
hospital. Repeatedly in my interviews, community members would 
comment the hospital is "ours", and this would often be one of the first 
things that was mentioned: 
It's ours. It is the community's hospitaL39 
. . . we feel the hospital is ours. We support that hospital we'd do anything for 
it. 40 
This sense of ownership is fed directly from the communities' 
perceptions that it was local effort that saw the hospitals built, as one 
community member commented: . 
. . . it was built as the result of local people holding countless meetings 
getting their local authority on board. ... So) originally) the majority of these 
country hospitals in these small country towns were not provided by the 
hospital board they were provided by the locals) and were ceded to the 
hospital board . . largely as the result of local pressures. 41 
39rnterview, President Friends of the Darfield Hospital, 22 January 1996. 
40Interview, Darfield community member, 6 March 1996. 
41 Interview, Ellesmere community member, 29 November, 1995. 
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In the light of recent political events, this sense of ownership means that 
the hospital has assumed an enhanced role as a representation of the 
community's identity and history. As one local councillor commented: 
... the community paid money to put it there in the early [twentieth} century. 
. . People were rated to actually get the hospital originally. Some of those 
people have not forgotten that. So, yeah, it's part of the fomily silver you 
might say. Especially if you've paid for or contributed towards getting it up 
and running . .. . 50 that's still pretty fresh in one's memory.42 
In essence, the hospital is being seen as a community asset that represents 
the giving of past generations. Just as families seek to pass their assets 
and property on to their children, so too does the community seek to pass 
on its resources to the next generation. Hence, the hospital is seen as a 
communal inheritance, and as an extension of family inheritance. 
The sense of ownership is expressed through the community's extensive 
support for the hospitals. Each of the hospitals has a Friends of the 
Hospital organisation attached to it which raises money for equipment 
and patient comforts. The people involved in this organisation also 
maintain a visiting roster, take patients for outings in their cars, arrange 
flowers, donate goods, and do work at the hospital purely on a voluntary 
basis. The value of this work, and of the equipment donated, is many 
thousands of dollars, and from a small community, this represents a 
substantial contribution. As one member of the Friends of the Ellesmere 
Hospital commented: 
42Interview, Ellesmere community member, 23 January 1996. 
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... to date we've supplied forty or fifty thousand dollars' worth of equipment 
to the hospital at no charge on the Hospital at all. Just to make life less of a 
hassle. 43 
Yet communities make this commitment because they perceive the 
hospital as something owned by themselves, and as providing a valuable 
and essential service. As such, support for the hospital is widespread 
across the whole community, with many organisations and individuals 
regularly fundraising and making donations. As the president of the 
Darfield Friends of the Hospital commented: 
. . . organisations have been very good to us. . . and people are very very good 
with their donations . ... People will stop me in the street and say, "I haven 't 
given you anything for the hospitat' - and it will be five dollars. 44 
However, the hospitals are !lot only a critical part of the community's 
" . 
identity, they also represent a personal heritage for many individuals 
within that community. This sense of having being born at the hospital, 
or having family born there, was something that was frequently 
mentioned during the interviews, as one older farmer recalled: 
I was a struggling little fellow a long time ago, two of our children were born 
there, and my eldest daughter went there as well 45 
Especially in small rural communities which are parochial, family 
orientated, and dominated by families who have farmed in the area for 
several generations, many individuals perceive the hospital as being an 
intimate part of their lives. It is often the place where either they, or 
their parents and grandparents were born, and it gives them the option 
43Interview, Ellesmere community member, 23 January 1996. 
44Interview, President Friends of the Darfield Hospital, 22 January 1996. 
45Interview, Darfield community member, 10 May 1996. 
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of being able to die within the community. For rural people, the right 
to "die under [their] own sky" is highly valued, because dying within the 
community is more familiar, is more amenable to family and friends 
remaining near, and offers a quality of death that otherwise may not be 
obtained. 46 The hospital therefore has an intimate and tangible link 
with the community, and many people see the building and what it 
stands for as part of their birthright. As one interviewee commented in 
relation to Darfield Hospital: 
... [the} age group that we were socialising with took it as a given. It was 
always there, it always had been there, and it always would be. It was 
something that they'd grown up with. 47 
The sense of security provided by the hospital has also been intensified as 
a result of the loss of services brought about by the rural downturn. As 
two community members commented: 
The hospital reflects a sense of identity for the community, and especially for 
the elderly. There is an issue of flar there. When you get older, your friends 
start to die, ill health becomes more prominent. For older people, it represents 
their security blanket, and they are afraid of losing that. 48 
This village (Darfield) is composed of 65% elderly - retired people. Now that 
hospital is our security. . . . If I get sick I can go there. If I get sick the doctors 
will put me in the hospital I don't have to go to town . ... [which is} the high 
road to hell as far as we're concerned 49 
This latter comment also touches on the role of the hospital in allowing 
patients to remain in the community should they become unwell. 
Especially for rural elderly, the hospital means these patients can remain 
46Cited in Canterbury Area Health Board, Secondary Care Division, Report o/the Rural Hospitals and 
Rural Health Needs Review, p.57. 
47Interview, Former Darfield Hospital staff member, 26 April 1996. 
48Interview, Ellesmere community member, 15 December 1995. 
49Interview, President Friends of the Darfield Hospital, 22 January 1996. 
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close to familiar social and personal networks, and the benefit of this was 
expressed by one community member who commented: 
healing is about being in a comfortable place, and a beautiful place, close to 
ftiends and fomily, and knowing that there is that service there, is probably 
the greatest comfort of all. 50 
These sentiments were also expressed in a local newspaper editorial: 
Darfield Hospital is crucial to continuing local health-care. It 
provides back-up to the doctors. It provides a place of expert 
care, 24-hours a day, to those in medical need. The security 
which this gives to the local community cannot be given a 
monetary value. Money alone cannot buy the peace of mind. 
Local knowledge and the skies of home cannot be bought. The 
benefits of the established, tried and trusted health-care we 
now enjoy are not for sale. And they most certainly are not to 
be tal<.en from us merely because some ill informed bureaucrats 
would have it So.51 
Today, the legacy of these hospitals' origins is that they are still highly 
valued by their communities. They have a symbiotic relationship with 
the community, which is characterised by a process of mutual exchange 
and dependence, where the needs of each are supplied by the other. The 
hospitals give medical assistance ~nd employment to the community, 
and they also give a feeling of security, especially to the older residents, 
that remains tremendously important even today. As a result, local 
feeling for the hospital extends right across the community, and this is 
sustained by the constant contact the community has with the hospital, 
either through people having friends or relatives in the hospital, or 
through community efforts to fundraise for it.52 
member at Darfield Hospital pointed out: 
50Interview, Darfield community member, 17 May 1996. 
51 "Politicians Take Note" Malvern Record, Date Unknown. 
As a former staff 
52For a more general discussion of the role of rural hospitals, see Helen Tucker, The Role and Function 
o/Community Hospitals, Kings Fund Paper no. 70, London: Kings Fund, 1987. 
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... it wasn't the elderly folk feeling passionate, it was the whole community .. 
. because of the nature of the hospital services, it touched a whole range of 
people. 53 
Ultimately, this attachment to the hospital meant that when the next 
serious threat to the hospitals was initiated by the Area Health Board, 
the rural communities would resist the threat with all their strength. 
. . . there would have been opposition to hospital closure anyway, but the 
threat of hospital closure on top of all the other closures over which you had 
absolutely no ability to influence whatsoever> bang> everyone was in like 
Flynn. 54 
The Area Health Board Years 1988 - 1991: Renewed Threat and a Narrow 
Escape for Rural Hospitals 
In the late 1980s, the pace of economic change in New Zealand began to 
accelerate rapidly. Rural communities, battered by the events of the 
past few years, were struggling to cope with the feelings of betrayal and 
disillusionment created by the economic downturn. However, as the 
1980s drew to a close, the atmosphere of fiscal constraint that had been 
fostered by the policies of the Labour government was still very strong, 
and was particularly evident with spending on health. In 1988, the 
government moved to make Area Health Boards compulsory, and 
introduced measures to make these Boards more efficient. Area Health 
Boards were now significant because, for the first time, they represented a 
statutory organisation that was concerned with the total health of its 
population .. This philosophy was reflected in the objectives of the Area 
53Interview, Former Darfield Hospital staff member, 26 April 1996. 
54Interview, Ellesmere community member, 15 December 1995. 
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Health Boards which were defined under the Area Health Boards Act 
(1983) as being: 
a. to promote, protect and conserve the public health, and to 
provide health services. 
b. to provide for the effective coordination of the planning, 
provision, and evaluation of health services between the public, 
private and voluntary sectors. 
c. to establish and maintain an appropriate balance in the 
provision and use of resources for health protection, 
promotion, health education and treatment services. 
In 1989, the Canterbury Board initiated an Expenditure Reduction 
Taskforce, and one of the recommendations made by that Taskforce was 
the closure of six of the Board's nine country hospitals.55 At this time, all 
the Area Health Boards were coming under significant pressure to 
reduce their expenditure, \ind throughout the Area Health Board, 
servIces were being more closely evaluated to determine if they were 
giving true benefits in proportion to their costs. As a former Canterbury 
Area Health Board staff member commented: 
... the Area Health Board reforms had definitely begun to make people think 
much harder about things like financial accountability, and were services 
value for money. 56 
However, fuelled by the events of the mid 1980s, opposition to the 
suggested closures was intense, and submissions and public meetings held 
by the Board reflected the community's disapproval. In light of that 
opposition, the Board decided to delay any decisions on the future of 
55Canterbury Area Health Board, Secondary Care Division, Report o/the Rural Hospitals and Rural 
Health Needs Review, op. cit., pp. 19-20. 
56Interview, Former Canterbury Area Health Board staff member, 22 February 1996. 
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those hospitals until a review of their role and function could be carried 
out. So in late 1990 a review was initiated for Darfield, Ellesmere, 
Lincoln, Akaroa, Rangiora and Waikari Hospitals. 
To carry out the reVIew, the manager of the Secondary Care division 
convened a working party which commenced its operations in late 1990. 
In conducting the review, the working party engaged in a consultative 
process to gather information from a variety of sources. Notably, this 
included advertising the review in the media, holding informal meetings 
with the staff and medical superintendents of the rural hospitals, having 
public meetings in each of the areas which were also attended by the local 
Councils, and receiving written submissions from individuals and groups. 
Community response to the review was once again very vocal, and relied 
on traditional methods of lobbying. These included writing letters and 
submissions to the members"of the Board, high community turn out at 
public meetings, and publicising the case of the hospitals where possible,5? 
The review was extremely important for the rural hospitals because they 
were being strongly perceived as an, easy area in which to make reductions 
because of their high cost and low utilisation rates. As a former 
Canterbury Area Health Board staff member commented: 
1 think there probably was a sense they were proportionately consuming more 
resources than could be afforded in terms of all the other pressures on the 
Area Health Board budget at the time. 58 
With the much greater emphasis on financial accountability than had 
existed in the past, this latest episode represented the most serious threat 
57 Canterbury Area Health Board, Secondary Care Division, Report of the RUl'al Hospitals and RUl'al 
Health Needs Review, 
58Interview, Former Canterbury Area Health Board staff member, 18 May 1996. 
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rural hospitals had experienced to date. Throughout the history of the 
Hospital Board, there had been tensions between rural and urban 
members over the costs and benefits of rural hospitals, but these tensions 
. manifested themselves much more explicitly in this period, and the push 
by urban administrators to shut the hospitals was very strong. This view 
was expressed by a member of the review team: 
I suspect part of the· agenda was the question> unspoken> can we do without 
any of them? Can we close any of them? I don)t think that was ever said. . 
. but I had this fairly strong feling that this was an unspoken question in 
conducting the review in the first place.59 
However, it is also important to note that some hospitals were seen as 
being less justified than others, primarily because of their closeness to 
Christchurch. There was certainly a perception within the Area Health 
Board that people living in '~reas like Ellesmere, Rangiora and Darfield, 
could be sacrificed to provide services in other more isolated areas like 
Kaikoura, Waikari, and Akaroa, and as such areas. As a former 
Canterbury Area Health Board staff member pointed out: 
. . . one has to take a fairly hard line. . . . The wider good for people. . . of an 
Area Health Board [is} to be sure that the money is being spent in terms of best 
outcomes for the total population . .. . If you )re reasonably close to a big city 
with a full range of hospital related services like Darfield or Rangiora or 
Ellesmere which are inner ring hospitals) is that so much of a hardship to 
travel thirty or forty minutes . .. for those comprehensive services? 60 
The ongoing tension meant that long serving members from the rural 
areas developed good political skills which allowed them to use the 
59Interview, Former Canterbury Area Health Board staff member, 22 February 1996. 
60Intervlew, Former Canterbury Area Health Board staff member, 28 May 1996. 
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institutional structure to their advantage. This can be very clearly seen in 
the decision to conduct a review by Mrs Gardiner. She commented: 
. . . while many of the town members supported this idea of reducing the 
services in the country areas through country hospital closure, there were one 
or two who were sympathetic towards them, and politically it was easier to put 
things off . .. to say I suggest we have a review of the country hospitals in order 
to determine their viability, and their need . .. this was a ploy I used sometimes 
to prevent the immediate closure of those hospitals. 61 
Primarily, she was able to argue that it was the Area Health Board's 
responsibility to provide for the total health needs of its catchment 
population, and as such it needed to look at the hospitals in the context 
of total health services in rural areas. As a former Canterbury Area 
Health Board staff member recalled: 
The argument was very strong,\-.'that if you were having integrated services, you 
had to look at the whole lot. It was no good seeing the hospitals in isolation 
and saying that's it, without looking at what other services are going to take 
their place. 62 
However, it is important to recogmse that attempts to protect the 
hospitals went beyond one member acting in isolation: there was a 
concerted effort by the supporters of the rural hospitals. This inc:luded 
key people from the Board's administrative staff, and the communities 
themselves who were able to organise efficiently to resist the threat. As a 
former Canterbuty Area Health Board staff member pointed out: 
... the rural communities on the whole can work very coherently together. It 
doesn't take a great deal of effort to get a rural community to turn out a 
61 Interview, Former Canterbury Area Health Board Member, Mrs June Gardiner, 16 February 1996. 
62Interview, Canterbury Area Health Board scaff member, 9 July 1996. 
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meeting of several hundred vocal people, who know exactly what they want, 
and are not frightened to say so to anybody who comes from an urban area. 63 
It makes a very strong impact on urban administrators when rural 
communities turn out in large numbers to support their hospitals. This 
also represented a form of lobbying that was very effective for 
communities, primarily because it exploited the close links that the 
elected members of the Board felt they had with the people they 
represented. Repeatedly in interviews, community members would 
comment on how Board members and staff from the Area Health Board 
would be amazed at the depth of feeling that the communities had for 
their hospitals. Hence, with the support from within the Board by the 
rural members, communities were successful in opposing unpopular 
decisions like the closing of rural hospitals. As a former Canterbury Area 
Health Board member com.rpented: 
mostly the case was so obvious as to where the community stood that the 
bean counters had to step back as it were, and give in. 64 
Upon completion of the reVIew, a report was written, recommending 
that all the rural hospitals in the review be retained.65 This report was 
accompanied by a commentary from the manager of the Secondary Care 
division in which he outlined four options for the Board to consider. 
Included amongst these options was the closure of Ellesmere Hospital, 
and the maternity and general medical care beds at Darfleld and 
Ellesmere be changed to provide only day care.66 When both reports 
63Imerview, Former Canterbury Area Health Board staff member, 9 July 1996. 
64Interview, Former Canterbury Area Health Board member, 2 May 1996. 
65Canterbury Area Health Board, Secondary Care Division, Report of the Rural Hospitals and Rural 
Health Needs Relliew (Akaroa, Dmfield, Ellesmere, Lincoln, Rangiora, Waikari), Christchurch: 
Canterbury Area Health Board, May 1991. . 
66Winston McKean, Report of the Rural Hospitals and Rural Health Needs Review, Internal memo from 
the Manager, Secondary Care Division to the Canterbury Area Health Board, 21 June 1991. 
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were presented to the Board, it is widely acknowledged that it was June 
Gardiner who persuaded the Board to accept the report's 
recommendations that all the hospitals be retained. As her case was 
supported by figures that showed it would be more expensive to provide 
alternative services should the rural hospitals be closed, the 
recommendations were accepted for Akaroa, Lincoln, Waikari and 
Rangiora hospitals. 67 In the case of Darfield and Ellesmere hospitals, 
however, it was agreed to refer the issue of closure to the Community 
Mfairs and Public Relations Committee for further consideration. The 
timing of this meeting was also a critical factor in preventing the closure 
of the hospitals. This was because it was very soon after this that the 
health reforms were announced, the Area Health Boards were 
disestablished, and all major efforts to reorganise services were held in 
abeyance. 
Conclusions 
In 1991, the rural hospitals in Canterbury were extremely fortunate to 
escape closure. On this occasion, it was the political skills of the rural 
Board members, and the intense public opposition in rural areas to the 
possibility of closure that were sufficient to persuade the Board once 
again that the hospitals needed to remaIn open. Yet this outcome 
highlighted very clearly what the reformers saw as the structural 
weaknesses of the Area Health Board system that the reformers argued 
prevented the efficient operation of the health system. Skilful 
representatives could block what the reformers saw as measures to 
improve the efficient operation of the health system. Consequently, 
67 A financial analysis of the costs of providing alternative services to rural areas should the rural hospitals 
be dosed found significant increases for the Canterbury Area Health Board. See, Canterbury Area Health 
Board, Secondary Care Division, Report of the Rural Hospitals and Rural Health Needs Review, 0p. cit., 
Appendix 8, p. 1. 
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the health reforms were designed to shift power from the community to 
the 'bean counters' by replacing largely elected Boards with entirely 
appointed ones, and requiring them to' consult' with communities only 
over changes to the range of services available in their localities. It was 
hoped that this would insulate the RHAs from these kinds of 
community pressures, and so enable them to make difficult and 
unpopular rationing decisions. 
Chapter Three: Theoretical framework and the Health Reforms 
Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter Two, debates over rural hospitals involve 
considerably more for local communities than the loss of an aging 
building. Such debates, however, are not confined to rural areas but 
point further to deeper issues of power and control that are endemic 
within health systems. As local communities and health organisations 
struggle over specific buildings, they invoke broad interests which can be 
found in health systems throughout the world. As actors, local 
communities and health organisations have their own preferences and 
goals, and engage in a mixture of competition and collaboration with 
each other to have those goals satisfied. This competition and 
collaboration occurs in a political arena comprised of and regulated by 
specific institutions, and it is these institutions which have the effect of 
privileging some interests and disadvantaging others. 
This pattern of institutional influence is particularly relevant to New 
Zealand because the last five years have witnessed a radical change in the 
institutional structure of the health system. This change involved a 
deliberate attempt to re-weight the strengths of the key actors in the 
health system to produce new outcomes in their conflicts. By 
weakening the power of communities and providers and strengthening 
the position of managers and appointed Boards working in the health 
administrative bodies, it was hoped local communities would no longer 
be able to exert such political pressure as they had in the past been able to 
use to block the rationing decisions of Area Health Boards. The key to 
this strategy was the abolition of Area Health Boards and the 
59 
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introduction of a 'managed market' mto the health system. 
Correspondingly, this chapter aims to investigate effects of this change 
to a 'managed market' system, using two complementary analytic 
approaches: the 'new institutionalist' framework; and structuralist 
theory, based on the work of Robert Alford, with additional aspects from 
the work of Ellen Immergut. 1 
The New Institutional Framework 
In recent years, the role of institutions in political, social and economic 
life has been the subject of renewed interest in many academic disciplines. 
As Powell and DiMaggio state: 
There are, in fact, many new institutionalisms - in economics, 
organisational theory, political science and public choice, 
history and sociology - united by little but a common 
conviction that instituti'bnal arrangements and social processes 
matter.2 
1 It is also important to recognise that there are many different ways to study the nature and exercise of 
power within health systems, including for example, Marxist approaches, pluralist approaches, and 
political economy approaches. Each of these perspectives has its own assumptions about the nature of 
society and the behaviour and characteristics of groups and individuals, and consequently brings its own 
unique insights into the study of power. However, the focus of this thesis is not so much to explore and 
debate theory as to find conceptual tools to trace the effects of changing institutional forms on the relative 
power of different actors located within the health system. Hence, a 'new institutionalist approach' was 
considered to be the most useful framework to use. For readers interested in these other approaches, see 
among others, the work ofV. Navarro, Medicine Under Capitalism, New York: Prodist, 1976 for a 
Marxist approach. Pluralist ideas have best been encompassed in the work of D B Truman, The. 
Government Process, New York: Knopf, 1951, and in R. Dahl, Who Governs? New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1961, and have been applied to the British health system in work by H. Eckstein, Pressure Group 
. Politics, Allen and Unwin, 1960 and A. J. Willcocks, The Creation of the National Health Service, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967. The work of Marmor and Christianson in T. Marmor andJ. B. 
Christianson, Health Care Policy: A Political Economy Approach, Beverley Hills: Sage, 1982 also 
demonstrates the political economy approach, as does the very recent work ofJames Conner in the New 
Zealand setting, see James Conner, The Political Economy of Health Care in New Zealand: A Comparative 
Analysis. Unpublished PhD Thesis, Christchurch: Universiry of Canterbury, 1995. For a work that 
attempts to distinguish and synthesise these different approaches, see the classic publication of Steven 
Lukes, Power: A Radical View, London: Macmillan Press, 1974. Institutionalist approaches can in some 
ways be considered as attempts to analyse further Lukes second and third dimensions of power. See for this 
argument Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, "Political Science and the Three Institutionalisms", Political 
Studies, vol. no. 5, 1996, pp. 936-957. 
2Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, "Introduction" in Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio (eds), The 
New Institutionalism in OrganisationaiAnalysis, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, p.3. 
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In political SCIence, the study of institutions has long been a central 
aspect of the discipline, but the importance given to institutional 
variables has changed over time as new approaches to the study of 
political life have risen and fallen in popularity amongst scholars. Prior 
to the 1950s, the study of institutions dominated the discipline, but 
much of this work comprised primarily descriptive studies of different 
administrative, legal and political structures, with analysis confined to 
comparing and contrasting the institutional structures across countries. 3 
With the onset of the behavioural revolution in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
emphasis changed from studying the formal structures of various 
governmental institutions to understanding how the informal 
distributions of power, and the attitudes and behaviours of individuals 
and groups, explained the outcomes of political conflicts. 
Developing at approximately the same time as the behaviouralist 
revolution was the rational choice school of thought. This approach 
closely overlaps with what March and Olsen have identified as the 
exchange perspective. In this perspective, politics is seen as the 
aggregation of individual preferences into collective actions by 
procedures of negotiation, bargaining, coalition formation and 
exchange. 4 Politics is viewed as a "market for trades" in which 
individuals and groups are perceived as self-interested, rational actors who 
act to maximise their preferences. Individual actors are assumed to have 
stable, consistent and exogenous preferences, and they pursue those 
preferences by considering alternative bargains in relation to their 
3Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics" in Sven 
Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth (eds), Structul'ing Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992. See also I-Iaans Daalder, "The Development of the Study of Comparative. 
Politics", in Hans Kernan (ed), Comparative Politics: New Directions in Theory and Method, Amsterdam: 
VU University Press, 1995, pp. 11-30. 
4James March and Johan Olsen, "Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions", Governance, voL 9, 
no. 3, 1996, p. 248. 
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"expected consequences", and choose the combinations of bargains that 
optimise their preferences. Collective action is dependent on the 
willingness of sufficient numbers of political actors to make a change, 
and on the negotiation of bargains and side-payments among potential 
trading partners. The ability of any actor to realise his/her desires in this 
system is dependent on what those desires are, what exchangeable 
resources the actor has, and what political rights the actor is entitled to. 
The greater the exchangeable resources, and the more rights to political 
voice, the stronger the position of the actor to trade.s 
Both the behaviouralist and the exchange perspectives have been 
criticised for leaving unexamined the role played by institutions in 
explaining political outcomes. Eventually this difficulty fostered the 
development of a new approach to the study of politics and policy 
making, one which "redisco.yered" institutions, and the significance of 
institutional variables in explaining the outcomes of political conflicts. 
This alternative approach is classified by March and Olsen as the 
institutional perspective, and emphasises the role of institutions in 
political life. 6 The (new institutionalist' approach argues for the primacy 
of institutions in shaping the goals and strategies of actors, and III 
influencing the outcomes of political struggles between those actors. 
p.249. 
6For development of the new institutionalist approach, see the work ofJ. March and J. Olsen, "The New 
Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life", American Political Science Review, vol. 78, 
1984, pp. 734-749; J. March and J. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions. New York: Free Press, 1989; J 
March and J Olsen, Democratic Governance, New York: Free Press, 1995; Theda Skocpol, States and 
Social Revolutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979; Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State 
Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research" in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda 
Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985; Suzanne Berger, 
"Introduction" in Suzanne Berger (ed), Organizing Interests in Western Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981; Peter Katzenstein, Between Power and Plenty, Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1978; Peter Hall, Governing The Economy: The Politics o/State Intervention in Britain and France, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
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However, even within this institutional perspective, there are different 
understandings of the role played by institutions. Koelble has identified 
two broad groups of new institutionalists, one developing from rational 
choice and the other from strands in political science and sociology, 
'historical institutionalism' J 'Rational choice institutionalists' perceive 
individuals as rational actors seeking to maximise their self-interest, and 
hence treat institutions only as an "intervening variable capable of 
affecting an individual's choices and actions but not determining 
them."8 In contrast, the historical institutionalists argue that 
institutions playa more determinant role, shaping the choices, strategies 
and goals of individuals and groups. Thelen and Steinmo argue that 
institutions mediate the "relations of cooperation and conflict" between 
political actors, and in so doing structure political situations.9 
As Peter Hall emphasises'" this institutionalism focuses on the 
ccrelational character" of institutions, or the way in which they configure 
the interactions of political actors. IO Institutions do this in a number of 
ways. North argues that institutions are the "rules of the game m a 
society," that is, they represent, humanly created constraints that 
structure interactions between individuals and groups,ll providing 
political actors with consistent rules of behaviour, conceptions of reality, 
standards of assessment, affective ties and endowments, and thus with a 
7Thomas Koelble, "The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology", Comparative PoLitics, 
vol. 27, 1995, p. 232. For examples of rational choice institutionalists, see the work of Karen Cook and 
Margaret Levi (eds), The Limits of Rationality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990; Douglass 
North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990. 
8Koelble, "The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology", op. cit., p. 232. 
9Thelen and Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics", op. cit., p. 9. 
10Hall, Governing The Economy, op. cit., p. 19. 
11 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance., p.3. 
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capacity for purposeful action. Institutional structures also create rules 
regulating the possession and use of political rights and resources. 12 
As a result, the institutional arrangements of any particular system will 
affect the interactions of political actors, most notably by privileging 
some, and disadvantaging others. Institutions therefore structure the 
battles that occur between the different political actors in the polity, and 
in so doing, influence the outcomes of those struggles. This is 
particularly relevant for health policy and for rural hospitals because as 
Immergut shows, institutions explain policy outcomes 
... precisely because they facilitate or impede the entry of 
different groups into the policy making process. Different 
procedures for maldng policy decisions frame policy debates: 
They change the array of actors that are brought into the 
decision making process, and they provide distinct sets of 
advantages and disadvantages to groups wishing to promote 
their interests. 13 
The definition of the term institution, however, is a source of much 
debate in the literature. Historical institutionalist theorists work with 
definitions of institutions that indude both the formal structures of 
polities, as well as informal rules arid procedures that govern behaviour. 
Hence, they are interested in a range of state and societal institutions 
that mould the interests of political actors, and structure their power in 
relation to other groups. These may include such things as 
constitutional rules and the structure of party systems, as in the work of 
Ellen Immergut, as well as what March and Olsen identify as "systems 
of law, social organisation (such as the media, markets, or the family), 
12March and Olsen, "Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions", pp.249-251. 
13E1len Immergut, Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992, p. xii. 
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and identities or roles (such as «citizen", «official", or «individual)."14 
However, for the purposes of this thesis, Peter Hall's definition of 
institution will be used. Hall treats institutions as «the formal rules, 
compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure 
the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and 
economy."15 
Historical institutionalism also takes into account the role of time. 
Time is a crucial factor because it helps to explain why actors develop 
particular goals, and why they favour some goals over others. An 
historically based analysis is also important to understanding how and 
why an actor's preferences and strategies change, and the role of 
institutions in causing that change. This is particularly relevant to New 
. Zealand because the goals of central government and local communities 
have remained relatively con$tant, but the strategies these actors employ 
to satisfY their goals have radically changed as the institutional structure 
of the system has altered. 
Ellen Immergut and Veto Points 
The work of Ellen Immergut has developed the field of historical 
institutionalism by emphasising the importance of veto points. In her 
work, Immergut sought to explain how attempts to introduce national 
health insurance policies in France, Sweden and Switzerland produced 
different policy outcomes in each of the three countries. Notably, she 
found the ability of the medical profession to successfully oppose 
national health insurance proposals varied across countries. If the 
profession was everywhere opposed to national health insurance, the 
14Marchand Olsen, Democratic Governance, p.27. 
15Hall, Governing The Economy, p.19. 
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political outcomes of that opposition were quite different, ranging from 
rejection of the proposal in Switzerland; the introduction of a 
compulsory public insurance program that paid for medical treatment 
by private doctors in France; while a de facto national health service 
providing medical treatment directly to citizens through publicly 
employed doctors in state hospitals was introduced in Sweden. 16 
To account for these differences between her cases, Immergut identifies 
the institutional structure of each state, and specifically, the location of 
veto pqints within that structure. . She argues that it is the institutions 
which establish the 'rules of the game' for politicians and interest groups 
seeking to enact or to block certain policies. Veto points are places of 
strategic uncertainty or institutional vulnerability where the 
mobilisation of sufficient opposition c~n block policy proposals. 
Immergut shows that political decisions are not single decisions made at 
anyone point in time, but are instead comprised of a sequence of 
deCisions made by different actors at varying institutional locations. 
Hence, to reach a decision, such as the passing of a piece of legislation, 
affirmative votes must be given at. all the decision making points. The 
power of interest groups, such as physicians, to influence these decisions 
depends on their ability to control those veto points so that the key 
individuals in those decision making points will block the proposed 
action. Crucially, then, she argues that interest group power, and 
specifically the presence or absence of medical dominance, "depends on 
the veto points within political systems and not on the properties or 
organisation of particular groups."17 
16Immergut, Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western Europe, op. cit. 
17 ibid, p. 32. See also Ellen Immergut, "The Rules of the Game: The Logic of Health Policy Making in 
France, Switzerland, and Sweden" in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thden, and Frank Longstreth (eds), 
Structuring Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 63. 
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For Immergut, the location of veto points IS not random, but is 
dependent on the constitutional provisions which establish the formal 
rules for the division of power between first, the elected representatives, 
and second, the electoral results and the characteristics of the party 
system. Together these 'de jure' constitutional rules and 'de facto' rules 
of the electoral and party system create the background against which 
politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups act to either support or resist 
policy proposals. Immergut asserts that these institutional rules do not 
predetermine policy outcomes, but instead change the course of policy 
making by the way the rules "link particular decision makers, or allow 
them greater or lesser independence of action."18 However, she also 
argues that by establishing the rules of the game, institutions enable 
observers to predict the ways in which policy debates will be played out. 
Robert Alford's Theory of Structural Interests 
If Immergut's work focuses on how the institutional framing of 
decisions shapes the outcomes of struggles among health system actors, 
Robert Alford's work points to who those actors are. In his chief work, 
Health Care Politics, Alford examines the New York health care system 
and argues that modern health systems produce three types of structural 
interests: dominant interests, represented by 'professional monopolists'; 
challenging interests, represented by 'corporate rationalisers'; and 
'repressed interests', who correspond to local community populations. 19 
18Ellen Immergut, Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western Europe, op. cit., p. 27. 
19Robert Alford, Health Care Politics, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1975. Alford's work is a 
classic account of the interests produced by modern health systems, and has fostered a body of work that 
develops his framework to explore the location of power within health systems, and how conflicts between 
competing interests are resolved. For examples of Alford applied in the British context, see the work of 
Christopher Ham, Health Policy in Britain: The Politics and Organisation of the National Health Service, 
London: Macmillan, 1981; Judy Allsop, Health Policy and the National Health Service, London: 
Longman, 1984; Gerald Wistow "The Health Service Policy Community: Professionals Pre-eminent or 
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Within the health system itself, Alford saw the medical profession as the 
dominant structural interest; the heads of medical schools, insurance 
companies, and hospitals as the corporate rationalisers; and disadvantaged 
community populations as repressed interests. 
Alford contends that these groups are engaged in a continual struggle 
for power over the control of key health care resources and institutions. 
As this struggle occurs in a system that is strongly influenced by the 
biomedical model which privileges the professional monopolisers, 
corporate rationalisers and especially local communities are never able to 
emerge as victors, and can only ever achieve a stalemate with the more 
advantaged groups. Alford also argues that as a consequence of this 
control by the dominant structural interests, efforts by bureaucratic and 
market reformers, the (corporate rationalisers,' to resolve the (crisis' 
afflicting health care do not produce substantial change, but instead 
create a system of "dynamics without change."2o 
Alford's Structural Interests 
In Alford's classification, the medical profession are the most important 
group of professional monopolists.21 As the dominant structural interest 
Under Challenge?" in David Marsh and R Rhodes (eds), Policy Networks in British Government, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992; Nancy North, "Alford Revisited: The Professional Monopolisers, Corporate 
Rationalisers, Community and Markets", Policy and Politics, vol. 23, no. 2, 1995, pp. 115-125. For Alford 
applied in the Australian context, see G. R. Palmer "Social and Political Determinants of Changes in 
Health Care Financing and Delivery" in A. Graycar (ed), Perspectives in Australian Social Policy, 
Melbourne: Macmillan, 1978; S. Duckett, "Structural Interests and Australian Health Policy", Social 
Science and Medicine, vol. 18, 1984, pp. 959-966. For a comparative study of Alford applied in both the 
Swedish and British contexts, see Christopher Ham, "Governing the Health Sector: Power and Policy 
Making in the English and Swedish Health Services", The Milbank Quarterly, vol. 66, no. 2, 1988, pp. 
389-414. 
20Robert Alford, "The Political Economy of Health Care: Dynamics Without Change", Politics and 
Society, vol. 3, 1972, p. 128. 
21Among the medical profession, Alford includes physicians, speCialists, and researchers working in both 
universities and medical schools who not only gain income from private practice, foundations, 
universities, and government, but are also able to exploit organisational resources to further their 
professional and personal interests. 
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in the system, Alford argues the medical profession are served by the 
existing network of social, political and economic institutions of the 
system. Hence the profession has no need to organise continuously to 
defend their interests, nor any desire to change the status quo. Alford 
classifies them as monopolistic because "they have nearly complete 
control over the conditions of their work" and this control is "buttressed" 
by the traditions and status of their profession.22 
The principal activity of the professional monopolisers results in an 
increase in programs and projects, such as clinics, health centres, and 
outreach units from major hospitals. Although these facilities improve 
the delivery of health services, they are primarily established to provide 
advantages for the professional monopolists such as research, training, 
and professional status. These programs are then justified through a 
({continuous flow of symbols~' which not only legitimate the programs, 
but also prevent attempts by other groups to gain control of them by 
"reassuring" the agencies and constituencies to whom the medical 
profession is accountable.23 
Alford argues that maintaining their autonomy and control is a 
common goal of the professional monopolists, and they will mobilise to 
defend this interest when it is challenged. In Alford's account, 
challenges to the control of the medical profession come from the 
corporate rationalisers. Corporate rationalisers are the personnel 
occupying the top positions in a variety of health organisations, and 
encompass hospital administrators, the heads of some quasi public 
insurance companies, state and federal health officials, directors of city 
22Alford, Health Care P()litics, 
23Ibid. 
p.194. 
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health agencIes, public health officials, and medical school directors. 
Driven by changes in technology and in the organisation of health care, 
corporate rationalisers have an ideology that seeks cc a rational, efficient, 
cost-conscious, co-ordinated health care delivery system" .24 In light of 
modern, hospital based technology, they see the medical division of 
labour as "arbitrary and anachronistic," and as a result, they endeavour to 
unifY resources and services under one central organisation.25 As a result, 
individual corporate rationalisers have strong incentives to expand the 
size and resources of their organisations, especially as any expansion is 
likely to accrue additional income and prestige. However, Alford 
contends that as corporate rationalisers are unable to control all of the 
factors in the production of health, they are unlikely to achieve full co-
ordination in practice.26 
Alford also argues that this consequence is hidden by the rhetoric of the 
corporate rationalisers which suggests that social or political mechanisms 
can be created which would unifY and integrate the system. In contrast, 
Alford contends that these mechanisms do not exist, and suggests that 
attempts to integrate the system result only in the creation of further 
agencies, usually without the power to fulfil their objectives. The 
actions of corporate rationalisers frequently result in an expansion of the 
functions, powers and resources of their own organisations, the overall 
impact of which is to further complicate both the private and public 
bureaucratic structures.27 
24Ibid, p. 204. 
25Ibid. 
26Ibid, p. 205. 
27Ibid, p. 208. 
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Alford's chief argument is that the emergence of the corporate 
rationalisers challenges the interests of the professional monopolisers. 
Although he states that the two groups exist in a symbiotic relationship, 
and can form alliances to achieve certain objectives, he also asserts that 
the corporate rationalisers are united by a common interest in extending 
the control of their organisations over the conditions of work, income, 
and division of labour of physicians. This results in a continuous struggle 
for power between these two groups, but it is a conflict the corporate 
rationalisers can never win because the conflict occurs in an institutional 
context which always favours the professional monopolists. As a result, 
Alford argues that corporate rationalisation will always remain an 'ideal' 
because systemic barriers ensure that the corporate rationalisers will 
never gain the necessary support or social power to fully integrate and co-
ordinate health care. 
The third grouping in Alford's classification are local communities in 
need of health care, and particularly white rural and urban poor, ghetto 
blacks, lower middle class families just above the Medicaid income 
threshold, and middle class families rendered medically indigent 
through escalating health care costs. Alford considers these populations 
repressed interests because they are guaranteed not to be served by the 
institutional structure, unless "extraordinary political energies" can be 
generated.28 These groups are represented by the equal health advocates 
who demand improved health services, as well as greater community 
participation in the decisions affecting health care. Alford contends, 
however, that the efforts of these individuals and groups will usually fail. 
Regardless of whether they focus their demands on a particular 
program or need, or on reform of the system, they unwittingly give 
28Ibid, p. 14. 
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legitimacy to the activities of either the professional monopolists, 
through the establishment of further programs, or to the corporate 
rationalisers, through the creation of new agencies with no real ability to 
co-ordinate or integrate the system. The result is that the system ends 
up moving in the opposite direction to that intended.29 
Alford also argues that community participation is most likely to lead to 
a situation of stalemate. Even when community groups are mobilised, 
they tend to become embroiled in conflicts amongst themselves and with 
other groups over such issues as funding, location, timing and control. 
As a result, their own actions can effectively prevent new programs or 
projects from coming to fruition, although Alford contends that the 
system works anyway to bring about this stalemate. This is because the 
structure of the system acts to ensure that neither the interests of the 
professional monopolists nor these of the corporate rationalisers are 
damaged. This occurs either through the requirement of «consensus," 
which necessitates the viewpoints of all groups being heard but ensures 
that none of them are implemented except those of the dominant 
interests, or by ensuring that the .decision making bodies on which the 
community groups are represented do not have sufficient power to 
effect change.3o 
Historical Institutionalism, Immergut and Alford in New Zealand 
In New Zealand the structural interests described by Alford can be readily 
identified, although there are some key differences in the composition 
and strength of those interests than in Alford's account. Doctors still 
constitute the professional monopolists, but in New Zealand local 
29rbid, pp. 218-220. 
30Ibid, p. 221. 
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communities consist of all commumtles and not just the poor and 
medically indigent. The corporate rationalisers comprise actors in the 
health sector who are principally concerned with the efficient operation 
of the sector, Treasury and assorted business interests who have been 
drawn into the health system as sources of independent advice. 
In the last decade, the interests identified as the corporate rationalisers 
have grown in prominence in the New Zealand health sector. This has 
occurred in conjunction with the rise of the New Right ideology. This 
ideology has placed a stronger emphasis on reducing the role of the state 
in the provision of welfare services and allowing market principles to 
govern the allocation of scarce resources. A key actor in the promotion 
of the New Right philosophies has been Treasury. After the economic 
stagnation and crisis that developed in the early 1980s, it was Treasury, 
supported by various private\,sector groups, who assumed a critical role in 
designing and implementing much of the reform that they argued was 
necessary to improve the country's economic performance,31 Over time, 
the recurrence of fiscal crises has allowed these interests the opportunity 
to extend their authority into '.the health sector, and to become 
extremely powerful in determining the restructuring of the sector. 
What is distinctive about New Zealand, however, is that the means 
through which this grouping seeks to achieve its aims has undergone a 
dramatic change in the last fifteen years. Whereas in Alford's account, 
31 For the influence of Treasury on social and economic policy, see for example, Jonathon Boston, 
"Treasury: its Role, Philosophy and Influence" in Hyam Gold (ed), New Zealand Politics in Perspective, 
3rd ed., Auckland: Longman Paul, 1992, pp. 194-215; S. Goldfmch and B. Roper, "The Treasury's Role in 
State Policy Formation" in Brian Roper and Chris Rudd (eds), State and Economy in New Zealand, 
Aucldand: Oxford University Press, 1993; Colin James, New Territory, Wellington: Bridget Williams 
Books, 1992; Jane Kelsey, Rolling Back the State, Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 1993; Jane Kelsey, 
The New Zealand Experiment, Auckland: Aucldand University Press, 1995; J. Deeks and N. Perry (eds), 
Controlling Interests, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1992; Brian Easton (ed), The Making oj 
Rogernomics, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1989; Ruth Richardson, Making A Difference, 
Christchurch: Shoal Bay Press, 1995. 
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corporate rationalisers relied on bureaucratic mechanisms to achieve 
their aims, in New Zealand these mechanisms have been supplanted by 
the use of market disciplines. Hence from the mid 1980s, corporate 
rationalisers have become increasingly reworked as market rationalisers. 
In his work, Alford argued the corporate rationalisers could never win 
over the professional monopolists because the system always acted to 
protect the interests of the dominant group. In New Zealand, however, 
it has been this very argument that has allowed the market rationalisers 
to be so influential in the restructuring of the health sector. The market 
rationalisers have contended that 'capture' of the health system by the 
medical profession and local communities acts as a barrier to the efficient 
operation of the system. Consequently, the corporate rationalisers have 
argued the need for an institutional structure that embodies market 
disciplines, and privileges their interests over those of providers and 
communities. However, as Chapters Four and Five argue, the outcomes 
of this new institutional structure have not always turned out as the 
market rationalisers anticipated. 
Reform of the New Zealand Health System: 1974-1991 
The first major initiative to reform the health service in New Zealand 
came in 1974 with the third Labour government's White Paper, A 
Health Service For New Zealand.32 At this time, the health system was 
virtually controlled by the medical profession and locally elected 
Hospital Boards, who oversaw the distribution of resources in secondary 
care. Between 1967 and 1971, however, poor economic performance and 
rising levels of international debt began to put pressure on the health 
budget, and the government became increasingly concerned about its 
32New Zealand Government, A Health Service for New Zealand, Wellington: Government Printer, 
1974. 
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ability to fund the open ended commitment to health care contained in 
the 1938 Social Security Act. Despite a brief period of prosperity between 
1972 and 1974, economic concerns meant the government began 
focusing on finding ways to contain health care costs, and ensuring that 
services were cost effective. 
A Health Service For New Zealand identified the key problems of the 
health sector as stemming from the (fragmentation' that existed in the 
funding, delivery and organisation of the system. At that time, the 
health system featured both public and private providers, locally elected 
Hospital Boards governing hospital services, district offices of the 
Department of Health delivering public health services, and from 1974, 
the Accident Compensation Corporation as a second public funder of 
accident victims. Like the corporate rationalisers as Alford defined them, 
reform of the administrative structure through an overarching 
bureaucratic mechanism was still considered the most appropriate way to 
address the problems of the health system. 
At the heart of the proposals was a New Zealand Health Authority 
which would assume responsibility for priority setting, policy making 
and strategic planning at the national level. It would replace the 
Department of Health, and was to «provide leadership to match its 
funding of the new regional authorities."33 This Authority would be 
complemented by fourteen Regional Health Authorities which would 
replace the existing Hospital Boards, and would plan, provide, and 
develop health services in the public, private, and voluntary sectors. 
Together, these agencies would overcome the problems of fragmentation 
33John Martin, "Devolution and Decentralisation" in Jonathon Boston, John Martin, June Pallot and 
Pat Walsh (eds), Reshaping The State; New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution, Auckland: Oxford 
University Press, 1991, p. 278. 
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by producing a «co-ordinated, comprehensive and functionally 
integrated health service. "34 
However, these proposals proved to be highly contentIOus and 
engendered much hostility among the groups who benefited from the 
existing system.35 Elected boards resented the loss of status that the shift 
to Regional Health Authorities would entail, and the medical profession 
opposed the reforms on the basis that they would allow central 
government to have greater control over doctors.36 This created a 
strong reaction amongst the medical profession, with a New Zealand 
Medical Journal editorial claiming the proposals would create an 
{(authoritarian monster" that would be imposed «not only on the 
medical profession but on the people of New Zealand")? As a result, the 
reforms were never implemented, and were widely believed to have 
contributed to the Labour: government's defeat in the subsequent 
election. 38 
However, A Health Service for New Zealand is vitally important to 
understanding the history of health reform in New Zealand, not only 
because of the nature of its proposals, but also because {(its political 
shadow haunted reformers for another fifteen years. "39 Following the 
Labour government's defeat in 1975, reform of the health system was 
341'his is a direct quote from the Department of Health's 1974 annual report. Cited in Derek Dow, 
Safeguarding The Public Health: A History of the New Zealand Department of Health, Wellington: 
Victoria University Press, 1995, p. 214. 
35Geoff Fougere, "From Market to Welfare State? State Interventions and Medical Care Delivery in 
New Zealand" in C. Wilkes and 1. Shirley (eds), In The Public Interest, Auckland: Benton Ross, 1984, p. 
83. 
36In the longer term, it was envisaged that the role of the Regional Health Authorities would extend to 
primary care through centrally funded health benefits Source: Miriam Laugesen and George Salmond, 
"New Zealand Health Care: A Background", Health Policy, vo!. 29, 1994, p.15. 
37New Zealand Medical Journal, Editorial, "Solidarity", vol. 81, 11 June 1975, p. 525. 
38Iain Hay, The Caring Commodity: The Provision of Health Care in New Zealand, Aucldand: Oxford 
University Press, 1989. 
39Martin, "Devolution and Decentralisation", p.278. 
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seen as electoral folly, and successive governments moved with "glacial 
slowness" in the area of health sector reform. 40 In spite of this, change 
did occur as the new National government recognised the growing 
urgency of the health system's problems. However, the government 
adopted a more consultative approach than its predecessor, and 
established the Special Advisory Committee on Health Services 
Organisation (SACHSO). Sensitive to the pressure for a more 
integrated system, the final proposals of SACHSO were very similar to 
those of A Health Service for New Zealand, but centred around the 
formation of Area Health Boards. Area Health Boards were designed 
to synthesise both hospital and public health services at the local level by 
amalgamating the functions of the Hospital Boards and the 
Department of Health's district health offices into one regional body. By 
creating one administrative body to plan and co-ordinate health services 
in the public, private and ·;voluntary spheres, it was hoped that the 
duplication and fragmentation in the provision of services that was 
believed to exist under the Hospital Board system would be significantly 
reduced. It was also hoped that by having just one body, services would be 
rationalised and could be delivered for the same amount of money or 
less, hence improving efficiency in the system.41 
The government was unwilling to impose the concept of Area Health 
Boards on Hospital Boards, and instead trialed them under two pilot 
schemes in Northland and Wellington until 1981. Although these 
schemes did not replace the existing structures but operated alongside 
them, they were considered a success, and the Area Health Board concept 
40GeoffFougere, "The State and Health Care Reform" in Andrew Sharp (ed), Leap Into The Dm'l<: The 
Changing Role of the State in New Zealand Since 1984, Auckland: Auddand University Press, 1994, p.llO. 
41Gordon Davies, "New Zealand Health Care: From Ossification to Action", Journal of Health 
Administration Education, vol. 8, no. 3, 1990, p.377. 
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was formally endorsed in legislation in 1983. In spite of this success, the 
political sensitivity of the reorganisation of health services meant it was 
largely left to the Hospital Boards to initiate the transfer to Area Health 
Boards. On the whole, Boards were slow to make this transition, and it 
was only in 1989, with the appointment of Helen Clark as Minister of 
Health, that the transition to Area Health Boards was finally 
completed. 
During the early 1980s a second effort was also made to improve the 
efficiency of the health system, and this was the shift to a population 
based funding formula (PBFF) to finance Hospital Boards. 42 In the early 
1980s, Treasury began to place funding restrictions on Vote:Health as 
the commitment to providing unlimited resources embodied in the 
1938 Social Security Act became unsustainable. 43 In light of this 
pressure, increased attention ,began to be focused on hospital spending, as 
this alone was responsible for consuming nearly 70% of Vote:Health. 
Spending on hospitals was also an area of concern because significant 
inequities existed in the wealth of Boards and in the type and quality of 
services they offered. These inequities largely stemmed from the 
funding mechanism that was used to finance Hospital Boards. At that 
time, Boards were funded according to their previous year's entitlement, 
along with adjustments for wage and price increases, the construction of 
new buildings, and general growth. Unfortunately, the result was a 
system that was highly politicised, with politically skilled Boards being 
able to win funding increases at the expense of less proficient Boards.44 
42For a more detailed account of this funding formula', see Advisory Committee on Hospital Board 
Funding, The Equitable Distribution of Finance to Hospital Boards, Wellington: Government Printer, 
1980, and later, A G. Smith and F. M. Sutton, The Hospital Funding Formula Blue Book Series 19, 
Wellington: Department of Health, 1984. 
43Dow, Safeguarding The Public Health, p. 220. 
44Davies, "New Zealand Health Care: From Ossification to Action", op. cit., pp. 375-377. 
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A further weakness of this method for allocating resources was that it 
did not take into account the need to make changes in the level of 
funding to Boards to compensate for changes in the population. As the 
population in the North Island, and particularly Auckland rose, but the 
population in the South Island remained static, this placed severe 
funding pressure on Auckland. As a result, in 1983 the National 
government moved to a population based funding formula to finance 
public hospitals. 
The PBFF was a complicated formula that was designed to provide a 
technical solution for the difficult and very political question of how to 
distribute resources equitably. Although the formula was clearly aimed 
at allowing central government greater control over the amount of 
funding Hospital Boards rece,ived, it was also attractive to Boards because 
it allowed them much greater control over how they used their 
entitlement.45 However, it was still very difficult to reduce funding to 
hospital boards because Boards threatened with cutbacks were able to 
voice their concerns, and the resulting publicity usually prevented the 
reductions from occurring.46 In. spite of this, the introduction of the 
PBFF did result in the per capita funding for hospitals remallllllg 
virtually constant over the next decade.47 
In 1984 the National government was defeated. The new Labour 
government immediately embarked on a program of sweeping reform 
necessitated by a severe fiscal crisis, and an urgent need to improve the 
country's economic performance which had stagnated under the policies 
45Fougere, "From Market to Welfare State?" pp. 83-84. 
46Davies, "New Zealand Health Care: From Ossification to Action", or. cit., pp. 375-377. 
47Pougere, "The State and Health Care Reform", OF. cit., p. 109. 
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of the prevlOUS National government.48 The architects of this reform 
were Labour's Minister of Finance Roger Douglas and Treasury. For the 
health sector, this marked the beginning of the rise of the corporate 
rationalisers, and their arguments that the system was beset with provider 
and community <capture'. The 1984 post election briefing document 
produced by Treasury commented on «underlying deficiencies"49 in the 
structure of the health system, arguing that resources were not always 
being used to their fullest. 50 More specifically, Treasury analysts 
commented on the phenomenon of <provider capture' in health.51 These 
analysts argued that spending on community health care, which was 
cited as having the potential to be a better form of treatment than the 
use of larger institutions, had not increased, and that this failure may 
have been due to physicians acting to favour their interests rather than 
those of their consumers: 
... this failure to shift resources to areas of higher potential 
benefits may reflect the orientation of health services to the 
preferences of suppliers, rather than to the preferences of their 
clients. 52 
48Th ere is a wealth of literature on this reform. Interested readers should see, among others, Alan Bollard 
and Robert Buclde (eds), Economic Liberalisation in New Zealand, Wellington: Allen and Unwin, 1987; 
Jonathon Boston and Martin Holland (eds), The Fourth Labour Government, Auckland: Oxford 
University Press, 1987; Brian Easton (ed), 1'lJe Making ofRogernomics, Margaret Wilson, Labour 
in Government 1984-1987, Wellington: Allen and Unwin, 1989. 
49New Zealand Treasury, Economic Management, Wellington: Treasury, 1984, p. 270. 
50The post election briefing document argued this was due to two factors. First, the 'free' provision of 
health care to consumers removed the role of price signals that would otherwise ensure that the quality 
and volume of services delivered reflected their cost. Second, providing services through government-
funded institutions reduced the incentive for suppliers to provide those services at least cost. Source: New 
Zealand Treasury, Economic Management, op. cit., p. 271. 
51 'Middle class capture' and 'provider capture' are otten used to indicate connected occurrences. 
Provider capture is the situation "where those who supply state-provided services pursue their own 
interests at the expense of the interests of consumers." The medical profession is otten targeted as an 
example of provider capture because of the high costs to enter the profession, and the significant barriers 
that afe imposed on unlicensed practitioners. Although these restrictions are cited as necessary to maintain 
a high standard of professional care, they also generate benefits which physicians are able to appropriate 
for personal gain. This privileged position also allows physicians to pursue their own interests such as 
acquiring high cost technologies, and favouring middle class clients with whom they share a cultural and 
behavioural affinity at the expense of lower class patients. Source: Geoff Bertram, "Middle Class 
Capture: A Brief Survey", in Royal Commission on Social Policy, April Report, VoL II, Part 2, 
Wellington: Government Printer, 1988, pp. 109-170. 
52New Zealand Treasury, Economic Management, p.272. 
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However, the government's attention was not on health, but on 
introducing a variety of measures to liberalise the economy, and Increase 
efficiency in all sectors of government activity. These included the 
introduction of private sector management and accounting practices 
into the public sector, the deregulation of many industries, including 
banking, finance, transport, telecommunications and broadcasting, and 
the transformation of government departments with commercial value 
into profit generating State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Many of these 
were later fully or partially privatised, and sold to overseas buyers. 53 The 
heavy emphasis on greater efficiency that was present in the public sector 
was also spilling over into health. The amount of funding being spent 
on health was increasing, but the government was beginning to question 
more closely the benefits of these increases. Prompted by a fall in the real 
value of the General Medical Services benefit, and an acute conflict 
between doctors and the Minister of Health over 'free' visits for children, 
the Government initiated a review of the health sector in 1986. 
This review was to examine the existing system of health care benefits, 
but its terms of reference also included reporting on the "underlying 
rationale for state involvement in health and to recommend broad 
principles and directions for reform."54 The report, Choices for 
Healthcare, noted areas of concern within the health sector such as 
perverse incentiv~s for surgeons to work in the private and public sector, 
confused accountability, lack of adequate information on the costs and 
effectiveness of services provided by hospitals, and insufficient 
responsiveness to the needs of many consumers of health services. The 
53Kelsey, The New Zealand Experiment, pp. 3-4. 
54Claudia Scott, Geoff Fougere, and John Malwick, Choices For Health Care: Report of the Health 
Benefits Review, Wellington: Government Printer, 1986, p. 1. 
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report proposed five broad structural options for the health care system, 
but expressed a preference for Option 4(b) which retained the state as the 
dominant funder of health services but introduced more contestability 
into the provision of services. In this option, the report envisaged a 
system where Area Health Boards would determine the range of services 
to be provided for their populations through research and discussions 
with communities and providers, and would then put these services out 
for tender and award contracts on the basis of quality and price.55 It was 
argued that this system would be more accountable, encourage better use 
of resources, and be more responsive to consumers. Changes to equity 
and efficiency, however, would depend on the details of the contracts 
between boards and providers.56 
Although the proposals recommended by the review team were never 
implemented, the drive to improve the efficiency of the health sector by 
the corporate rationalisers was growing stronger. Both Roger Douglas 
and Treasury were concerned about the amount of money the health 
system was continuing to consume, and this led to a second review of the 
sector in 1987, to be chaired by Alan Gibbs. Gibbs was «a private sector 
whiz-kid" who had chaired the board of Forestcorp, and had been 
responsible for radical restructuring that resulted in massive job losses)7 
His chairmanship was extremely significant not only because he was a 
clear advocate of privatisation but because his appointment fuelled 
concern in the health sector that the review's agenda was one of 
privatisation. Even before its release, the work of the Hospital and 
Related Services Taskforce was to prove highly controversial. Material 
was leaked to the media which suggested the Taskforce was exploring the 
55Ibid, p. 111. 
56Ibid, p. 112. 
57Interview, Former Canterbury Area Health Board member, 2 May 1996. 
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possibility of privatising the health system, and Gibbs has since stated, 
«[tJhe model we came up with ... was only a transitional step to people 
purchasing their own health services paid for from tax cuts. In the long 
run I foresaw hospitals being privatised."58 
Not surprisingly, on its release the report of the Taskforce, commonly 
referred to as the Gibbs report, was highly critical of the public hospital 
system. 59 It claimed the system was inflexible, unresponsive and 
inefficient, and cited the lengthening waiting lists and low morale as 
key areas of concern. The report also strongly criticised the triumvirate 
system of management as being cCover-centralised, bureaucratic, inflexible 
and confused," which produced stifled leadership and diluted 
acco untabili ty. 60 Furthermore, it condemned the lack of adequate 
management information in the system, and claimed it produced a lack 
of cost consciousness which undermined the efficient allocation of 
resources in the hospital system.61 
The report also claimed inefficiencies in the sector were a product of 
C provider capture'. This was·, extremely important because the 
prominence given to provider capture in the Gibbs report reinforced the 
government's perception that this was a structural flaw of the health 
system. Hospital and Area Health Boards felt a loyalty to their staff 
which meant they could not always make efficiency gains, and services 
were often oriented more to the needs of providers than consumers. This 
was most clearly reflected in the high percentage of resources that were 
58Davld McLoughlin, "How Bad is Our Health System? Is New Zealand's Number One Concern 
Beyond Solvingt, North and South, Issue 126, September 1996, p. 74. 
59 Alan Gibbs, Dorothy Fraser and John Scott, Unshackling the Hospitals: Report of the Hospitals and 
Related Services Taskforce, Wellington: Government Printer, 1988. 
60Ibid,pp. 18-19. 
61 Ibid, p. 21. 
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commanded by hospitals, which favoured clinicians, but often came at 
the expense of community based programs. This perception of provider 
capture was also reinforced by a survey released at the same time which 
found approximately two thirds of Hospital board positions were 
occupied either by doctors, or by the spouses or relatives of medical 
professionals.62 
The report addressed these problems by proposing: 
a structure which retains government as the main funder and 
provider, but introduces a clear separation between the two 
roles. This separation enables a market to be created in which 
prices are set by modified competition between hospitals.63 
These proposals entailed the creation of six regional health authorities 
to be responsible for determining the health needs of their populations, 
and purchasing health services through contracts with public, private 
and voluntary organisations. These regional health authorities would 
not own any services, but would instead contract with providers on a 
«competitively neutral basis," and would award contracts according to 
quality and value for money.64 Public hospitals. would become 
independent and separate business units, and Area Health Boards would 
become more like «the boards of public companies" who «would be able 
to concentrate on running efficient services."65 As a result, the report 
argued the new structure would "unshaclde" the organisations 
responsible for providing health services from bureaucratic control, and 
62Simon Ferguson, The Inconvenient Realities of Health Reform, Unpublished MA Thesis, University of 
Auddand, 1995, p. 88. 
63Gibbs et. aI., Unshackling the Hospitals, op. cit., p. 26. 
64Ibid, p.27. 
65Ibid, p. 28. 
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would "raise the levels of efficiency, responsiveness and accountability. 
while also improving access and morale" in the system.66 
Yet the idea of a market in health was not new, as it had been clearly 
stated in Treasury's post election briefing to the government in 1987: 
So long as the state is a major purchaser of health care there 
seem to be advantages in separating the purchase of health care 
from the production of hospital or other services.· The present 
amalgamation of functions causes confusion of roles. Equity 
goals and efficiency targets are forever entangled.67 
Instead, the biggest impact of the Gibbs report came from the efficiency 
savings cited in the Arthur Anderson report, and the corresponding 
prominence they gave to the idea of market disciplines operating in 
health. Accompanying the Gibbs report was an independent study 
completed by the internatio'J:?-al firm Arthur Anderson on the efficiency 
of the hospital sector.68 In this report, the Arthur Anderson analysts 
claimed that huge savings of between 24 and 32 per cent of the operating 
expenditure, or approximately $450 to $600 million, could be made in 
the hospital sector. 69 These figures were then used to underpin the 
Gibbs Report's prescription for reform. Yet this claim was made with-
data that the report had openly acknowledged as being completely 
inadequate. Consequently, the claim was strongly criticised by 
opponents of the report, who correctly argued that its methodology was 
severely flawedJo Nonetheless, these claims were frequently repeated by 
66Ibid, p.3 and 27. 
67New Zealand Treasury, GovernmentManagement, Wellington: Government Printer, 1987, p. 159. 
68Arthur Anderson and Co., Hospital Performance Assessment Reuiew, Wellington: Departmem of 
Health, 1987. . 
69Gibbs et. al., Umhacklingthe Hospitals, op. cit.) p.13. 
70Due to an absence of the appropriate data on New Zealand hospitals, the report used comparisons of 
resources of what were argued to be comparable services. The savings were then determined by "assigning 
to all hospitals the lowest level of costs estimated for a service in the study and subrracting this from the 
estimate of current actual costs". Source: Geoff Fougere, "Health Policy and the Gibbs Report: An 
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Alan Gibbs in the media, and gave considerable publicity to the ideas and 
philosophy of the corporate rationalisers. However, these predictions 
not only fuelled expectations in the system as to what efficiency gains 
were possible, but they would persist in the sector, significantly 
influencing later efforts at reform. 
The Gibbs report is extremely significant because it marks the evolution 
of the corporate rationalisers into market rationalisers. The goals of 
efficiency, cost consciousness and co-ordination idealised by the corporate 
rationalisers are clearly expressed in the Gibbs Report. In contrast to the 
1974 A Health Service for New Zealand, the means of achieving these 
goals had changed from the command and control bureaucratic structure 
to a market, or quasi-market, mechanism. 
It soon became clear that the government was not going to implement 
the proposals of the Gibbs Report. This was largely due to strong 
resistance from doctors who opposed the level of competition contained 
in the report, and by the change in Minister of Health from Michael 
Bassett to David CaygilL Neither·.David Caygill nor his successor Helen 
Clark saw the Gibbs report as an .appropriate direction for reform. In 
spite of the government's rejection of the Gibbs Report, however, change 
continued to occur in the sector. Helen Clark focused on strengthening 
government's influence on the spending decisions of the Area Health 
Boards. This involved reducing the number of elected members and 
replacing them with appointed members, introducing a contract system 
between the Ministry of Health and the Area Health Boards, and 
development of the New Zealand Health Charter and New Zealand 
Health Goals and Targets to set joint objectives for Boards to achieve. 
Analysis", Paper presented at the New Zealand Sociology Association Conference, 26-28 August, 1988, p. 
4. 
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These measures were also complemented by the State Sector Act (1988) 
which saw the introduction of general management into Area Health 
Boards. Subsequently, by the end of the decade, many Boards were 
beginning to operate in a more business-like manner, and were 
achieving productivity improvements,71 
Helen Clark also continued the trend begun by Michael Bassett to use 
independent consultants rather than advice from the medical 
community. In essence, this trend was in response to concerns over 
provider capture. Prior to the mid 1980s, physicians were the dominant 
voice advising governments on the direction of health policy, but because 
physicians were perceived to have vested interests in the way health 
services were provided, they became seen as an inappropriate source of 
policy advice. As a result, international and domestic companies such as 
Arthur Anderson, Coopers aJ;1d Lybrand, and CS First Boston Ltd were 
called upon to write reviews of the health sector, and to develop solutions 
for reform.72 However, many of these companies perceived the problems 
and solutions of the health sector in the same light as Treasury. 
Consequently, although the use of these companies gives the appearance 
of allowing previously unheard voices to comment on and influence 
health policy, these consultants were used by Treasury and Ministers 
largely to give legitimacy to points of view already promoted in the 
health sector.73 
7lToni Ashton, "Reform of the Health Services: Weighing Up the Costs and Benefits" in Jonathon 
Boston and Paul Dalziel (eds), The Decent Society? Essays in Response to National's Economic and Social 
Policies, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992, p.150. 
72Robert Blank, New Zealand Health Policy, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1994. For more detail 
on the use and costs of these consultants see James Conner, The Political Economy of Health Care in New 
Zealand: A Comparative Analysis, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Christchurch: University of Canterbury, 
1995. 
73See, for example, Jane Kelsey, The New Zealand Experiment, op. cit.; Brian Easton, "How Did the 
Health Reforms Blitzkrieg Fail?", Political Science, vol. 46, no. 2, 1994, pp. 215-233; Joe Atkinson, 
"Health Reform and Thin' Democracy", Political Science, vol. 46, no. 2, 1994, pp. 193-214; Simon 
Ferguson, The Inconvenient Realities of Health Reform, op. cit. 
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However, 1990 was an election year, and the resulting loss by the Labour 
government indicated that some sections of New Zealand society had 
clearly had enough of the rapid, far-reaching reform which had occurred 
over the last six years. The National party had campaigned on the basis 
that it would not introduce further radical change to the health sector, 
but when it took office, it embarked ona program of even further 
reform, necessitated initially by the presence of a fiscal crisis that 
developed after the election.74 The government claimed the urgency 
and unexpected nature of this crisis necessitated a program of "stiff 
medicine" to bring the country back to economic prosperity, and 
National needed to abandon many of its election promises and introduce 
drastic cuts to government spending, especially in the area of welfare.75 
In this package, the Nation~l government also announced the creation 
of a Health Services Taskforce to "identifY and investigate the roles of 
Government, the private sector, and individuals in the funding, 
provision and regulation of health services."76 The terms of reference 
for the Taskforce, however, clearly reflected the strong market 
orientation of the new Government. Specifically, they referred to the 
need for the greater targeting of assistance, more individual 
responsibility in the provision of health services, and the necessity of 
competition to improve efficiency within the sector. The Government 
wanted the Taskforce to . analyse the existing reviews of the health 
sector, in conjunction with international experience, and develop a 
74 For a discussion of the existence of the fiscal crisis in 1990, see Paul Dalziel, "National's Economic 
Strategy" in Jonathon Boston and Paul Dalziel (eds), The Decent Society? Essays In Response to National's 
Economic and Social Policies, Aucldand: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
75James Bolger, Ruth Richardson and William Birch, Economic and Social Initiative ~ December 1990, 
Statements to the House of Representatives, Wellington: New Zealand Government, 1990, p.3. 
76Ibid, p.75. 
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solution which would be appropriate for New Zealand society.?7 The 
Taskforce completed its work shortly before the Budget was announced, 
but its findings were never released to the public. Hence, it can only be 
assumed that the Taskforce's conclusions supported the recommendation 
of the Treasury and the Gibbs Report to introduce competition into the 
health sector by separating the purchasing from the provision of health 
services,78 
The shape of the reformed health system was finally revealed with the 
government's first budget on 30 July 1991, in a report entitled Your 
Health and the Public Health, which also became known as the Green and 
"White Paper.?9 As had been reiterated in Treasury's post election briefing 
document, the reforms were an attempt to confront the perceived 
problems of the health sector by radically redesigning its institutional 
structure. By separating t~e purchasing of health services from their 
prOVlSlOn, the 'market rationalisers' sought to privilege their interests 
above those of providers and communities, and so create the conditions 
in which efficiencies would be 'ground out' of the system.80 
The existence of a fiscal cnSlS was .agam used to justify the scale of th~ 
reforms, with the country's poor economic performance and high levels 
77Simon Upton, Your Health and the Public Health, Wellington: Government Printer, 1991, p. 10. 
78 At the same time as the Taskforce was in operation, the Business Roundtable commissioned a report by 
Patrida Danzon, a visiting professor from CS First Boston. The report described how a publicly funded 
health system could be tninsformed into a privatised system, but it was influential only to the degree that 
it worked out in practice ideas that were already being independently developed by Treasury and the 
Taskforce. See Patricia Danzon and Susan Begg, Options for Health Care in New Zealand, Wellington: 
CS First Boston, 1991. 
79Simon Upton, Your Health and the Public Health, Wellington: Government Printer, 1991. 
80See among others, Simon Upton, Your Health and the Public Health,~; Geoff Fougere, "The 
State and Health Care Reform", op. dt.; Brian Easton, "How Did the Health Reform Blitzkrieg Fai1?", 
op. dt.; Toni Ashton, "Reform of the Health Services: Weighing Up the Costs and Benefits", op. cit.; Pim 
Borren and Alan Maynard, Searching for the Holy Grail in the Antipodes: The Market Reform of the New 
Zealand Health Care System, York: Centre for Health Economics, 1993; Philippa Howden-Chapman, 
"Doing the Splits: Contracting Issues in the New Zealand Health Service", Health Policy, vol. 24, 1993, 
pp. 273-286; Claudia Scott, "Reform of the New Zealand Health Care System", Health Policy, vol. 29, 
1993, pp. 25-40. 
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of overseas debt being cited as key factors in the need for reform. In 
particular, these factors meant the government could no longer afford to 
fund the open ended commitment to health services of the 1938 Social 
Security Act, and instead needed to limit its liability and shift the costs 
of providing health services back to individuals and families. 81 The 
proposals for reform could also be understood as laying the foundations 
for the eventual privatisation of the health system, so creating the 
means by which the state would be able to exit from the provision of 
health services. 
The government argued that the current health system was "structurally 
flawed," and unable to "deliver accessible and affordable care to New 
Zealanders in the future."82 However, as the Area Health Board system 
was not fully operational until 1989, many commentators argued the 
system had not been in existence long enough to justify this claim. Area 
Health Boards had been introducing measures to improve efficiency, and 
were working towards a "delivery system which more closely resembled 
the business practices of private enterprise."83 However, some Area 
Health Boards, particularly Wellington and Auckland, were having 
significant difficulties, and their difficulties appeared to typify what the 
reformers considered was wrong about the Area Health Board system. 
The architects of the reforms argued that significant institutional 
reform was requited as Area Health Boards suffered from a number of 
structural difficulties that prevented them from operating effectively. 
81Upton, Your Health and the Public Health, op. cit., p. 1. 
82lbid, p.9. 
83Examples of these measures include the introduction of general management and service management 
into the Boards, the installation of computerised information systems, the development of performance 
indicators, and the preparation of business plans by Area Health Boards. Source: Toni Ashton, "Reform of 
the Health Services", op. cit., p. 150. 
Theoretical Framework and the Health Reforms 91 
First, Area Health Boards were perceived to have conflicting roles as the 
purchaser and provider of services. This meant Boards had strong 
incentives to purchase their own services even when other more efficient 
and appropriate providers were available, particularly as contracting out 
to other suppliers could result in the loss of jobs for Board staff, and 
Board facilities being underutilised. Area Health Boards were also seen 
to be operating in a policy framework that placed too many constraints 
on the way they used their resources and offered only weak incentives for 
them to use their resources efficiently.84 As a result, Boards tended to 
reduce costs through cutting services, and these reductions were often 
made to <Cinderella' services, such as mental health. 
These cuts to services were also exacerbated by the dual accountability of 
Area Health Boards. Elected Boards were seen to be accountable to both 
their local constituents and: the Minister of Health, but whereas they 
were seen to have strong responsibilities to the communities which 
elected them, they were perceived to have little responsibility for the 
funding they received.8s Consequently, when Boards wanted to reduce 
services or make changes to the delivery of a particular service, they would 
often experience intense public. opposition that would effectively 
hamper their ability to implement that change. The Green and White 
Paper argued that this "politicisation of the decision-making process" 
encouraged Boards to shift the responsibility onto government through 
claiming a lack ~f funding instead of attempting to improve their own 
efficiency. 86 Furthermore, as Boards received funding from government 
regardless of their performance, inefficient Boards could argue for 
84Simon Upton, Your Health and the Public Health, pp.23-26. 
85For a discussion of the accountability of Area Health Boards, see John Martin, "Devolution and 
Accountability: Governance in the Health Service", NZ Health Review, vol. 9, no. 1, 1989, pp. 7-12 
86Upton, YOUI' Health and the Public Health, op. cit., p.9. 
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more funding if serVIces were threatened, hence perpetuating the 
wastage of resources. 
'Provider capture' was again identified as a major impediment to the 
efficiency and responsiveness of the system. The Green and White Paper 
argued Area Health Boards were subject to provider capture because the 
Boards tended to favour hospital based services. Not only did this 
concentration on hospitals advantage clinicians, but it meant there was 
"little incentive to move to community, day-stay or outpatient care, even 
where this would serve patients better and offer greater value for 
money.»87 Hence, Area Health Boards were criticised for not being 
sufficiently responsive to consumers' changing needs, and for 
perpetuating the focus on the 'bricks and mortar' of health services. 
In addition, the system was also criticised on a number of other grounds. 
Waiting lists were perceived as being too high, and there was a lack of 
sufficient management information, especially on the costs of services. 
The fragmented funding for primary, secondary and accident care, and 
the poor integration between the$e sectors, were also targeted as key 
problem areas, with the Green and White Paper claiming "no one agency 
has responsibility for ensuring that a person's care is well managed, or 
meets their needs in adequately in a cost-effective way."88 As such, the 
system suffered from duplication of services, and poor communication 
and co-ordination, with consumers at risk of "falling between the 
cracks."S9 
87Ibid, p. 13. 
88Ibid, p.42. 
89Ibid. 
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In response to these perceived failings, the government argued that 
radical reform of the health system was needed; reform that embodied a 
separation of the purchaser from the provider . To this effect, Area 
Health Boards were immediately dis-established, with Commissioners 
being appointed to oversee their functions until the reforms came into 
effect in July 1993. Their functions would then be the responsibility of 
two new organisations, Regional Health Authorities and Crown Health 
Enterprises. On the purchasing side, four RHAs would be established to 
be responsible for the purchase of all publicly funded health and 
disability support services for their respective populations. 9o They would 
purchase both primary and secondary care, and would do this through 
contracting with competing public, private, and voluntary agencies. 
They would be funded through the Ministry of Health, and would be 
governed by an appointed Board of directors instead of elected officials. 
RHAs were required only tef consult with communities over the range 
, . 
of services to be provided in their localities. With the loss of direct, 
elected representation, this was a substantial loss of power for local 
communities.91 
Secondly, the way in which health serVIces would be provided was 
reorganised. Public hospitals were reshaped along commercial lines to 
become Crown Health Enterprises. Unlike Area Health Boards, CHEs 
were to «operate on a business-like basis," and were to make a return for 
their shareholding Ministers.92 Their funding would be directly related 
to their ability to compete with other public, private and voluntary 
90Initially, the government intended to create competition for the RHAs through the establishment of 
Health Care Plans (HCPs), but in response to public opposition and administrative difficulties, the HCPs 
were indefinitely delayed. 
91See George Salmond, "A Community Left Behind" in Lyndon Keene (ed), Health Reforms: A Second 
Opinion, Wellington: Wellington Health Action Committee, 1992, p. 11, and John Martin, "The Case 
for Local Voice" in Lyndon Keene (ed), Health Reforms: A Second Opinion, Wellington: Wellington 
Health Action Committee, 1991, p. 22. . 
92Upton, YOUI' Health and the Public Health, op. cit., p. 35. 
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providers for RHA contracts. Where it was not suitable for smaller 
hospitals to become CHEs, local communities were given the option of 
assuming ownership of their local facilities as Community Trusts (CTs). 
This option was subject to government approval and economic viability. 
While it allowed communities more involvement in the provision of 
health services to their area, these trusts would be dependent on their 
ability to successfully negotiate contracts for their funding. 93 
In separating the purchasing role from the provider, the government 
sought to create a competitive, 'quasi-market' in which RHAs would 
purchase services for their local populations from competing providers. 
It was assumed the establishment of competing providers would place 
pressure on these organisations to deliver the most efficient forms of 
health service for a given quality. This would then lead to a system 
which would allow "more people [to be] treated with the same or better 
quality of service, for the same amount of money."94 Its designers also 
intended it to stimulate innovative ways of delivering health care, and 
to promote greater flexibility within the health system, thus better 
equipping it to adjust to the changing demands of consumers.95 
93In addition to these steps, the government also implemented changes to the system of user part charges, 
and established a National Advisory Committee on Core Health and Disability Services to develop a list 
of "core services". Core services would be services that "everyone should have access [to] on affordable 
terms and without unreasonable waiting time." See Upton, or cit, p. 75. RHAs and Healthcare Plans 
would be required to purchase this list of services, and the government would assist all consumers to obtain 
these services. The government contended the concept of core services would not only allow the 
government to limit its obligations to provide access to health services, but it would also facilitate better 
rationing of scarce resources and control the growth of medical expenditure. In addition to these steps, the 
government established a Public Health Commission (PHC) to assume responsibility for the provision of 
public health services, and indicated its intention to review the means by which the health system was 
financed. The PHC was later reintegrated back into the Ministry of Health, and the government decided 
to retain a tax based system of financing the health system as a result of public opposition and enormous 
practical difficulties in the alternative schemes. 
94Ibid, p. 37. 
95Fougere, "The State and Health Care Reform", op. cir., p. 113. 
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Although these goals are in the public's interest if they improve the 
delivery of health services, it is also evident that quite apart from the 
stated aims, the National government's health reforms sought to 
implement an institutional structure that would privilege the fiscal 
agendas of central government. In theory, this new institutional 
structure would insulate the RHAs "from those [interests] seen to have 
<captured' the old system," so that the RHAs could make the difficult 
rationing decisions that Area Health Boards were seen to be incapable 
of.96 The dominance of providers was weakened by shifting the initiative 
for deciding what services should be delivered from providers, notably 
doctors, to purchasing agencies. By making RHAs responsible for 
determining the range of services to be purchased, and then contracting 
those services out to competing providers, RHAs would have strategic 
control over what health services would be available. Moreover, providers 
would be held at arm's length through the process of formal contracting. 
Local communities no longer had direct, elected representation on the 
governing Boards of the RHAs and CHEs, leaving only the requirement 
for consultation. 
Conclusions 
In New Zealand, reform of the health system has been part of a wider, 
ideologically driven process of reform. The steady rise in prominence of 
the New Right, . has brought massive amounts of change to virtually all 
sectors of New Zealand society, often within short time-frames, and at a 
high social cost. However, this change has been possible because it has 
occurred in a political system that Immergut would classify as having a 
minimum of veto points. New Zealand's very centralised system of 
96Fougere, "What is the Core Business ofVote:Health?" 09. cit., p.21. 
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policy making, with its extremely powerful executive, and few 
constitutional checks and balances offered the ideal arena in which the 
market rationalisers could impose their ideology on the health sector. 
The shape of the health reforms in 1991 represented a great success for 
the 'market rationalisers', and their principal agents, Treasury. 
Significantly, the implementation of a 'managed market' meant that 
Treasury was no longer influencing just the size of the health budget, 
but had become a key actor in determining the actual arrangement of 
the sector. In the designing the new institutional arrangements, the 
market rationalisers had sought to eliminate the veto points that 
Immergut would argue allowed providers and communities to have 
control over resource decisions, and had also introduced new purchasing 
interests that would further undermine the power of communities and 
providers. Although this system gave the appearance of placing the 
government in a stronger position to impose its interests on the system, 
the realities of implementing such a controversial and unpopular system 
would soon undermine the government's institutional strength. 
Chapter Four: Implementation of the Reforms: the Transition to RHAs 
and CHEs 
Introduction 
After the release of the Green and White paper, the government's next 
challenge was the implementation of the reforms. The government 
sought to complete the transformation to the new system as quickly as 
possible, but soon discovered that the implementation process would be 
far from smooth. The influence of the market rationalisers was 
maintained in the implementation process, as new organisations were 
created to establish the RHAs and CHEs which employed key figures 
from Treasury and the private sector.! However, this recruitment of 
prominent people from the private sector with business rather than 
health expertise only fuelled\.public fear over the purpose of the reforms, 
and created an increasingly hostile environment for a government 
seeking re-election. As the ideology of the reforms foundered in the 
wake of this public opposition, the government was forced to modify and 
withdraw the more controversial aspects of the reforms. For rural 
hospitals, the implementation of the reforms brought heightened 
vulnerability. Although the roll over of services required in the first year 
of the reforms gave the hospitals a small measure of security, this was 
offset by the troubled financial position of the CHEs. With the 
retention of debt from the Area Health Boards, and high operating 
deficits, CHEs had strong incentives to make efficiency gains through 
the closure of rural hospitals. 
1 For more development of this, see Brian Easton, "Why Did the Health Reforms Blitzkrieg Fail?", .QP.:. 
and Joe Atkinson, "Health Reforms and 'Thin' Democracy", 
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The Establishment of the RHAs and CHEs 
The proposals to reform the health system as foreshadowed in 1990 were 
officially announced as part of the National government's budget in Ju!y 
1991.2 Due to the lack of consultation in the development of the 
reforms,3 the public was largely unprepared for their strong commercial 
emphasis, and reacted with a mixture of surprise, fear and suspicion. 
Some of this reaction was linked to the release of the reforms as part of a 
Budget specifically intended to redesign crucial parts of the welfare 
system, and to change the public's attitude about the role of the state in 
the provision of welfare services. The Budget included such measures as a 
reduction in the levels of virtually all social welfare benefits, with greater 
targeting and means testing of benefits, the retention and increase of 
the unpopular national superannuation surcharge, and changes to the 
" 
payment of compensation for accident victims. Clearly, the Budget's 
aim was to reduce the government's expenditure on welfare, and to 
encourage the provision of welfare services as a responsibility of 
individuals and families rather than the state. The coupling of the 
health reforms with the Budget suggested to many that the proposed 
restructuring of the health sector was more concerned with allowing the 
government to reduce its expenditure and involvement in health rather 
than creating a better health system. 
Consequently, the release of the reforms with the Budget pushed to the 
limit the public's willingness to accept the health reforms as necessary 
2For an analysis of this Budget, see Jonathon Boston and Paul Dalziel (eds), The Decent Society?, 
Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
3Atkinson, "Health Reforms and 'Thin' Democracy", p. 195, and Alan Gray, "Good Health Care 
is Everybody's Business" in Health Reforms: A Second Opinion, Wellington: Wellington Health Action 
Committee, 1992, p. 12. 
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and beneficiaL The sheer magnitude and scope of the reforms meant 
they would have been difficult to accept at any time, but they were even 
more so in a context of sweeping reform to a welfare system that had for 
so long been a source of national pride. This issue had been recognised 
by the public relations firm Logos hired by the government to make the 
Budget more attractive to the public. Accordingly, Logos specifically 
recommended launching the health reforms before the Budget to 
separate the two, and to prevent the complexity of the health reforms 
detracting from the overall message of the Budget. In the «messy last-
minute scramble"4 before the release of the Budget, however, this 
recommendation was not followed by the government, and as a result, 
the launch of the health reforms was a «political and public relations 
fiasco. "5 
In Canterbury, for example, ".tural communities reacted with shock at the 
announcement of the reforms. With the abolition of the Area Health 
Boards, the fragile security that each community had worked so hard to 
achieve for its hospital was destroyed. This created strong feelings of 
disappointment and frustration.in these communities, which were 
exacerbated by the realisation that the issue would have to be 
renegotiated, but this time with new organisations likely to hold very 
different priorities from those of the Area Health Board. 
However, the public's feelings of concern were considered less important 
by the government than the need to get the reform process under way. 
The government imposed a very tight deadline on the implementation 
of the health reforms, requiring them to be fully operational by 1 July 
4Atkinson, "Health Reforms and 'Thin' Democracy", op. cit., p. 198. 
5Ibid. 
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1993, only two years after their announcement. This was in keeping 
with the trend of rapid policy implementation initiated under the 
Labour government and reflected the National government's concern 
with making the reforms operational before the general election in 
1993. The presence of such powerful stakeholders in the health system as 
the medical profession, who had a history of successfully resisting 
previous government efforts at reform, as well as anticipation of the 
public discontent that the reforms were going to produce, created a sense 
of urgency for the government that the new structures be established as 
quickly as possible to ensure their survival. 
Although the government had stated in the Green and White Paper 
that reform would be implemented in a "well-managed, co-ordinated, 
and timely way," their deadline made this commitment virtually 
impossible.6 Constraints on··time created the conditions in which hasty, 
and in hindsight unwise, decisions over the implementation of the 
reforms would be made.? This could initially be seen with the decision 
not to give the Department of Health responsibility for implementing 
the reforms. The Department was.rejected because it was perceived to be 
dominated by <vested interests' protective of the old system. Instead the 
Department was to administer the existing system, while a Health 
Reforms Group (HRG) was established in the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) to oversee the reform process. 8 The 
HRG formally encompassed the Health Reforms Directorate (HRD), 
which was responsible for creating the Regional Health Authorities; the 
National Interim Provider Board (NIPB), appointed to establish the 
6Upton, Your Health and the Public Health, op. cit., p. 127. 
7For more development of this, again see, Brian Easton, "How Did The Health Reforms Blitzkrieg 
Fail?", op. cit., Joe Atkinson, "Health Reform and 'Thin' Democracy, op. cit., and Simon Ferguson, 
The Inconvenient Realities of Health Reform, op. cit. 
8Atkinson, "Health Reforms and Thin Democracy", op. cit., p. 199. 
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providers, particularly Crown Health Enterprises; and the 
Communications and Co-ordination Unit (CCU), responsible for co-
ordinating and communicating the reform process. 9 The HRG's 
placement with the DPMC was significant because it allowed the 
DPMC to maintain a close working relationship with Treasury, and for 
Treasury to have considerable oversight of the implementation of the 
reforms. As the HRG recruited staff from TreasUlY and from sources 
outside the health sector to occupy key positions within its ranks, this also 
strengthened TreasUly's direct influence on the reform process. 
The heavy reliance on personnel from outside the health sector to 
implement the reforms encouraged skilled health administrators to 
leave the sector. Their departure not only created a significant loss of 
expertise and 'corporate memory,' but, as Easton argues, meant that 
people with little experience in health administration were making 
critical decisions about how the reforms would operate in practice. In 
turn, this hampered the successful implementation of the reforms, for 
health presents its own set of unique difficulties which warrant 
specialised expertise. Io The use of staff from TreasUlY and private sector 
businesses also opened the way for the reformers, and particularly the 
market rationalisers, "to impose their own vested interests on the sector," 
interests which in Easton's view could lead to the eventual privatisation 
of the system. II 
The spectre of privatisation has been a recurrent theme which has 
dogged the health reforms. Although the chief aim of the health 
reforms was claimed to be the creation of a quasi-market where 
9Ibid. 
10Easton, "How Did The Health Reforms Blitzkrieg Fail?", ~ p. 226. 
11 Ibid. 
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autonomous purchaser and provider organisations would have strong 
incentives to operate efficiently, and gain the maximum benefit from 
every Vote:Health dollar, this is only one of two frameworks in which 
the Green and White Paper can be understood. The Green and White 
Paper could be and was interpreted by many as introducing the 
structures which could lead to the eventual privatisation of the health 
system. 12 In the initial stages of the reforms, the appointment of high 
profile businessmen such as Sir Ronald Trotter and Dr Peter Troughton 
to control the provider side of the reforms fuelled public concern that 
the reforms would lead to the commercialisation of health, and the 
eventual privatisation of the system. Both Trotter and Troughton had 
backgrounds in restructuring and were strong advocates of privatisation, 
but they had no prior experience in health. Described as "can-do" men, 
Trotter and Troughton were careless of political processes, and held little 
regard for the need to build policy consensus or to generate public 
legitimacy. 13 Although the government argued they were involved 
because of their business expertise, their appointment to key positions 
within the reform structure created a strong link between business and 
health, and between those interests supportive of privatisation and the 
new provider organisations. 
To initiate the provider side of the reforms, the government appointed 
Sir Ronald Trotter to lead the National Interim Provider Board 
(NIPB), and under his direction it worked very quickly. Continuing the 
12See among others, Brian Easton, "How Did The Health Reforms Blitzkrieg Fam", Geoff 
Fougere, "Restructuring the Health Sector: Bringing Politics Back In", Discussant paper presented at 
Health Services Research Centre Conference: 'Emerging Themes in New Zealand Health Care' 
Wellington, 29 November 1994; Jane Kelsey, The New Zealand Experiment, op. cit.; R. Bowie and 1. 
Shirley, "Political and Economic Perspectives on Recent Health Policy" in John Spicer, Andrew Trlin 
and Jo Ann Walton (eds), Social Dimensions of Health and Disease: New Zealand Perspectives, Palmerston 
North: Dunmore Press, 1994; Wellington Health Action Committee, Health Reforms: A Second Opinion, 
Wellington: Wellington Health Action Committee, 1992. 
13Atkinson, "Health Reforms and 'Thin' Democracy", op. cit., pp.204-205. 
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trend of using outside consultants, the NIPB commissioned a number of 
private consultancy firms, including CS First Boston, to report on 
various aspects of the Crown Health Enterprise concept, as well as the 
priorities of the NIPB.14 Predictably, CS First Boston urged a strong 
commercial focus for the CHEs, and this was adopted by the NIPB. The 
NIPB released its findings in May 1992 in a report entitled Providing 
Better Health Care for New Zealanders,I5 In this report, the NIPB 
claimed that the previous system was beset by structural inadequacies and 
perverse incentives which meant increases in funding did not produce 
equivalent increases in output,I6 As a consequence, it recommended 
that CHEs should be formed along a businesslike, profit-making model, 
and be required to pay dividends to the government. Primarily, this was 
because the report contended that profit making organisations had 
(( direct incentives to take an active and compelling interest in their 
business efficiency," and ten1ed to be ((better run, more flexible in their 
approach and noticeably more innovative" than non-profit making 
organisations ,17 
As in the Green and White Paper, competition was again heralded as 
crucial to the system, being cited .as ((the only way of ensuring, on a 
continuing basis, constant innovation and best value at optimum quality 
for every health dollar."18 The NIPB believed there was ample scope for 
competition in the health sector, the sole exception being twenty four 
hour accident arid emergency services which were identified as having 
14CS First Boston, Identification of Tasks and Priorities for the National Interim Provider Board, Report 
prepared for the National Interim Provider Board. Wellington: CS First Boston, 1991. 
15National Interim Provider Board, Providing Better Health Care for New Zealanders: Report to the 
Government and New Zealand Public, Wellington: National Interim Provider Board, 1992. 
16Specifically, the NIPB report claimed that in four years, Vote:Health was increased by 20 percent, and 
while not all of that money went to public hospitals, public hospital output rose by only 1.8 percent in real 
terms. National Interim Provider Board. Providing Better Health Care for New Zealanders, op. cit., p.6. 
17Ibid., p. 38. 
18Ibid., p.8. 
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only limited potential for competition. For the system to work 
effectively, however, the report. argued that CHEs needed to be 
'competitively neutral'. This not only involved "neutrality of funding," 
where RHA contracts would be awarded "irrespective of provider 
ownership" so as to encourage efficiency, responsiveness and innovation, 
but also "neutrality between alternative providers," where providers 
owned by the Crown would not have advantages over other providers in 
the competition for contracts.1 9 
Competitive neutrality also involved CHEs retaining the debt incurred 
by Area Health Boards, although the report also acknowledged that 
there might be a need for the government to restructure some aspects of 
that debt to allow CHEs to be commercially viable. Moreover, the 
report advocated that the Crown might need to finance part of the 
CHEs' debt, but that this debt would be on "commercial terms," and 
would need to be refinanced "over a short period of years by direct 
borrowing from capital markets on a normal businesslike basis."20 
For rural hospitals, one of the most significant aspects of the report was 
the argument for CHEs to be insulated from direct political influence. 
The NIPB believed that for CHEs to be commercially successful they 
needed the freedom to rationalise, lease or sell surplus assets without 
political pressure from politicians. Hence, the report advocated an 
"arm's length" reiationship between the government and the managers 
of CHEs, and emphasised the importance of CHEs being sufficiently 
autonomous to make decisions on the effective use of resources, even 
when those decisions would be unpopular.21 The report argued that any 
19Ibid., p. 54. 
20 . Ibid., p. 62. 
21 Ibid.) p. 11. 
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interference by politicians would only compromise the efficiency and 
competitiveness of the CHEs, and urged politicians to focus any concerns 
over equity or access on the RHAs, as the purchasers of health care. In 
the Chairman's foreword to the report, Sir Ronald Trotter claimed that 
Ministers «add most value when they deliberately limit their own role to 
setting the right goals, monitoring performance against those goals and 
holding boards strictly accountable for their performance."22 He also 
warned that Ministers who did try to influence the resource decisions of 
CHEs could find themselves being held responsible for their actions and 
unable to hold the CHE boards accountable for the performance of the 
organisation. 23 Rather, accountability of CHE directors should centre 
around their ability to be "expeditiously replaced" if they failed to meet 
their objectives. 
In October 1992, the NIPB,'was disbanded and replaced by the Crown 
Health Enterprise Establishment Unit (CHEEU), headed by Dr Peter 
Troughton. The CHEEU's task was to refine and implement the 
recommendations of the NIPB. To ensure adequate competition, the 
NIPB report had recommended that 20 to 25 Crown Health Enterprises 
be established, each located around one acute care hospital. The 
CHEEU accepted this, and appointed fourteen Crown Health 
Enterprise Advisory Committees (CHEACs) in each of the Area Health 
Board districts to advise on the number and configuration of the CHEs 
and possible community trusts. These committees comprised between 
five and six people, appointed principally for their commercial and 
financial expertise. 
22Ibid., p.8. 
23Ibid., p.8. 
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In Christchurch, fierce debate erupted over the number of CHEs that 
should be created. Clinicians clearly favoured only one CHE, but other 
groups advocated more, arguing one CHE would be too large and 
cumbersome. Eventually, the issue was resolved with a decision to have 
two CHEs. These were divided so that one CHE, Canterbury Health, 
was responsible for all the acute secondary and tertiary services, general 
medicine, general surgery, and all of the specialities in medicine and 
surgery, while the second CHE, Healthlink South, would provide 
community based services, women, child and family health, elderly 
health, mental health, and some public health services. The 
Christchurch solution, however, was not adopted elsewhere. 
Placement of the Rural Hospitals into the New Structure 
It was only once this structure had been determined that the issue of the 
'. 
rural hospitals was addressed. After the boundaries of the CHEs and the 
RHAs were finalised, Canterbury was left with eight rural hospitals. The 
question of their long term position, however, was delayed because the 
CHEAC did not see them as an essential part of the CHE establishment 
process. As a member of the Canterbury CHEAC commented: 
... it was what are we going to do with the big events) is it important to us to 
decide on the rural ones as part of that process) and the answer we had to that 
was nO,24 
To place the hospitals into this new structure, a one day workshop was 
conducted by CHEAC in mid 1992. Each hospital was represented by 
the principal nurse, the local GPs, the local mayor, and other relevant 
community members. At this meeting, each group was given the option 
24Intervlew, Former CHEAC member, 25 May 1996. 
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of becoming a community trust, but this was unanimously rejected, and 
instead, all expressed a strong preference for being under the control of a 
CHE. The reasons behind this rejection are multifold. First, the 
representatives of each hospital felt that if they were to become a 
community trust, there would be greater potential for the hospital to 
close should the trust collapse. This was a very genuine concern, with 
each set of representatives voicing fears about the lack of surety in 
obtaining RHA contracts, the inability of the community to run the 
hospital without the support of a larger organisation, and the possibility 
of not having enough skilled community members willing to donate 
their time to run the trust. As one principal nurse commented: 
. . . I felt very strongly that. . . our little hospital needed this umbrella of 
expertise provided by a large corporate outfit such as a CHE, and I truly felt 
that.. [we} needed the support of that conglomerate, of the big sister or 
brother thing, that we'd never c?pe without it.25 
Consequently, they perceived the CHE as insulating them from these 
concerns, and as giving them a measure of security that they would not 
have as autonomous units. 
Mter this decision had been taken, each set of representatives then 
worked through a process of examining the central issues for their 
hospitals, as they were defined by the CHEAC team. At the end of that 
process each group made a decision to go with the CHE that they felt 
had the closest links with the type of services their hospitals provided. As 
a result, Akaroa, Darfield, Ellesmere and Waileari chose to join 
Canterbury Health, because of their acute and recuperative care focus, 
while Lincoln, Rangiora, Kaikoura, and Oxford became part of 
25Interview, Former Staff member Darfleld Hospital, 26 Apri/1996. 
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Healthlink South because of the maternity and elderly services they 
provided. 
However, this process to place the rural hospitals under the CHE 
structure was not viewed by all participants as being a genuine 
consultative exercise. Some of the principal nurses who were interviewed 
commented that they felt the issue of how to divide the hospitals 
between the two CHEs had been decided before the workshop was 
conducted, and that the equal division of the hospitals between the two 
CHEs was the best way to deal with what was seen by CHEAC as a 
difficult problem. As two principal nurses commented: 
We were virtually pushed into it, the decision had been made and we had to 
be seen to be going along with it. 26 
I think a decision was made to\Split them up, four each eHE, and even though 
as nurse managers and GPs and other interested folk [we} were led to believe 
that the workshop we went to was to decide our futures and where did we feel 
we should sit, I think the decision had been made. Because during the day .. 
. we were actively encouraged to re-think . .. and Tm quite sure that politically, 
the four-four formula had been seen to be the probable answer, and yet a 
consultation process was gone through. 27 
This perception that the decision had been made prior to the workshop 
stemmed from a number of factors. First, the representatives believed 
that rural hospitals were seen in the post-reform era as being inefficient 
and anachronistic, and in conjunction with their small size, and recent 
government policy seeking to de-emphasise the focus on the 'bricks and 
mortar' of institutions, had a more symbolic than essential role. 
Consequently, this fostered a perception among the representatives of 
26Interview, Principal nurse, 18 January 1996. 
27Interview, Former Staff member Darfield Hospital, 26 April 199G. 
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the small hospitals that the decision was made before the workshop to 
divide the hospitals equally between the CHEs so as to evenly distribute 
their (burden'. 
This was strongly denied by a representative of CHEAC, who felt that 
perhaps a sense of the decision being pre-determined came about because 
the workshop was a very structured process. This process was designed to 
make the participants confront what CHEAC considered to be the 
relevant issues on the topic, and to make decisions based on the 
individual characteristics and needs of particular hospitals. As a member 
of CHEAC commented: 
... there was a very deliberate attempt to have them go through confronting a 
series of issues . . . they were being forced to make decisions on the topic, rather 
than on a whole range of other issues, like which one had the biggest budget, 
who was going to give them the.~greatest assurances of future security . .. because 
[those were) not things that could be answered 28 
These opposite accounts clearly indicate the different way rural hospitals 
at the periphery, and urban administrators from the centre, view the 
Issue. From CHEAC's point of view, they had defined the most 
. . 
appropriate criteria in which the hospitals were to base their decision: the 
services the rural hospitals provided and the services that would be the 
responsibility of each CHE. As a member of CHEAC commented: 
The issues that were critical. .. [were} for a particular CHE, was it most 
important that it had an interrelationship with an organisation that dealt 
with acute services, and recuperation from hospital operations and so forth, or 
was it more important to have . had a closer relationship with an organisation 
that dealt with geriatrics and older people, or womens health and birthing.29 
28Interview, former CHEAC member, 25 May 1996. 
29Interview, former CHEAC member, 25 May 1996. 
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For the representatives of the rural hospitals these criteria did not address 
their most pressing concerns. However, the key issues to which the rural 
hospitals wanted answers, such as which organisation would give them 
the best chance of survivaL could not be answered. Therefore, although 
the representatives of the hospitals were apparently free to choose 
between the two CHEs, they were making a choice based on uncertainty 
and on a lack of knowledge about what to them were the critical 
questIons. 
By the conclusion of this process, the rural hospitals had been placed into 
the new CHE structure for Canterbury. This decision was taken using a 
service based approach as opposed to a needs based approach. The use of a 
service based approach, however, was not necessarily the best method for 
the rural hospitals because;jt is unable to take into account a wider 
concept of rural health or rural health services. In contrast, a needs based 
approach is designed to recognise the total health needs of a . rural 
community, and to improve the hospital's ability to fulfil those needs 
should the community wish for the hospital to be retained. As a former 
Canterbury Area Health Board staff member who was managing the 
rural hospitals during this transition, commented: 
We [didn't} say heres a community with a hospital in it, what services are 
currently being delivered from this hospital, do we want to continue to deliver 
those services, or do we want to develop a wider health service around that 
buildingfor that community? .. [It was} taking the here and now and saying 
what do we do with it, not saying heres the here and now, it looks like it might 
need modifying, lets put it in an environment that can modify it in the future 
to service the needs of the population. 30 
30Interview, Former Canterbury Area Health Board staff member, 19 April 1996. This individual was 
also involved in the transition to the new CHE structure, but will continue to be referenced as a former 
Canterbury Area Health Board staff member. 
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Once the hospitals had been placed with a CHE, they then had to be 
integrated into the structure of the CHE itself. The two CHEs took 
different approaches to this task, initially causing much uncertainty as it 
was feared this could create the opportunity for the hospitals to be dosed. 
In Canterbury Health, a needs-based approach was taken, and the 
hospitals were placed with Ashburton and Community Health Services 
on the basis that they shared a common philosophical background which 
could be mutually supportive: 
It was a needs based decision . . . with the view that the people managing 
Ashburton would have a similar understanding of the problems, the threat of 
closure, of withdrawal of services, of the forming community, and wanting to . 
. . hopefolly gather strength in each other's common understanding, and also 
being able to look at the needs of the community that they served, which were 
very similar, and so develop the services on a needs basis as opposed to an 
existing services basis.31 ' . 
In contrast, the hospitals that agreed to go with Healthlink South were 
placed using a service based approach. As a result, Lincoln and Rangiora 
were located in the maternity division, and Oxford and Kaikoura were 
fitted into the elderly health division. Separating these hospitals 
administratively, however, bolstered concerns that as small, isolated units 
they would be more vulnerable to dosure.32 
Nonetheless, the restructuring did create the opportunity for some 
improvements to be made to the hospitals. This was particularly 
important as many of them were suffering from the deferred 
maintenance that had been prevalent under the Area Health Board. 
31 Interview, Former Canterbury Area Health Board staff member, 19 April 1996. 
32Interview, Former Canterbury Area Health Board staff member, 19 April 1996. 
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Crucially, fire sprinkler protection was installed, which, with other 
measures, made the hospitals more viable in the new era, and created a 
sense of security that helped offset some of the uncertainty and suspicion 
that had been produced by the reforms. As the former Canterbury Area 
Health Board staff member managing the hospitals commented: 
We painted, spitted and polished, and it was really nice to have those carrots 
to offer people, that the health reforms {weren'tJ all bad, Look you're getting 
this and this and this, and they did . . and it was a positive thing for all of 
them, so they felt much more secure. 33 
The Lead Up to the 1993 Election 
The approach of the 1993 general election was an anxious time for the 
rural hospitals. The government, and the new RHAs and CHEs were 
being coy about the future ,of rural hospitals, to prevent adverse public 
reaction. Instead, the government concentrated on bedding down the 
reforms, and attempting to generate support for them prior to the 
election. This, however, was not an easy task. Network 
Communications, another public relations company contracted by the 
Health Reforms Coordination and Communications Unit to assess 
public response to the reforms, recorded that they were seen as ((costly, 
unfair, and ill-considered."34 The Tamaki by-election in 1992, which 
National came close to losing, also signalled the need for an advertising 
campaign to turn the tide of public opinion. However, that campaign 
was not initiated until May 1993, and as Easton argues, the damage had 
already been done and the campaign came too late to be effective.35 
33Interview, Former Canterbury Area Health Board staff member, 19 April 1996. 
34Atkinson, "Health Reforms and 'Thin' Democracy", op. cit., p. 201. 
35Easton, "How Did The Health Reforms Blitzkrieg Fail?", ~,p. 229. 
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The difficulties of accomplishing such radical reform so quickly also 
meant that much of the ideology of the reforms had been sacrificed to 
the practicalities of implementation. Intense public opposition and 
serious administrative difficulties meant that by the end of 1992 the 
government had abandoned Health Care Plans, and agreed to continue 
the funding of the health system through taxation. Furthermore, the 
National Advisory Committee on Core Health Services had rejected the 
idea of producing an explicit list of services and, instead, was focusing on 
gathering information on the costs and effectiveness of current health 
services.36 
In spite of the backdown of the government in these areas, public 
discontent continued to be fuelled by the Crown Health Enterprises, 
particularly with their strong commercial focus. In part, this stemmed 
from the requirement in the~ draft Health and Disability and Services 
Bill that CHEs be as "profitable and efficient as comparable business not 
owned by the Crown."37 Strong public criticism that CHEs would be 
more concerned with making a return on their assets rather than 
providing health services meant that the word «profitable" was replaced 
with «successful/' but this alteration .did not ease the public's concern, as 
the change seemed to do little to alter the spirit of the law,38 This 
change also did not clarify the relationship between the dual 
requirements that the CHEs act as successful businesses as well as being 
socially responsibl~ to the communities they served. As these commercial 
and social objectives could very easily conflict with each other, this only 
further confused the exact role of the CHEs. 
36See Jacqueline Cumming, "Core Services and Priority Setting: The New Zealand Experience", Health 
Policy, vol. 29,1994, pp. 41-60. 
37Health and Disability Services Bill, 1992, s.25. 
38Toni Ashton, "From Evolution to Revolution: Restructuring The New Zealand Health System", 
Health Care Analysis, Vol. 1, 1993, p. 61. 
Implementation of the Reforms: the Transition to RHAs and CHEs 114 
The government's difficulties with the unpopular health reforms led to 
the replacement of Simon Upton as Minister of Health by Bill Birch in 
March 1993. Described as one of the "toughest administrators in the. 
Cabinet," Birch was a more pragmatic politician than the intellectual 
Upton, and it was Birch who ultimately ensured that the RHAs and 
CHEs were operational by their deadline of J uly,39 Birch was unwilling 
to let the issue of rural hospitals become a political liability for the 
government in the lead up to the election. This stance saw him 
intervene to guarantee surgical services for a further fourteen months at 
Balclutha Hospital which had been identified for closure by the new 
CHE.40 This interference was in direct contrast to the recommendation 
of the National Interim Provider Board that CHEs should be free from 
political interference, and led the chairman of the Otago Crown Health 
Enterprise Advisory Committee, Sir Clifford Skeggs, to reSIgn 1ll 
protest. 41 Although Birch argued the intervention was to allow 
communities sufficient time to evaluate whether the services could be 
retained in some other way, his interference was a clear indication of a 
government under pressure with the health reforms. 42 
Exacerbating the government's position were the unresolved financial 
troubles of the CHEs. Two days before the reforms were to come into 
effect, the government announced that CHEs which ran into serious 
financial trouble ~ould receive a capital injection. This would involve 
restructuring their balance sheets to return them to a commercial 
position. A $200 million loan facility was also set up for CHEs to borrow 
39Easton, "How Did the Health Reforms Blitzkrieg Fail?", op. cit" p. 230. 
4°Astrid Smeele, "Short Reprieve for Balclutha Hospital", Otago Daily Times, 21 May 1993, p. 1; Oliver 
Riddell, "Birch's Action Over Hospital Angers CHE", Christchurch Press, 24 May 1993, p. 6. 
41 Evening Posr, "Skeggs Quits, Citing Interference By Govt', 25 May 1993, p. 1. 
42Bill Birch, "Birch's Breathing Space", New Zealand Herald, 12 June 1993, p. 8. 
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extra money to cover capital works, maintenance, and any shortfalls in 
the cost of providing services. 
For rural hospitals, however, the implementation of the reforms in July 
brought a renewed sense of security. This was because in the first year of 
the reforms, the government announced that all existing services would 
be purchased on a roll over basis. In this agreement, the government 
directed the RHAs to purchase the same range and volume of services 
from the CHEs as had been provided by the Area Health Board for 98% 
of the AHB's former funding. This roll over was partly motivated by 
the recognition that much of the necessary information required to 
operate a market in health was still missing. The CHEs did not have the 
information on the costs of their services, and hence could not produce 
adequate information on the prices they would require for their services; 
this made it virtually imp.'ossible for the RHAs to engage in any 
competitive tendering. 43 The roll over of services also meant that no 
major surprises would be generated by the health sector in the run up to 
the election. 
In the 1993 general election in November, health, and more specifically 
the government's health reforms, became a key issue. Although the 
government continued to promote the reforms, the lack of public 
consultation, the strong commercial emphasis of the CHEs, and the 
growing waiting lists meant that many segments of society were still 
unconvinced of the merit of the reforms. As a result, the government 
only narrowly regained power, and lost the huge majority that had 
characterised their win in 1990. After the election, Jenny Shipley 
43See Toni Ashton, "The Purchaser-Provider Split in New Zealand: The Story So Far", Australian 
Health Review, vol. 18, no. 1, 1995, pp. 43-59; Colleen Flood and Michael Trebilcock, "Voice and Exit 
in New Zealand's Health Care 
Sector", Contracting in the Health Sector, Auckland: The Foundation, 1994. 
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replaced Bill Birch as the new Minister of Health, and rejected calls to 
abandon the reforms. Instead, she argued that her role was to make the 
reforms succeed to benefit the people of New Zealand. 
This was not to be an easy task, however, particularly as the Ministry of 
Health's post-election briefing document warned the government of the 
likelihood of rural hospital closure. Due to a combination of factors, 
including underdeveloped management systems, operating deficits, and 
valuation and balance sheet difficulties, the briefing document 
identified that CHEs were experiencing severe financial difficulties and 
were not independent, financially viable l1;nits. Although the 
government had created the Residual Health Management Unit as a 
source of temporary finance for CHEs, it was acknowledged that CHEs 
would have to make significant efficiency gains, and where possible, find 
alternative sources of revenu~ to the RHAs to become financially viable. 
Crucially, the briefing document noted that efficiency gains were most 
likely to involve a "reconfiguration" in the way CHEs currently did 
business, and that this was likely to entail "reducing or closing 
uneconomic satellite hospitals, particularly in rural areas."44 
The briefing document also emphasised that the population based 
funding of RHAs, and the moves to bring RHAs to funding equity, 
meant that some CHEs, particularly those in the South Island, were 
going to be seriously affected. Under the reforms, the funding of RHAs 
for personal health and disability support services is determined by a 
population based funding formula. This formula calculates each RHA's 
share of the total available funding according to the size and 
44Ministry of Health, Ministry of Health Post Election Briefing: Strategic Issues in the Health Sector, Vol. 
1., Wellington: Ministry of Health, November 1993, p. 31. 
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characteristics of their population and the factors affecting the need for 
health services. These entitlements are known as 'equity'. This equity is 
then compared to the 'nominal funding' to be given to the RHA. in the 
year to ascertain whether an RHA is over-funded, that is above equity, or 
under-funded, that is below equity. The government then makes 
adjustments to the current or nominal funding to move the RHAs 
closer to equity.45 
The move to equity funding was particularly significant for the 
. Southern RHA because it was identified as being over-funded, and hence 
would not receive the same increases in funding as RHAs in the North 
Island. This problem was also exacerbated for the Southern RHA by the 
increasing amounts of revenue being absorbed by the demand driven 
areas of primary care and pharmaceutical expenditure. As a consequence, 
the move to equity funding,,:meant that unless the SRHA could control 
or reduce its demand driven expenditure, it would have fewer resources 
available to fund health services delivered by CHEs. This would place 
even greater pressure on CHEs to make efficiency gains through such 
measures as the closure of rural. hospitals. Community resistance to 
proposed closures, however, was likely to create strong pressure to review 
the means of funding RHAs. The post election briefing document 
acknowledged that the government could pay CHEs additional subsidies 
to improve their financial position, but asserted that such measures were 
likely to reduce the incentives for CHEs to behave efficiently. 46 
45Ministry of Health, Purchasing For Your Health: A Performance Report on the First Year of the 
Regional Health AuthOl'ities and the Public Health Commission, Wellington: Performance Monitoring 
and Review Unit, Ministry of Health, 1994. 
46Ministry of Health, Ministry of Health Post Election Briefing: Strategic Issues in the Health Sector, $ 
cit., p. 31. 
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The financial troubles of the CHEs continued to cause difficulties for 
the government. In December 1993, the chair of the Crown Health 
Enterprise Boards' Consultative Committee wrote to the Ministers of 
Health, Finance and Crown Health Enterprises criticising the 
commercial environment in which they were to operate. In particular, 
the group stated «this business of providing health is not a genuine 
commercial mode. We are not able to significantly influence the 
market, adjust prices or alter the nature of supply in order to capture a 
market in the way other commercial organisations do."47 The severity of 
the CHE's financial position led to an increase of $125 million in health 
spending in the post election Budget. This funding increase was to 
boost the position of the CHEs, but was also to improve the ability of 
the RHAs to purchase services from the CHEs.48 In early 1994, 
Healthcare Otago announced its intention to bid for a contract to 
manage private hospitals in Saudi Arabia. For a CHE in financial crisis, 
the Saudi venture offered a valuable source of alternative revenue. The 
actions of the CHE, however, caused an intense political controversy, 
which resulted in strong criticism that the venture would prevent the 
CHE from fulfilling its primary obligation of providing quality health 
and disability support services to its own reglOn. The political 
embarrassment led to the resignation of the CHE's Chief Executive 
Officer, James Patterson. 
Conclusions 
By the beginning of 1994, the transformation of the health system to a 
'managed market' was complete. The initial design of the reforms had 
47p Wilson, Letter to the Hon. Jenny Shipley, Minister of Health, Hon Paul East, Minister of Crown 
Health Enterprises, and Rt. Hon. Bill Birch, Minister of Finance, 17 December 1993. 
48Michael Rentoul, "Health gets $125m Top-Up from Gon", Christchurch Press, 3 March 1994. 
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been modified by the government in light of the intense public 
opposition to them, and as the ideological basis of the reforms had 
clashed with the political realities of implementing and administering 
such a system. In spite of these modifications, however, the reforms had 
still created an institutional structure that significantly altered the 
power of the key interests in the system. Between the financially 
troubled CHEs and the directives governing the purchasing strategies of 
the RHAs, rural hospitals were positioned extremely precariously. For 
rural communities seeking to retain their hospitals, the reformed health 
system would present them with their greatest challenge to date. 
Chapter Five: Implementation of the Health Reforms: 
Unanticipated Power Relationships Between the 
RHA, CHE and Local Communities 
Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter Four, by the beginning of 1994, the government 
had redesigned the health system to resemble a 'managed market.' The 
separation of the purchasing of health services from their provision had 
attempted to undo what was perceived as provider and community 
capture by eliminating the veto point offered by Area Health Boards. 
The government seemed better placed to impose more stringently its 
imperatives of fiscal control and equity on the system, while the 
abolition of directly elected Area Health Boards meant local 
communities no longer had formal representation in the system. 
According to the design of the reforms, these communities would be less 
able to resist attempts by RHAs and CHEs to redistribute resources in 
the health system through the closure ·of rural hospitals. 
However, once the roll over of services required in the first year of the 
reforms had concluded in mid 1994, the reforms began to produce a 
more fluid distribution of power among RHAs, CHEs and rural 
communities than the government had intended. Both the CHEs and 
rural communities demonstrated an ability to influence the decisions of 
the RHAs, despite the desire of the reformers for the RHAs to hold the 
more powerful position. The power of rural communities to retain their 
hospitals has stemmed from their ability to benefit from the particular 
mix of political factors at the national and local level generated by the 
prospect of rural hospital closure and the unpopularity of the health 
reforms. Paradoxically, this has meant that the desire of the reformers 
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to remove the spectre of <politics' from resource decisions in health has 
proved impossible to achieve. Instead, it is the politics created by the new 
system that local communities and CHEs have learned to exploit so as 
to improve their position. 
The Southern Regional Health Authority and the Dilemma of Rural 
Hospitals: Planning for the South 
When the RHAs came into existence m 1993, they were directed by 
central government to develop purchasing strategies that would improve 
equity of access to health services for their respective populations. l 
Inherent in this requirement, however, was a conflict between financial 
cost and the demands of communities for the retention of current levels 
of services. In the Southern region, these competing tensions were 
especially acute because of the particular characteristics of the region. 
".." 
First, the SRHA had assumed responsibility for an area representing 48 
per cent of the New Zealand land mass. In this area, only two thirds of 
the population lived in cities, with the remainder being thinly dispersed, 
often in places without good public transport and subject to adverse 
weather conditions.2 Hence, for the SRHA to improve equity of access 
for all its citizens, it would need to either substantially increase the 
amount of resources being devoted to services in those remote areas, or 
significantly redistribute existing resources. 
Moreover, the SRHA also identified that senous inequities existed in 
the delivery of health services within the region, arguing that services 
1 Interview, SRHA staff member, 11 December 1996. This requirement to improve access is reflected in 
the six principles which govern the purchasing decisions ofRHAs. The first principle is 'equity', and 
requires RHAs to "improve access of New Zealanders to health and disability services in terms of waiting 
times, geographical accessibility and afFordability." Source: Ministry of Health, Policy Guidelines for 
Regional Health Authorities 1994/95, Wellington: Ministry of Health, 1994, p. 8. 
2Southern Regional Health Authority, Planning For The South: Access to Health and Disability Services 
in the Southern Region, Dunedin: Southern Regional Health Authority, June 1994, p. 6. 
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were being delivered in an unplanned fashion based more on historical 
circumstances than on the present needs of communities} In particular, 
the SRHA considered that those communities with rural hospitals close 
to the facilities of a major city enjoyed a luxury, or above average level of 
hospital service, in comparison to rest of the region. Budgetary 
constraints imposed by the move to equity funding meant the SRHA 
would have to sacrifice services in the more advantaged areas to make 
gains in access for those in the 'worst off areas. 
Although the SRHA knew communities faced with the prospect of 
losing services or facilities would vehemently oppose such moves, the 
SRHA was constrained by its directives from government which require 
it to act in the best interests of the region as a whole. As a result, the 
SRHA used the time provided by the roll over of services in 1993/1994 
to begin work on a set of criteria that would allow for a more structured 
approach to the purchasing of health services in rural areas that would 
also redress some of the existing inequities. The first step in this process 
was a survey conducted in August 1993 that asked over 5000 residents of 
the Southern region what amount .of time they thought was reasonable 
to spend travelling to receive certain health and disability services.4 
These responses were then analysed, and in December 1993 the RHA 
released a discussion document entitled Access To Care which outlined a 
range of travel times to a variety of health and disability services. The 
public's response to. these times was then incorporated with the reaction 
from the RHA's consultation committees, and the results released m 
June 1994 in a planning document entitled Planning for the South.5 
3Southern Regional Health Authority, Planning For The South, op. cit., p.3. 
4Ibid, p. 10. 
5Southern Regional Health Authority, Planning For The South: Access to Health and Disability Services 
in the Southern Region, Dunedin: Southern Regional Health Authority, June 1994. 
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Essentially, Planning for the South outlined a framework where access to 
health and disability support services would be based on the size of a 
community's population, and the travel time by motor car to services. It 
set out four levels of care (levels A to D), and stated 90% of the 
population should have access to those levels within respectively, 30 
minutes, 60 minutes, 90 minutes, and 90 minutes or more. With 
respect to hospital services, the SRHA specified that communities should 
have access to what it considered to be an appropriate range of hospital 
services according to their population size. For populations reaching 
10,000 it was argued that 90% of those people should have access to a 
basic range of community services within 30 minutes, but that this did 
not include "hospital facilities."6 The exception to this was for 
. populations that were one hour or more travel time from their next 
neighbouring centre, and \~t was considered that these populations 
should have a basic range of inpatient beds, managed by their local 
general practitioners. Those populations were specifically identified, and 
in Canterbury they included Akaroa and Waikari, but excluded Darfield 
and Ellesmere. 
Crucially, the criteria laid out in Planning for the South did not mean 
that hospitals such as Darfield would automatically close, but that the 
SRHA was prepared to pay only its benchmark price for the services 
provided at those" facilities. In contrast, for hospitals like Akaroa and 
Waikari, which are an hour or more from the facilities of Christchurch, 
and hence considered to be more geographically isolated, the SRHA was 
willing to pay a premium, or an amount in addition to its benchmark 
price, to ensure services were provided in those areas. 
6Ibid. pp. 11-17. 
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Planning for the South was a watershed document in that it represented 
a critical change to the means that had been used to determine the 
provision of rural hospital services. Under the Hospital and Area 
Health Boards, the provision of hospital services depended primarily on 
utilisation levels and financial viability, as well as on the historical 
provision of services which could be perpetuated by key individuals 
defending the interests of rural hospitals at the Board level. This 
approach was reinforced by rural communities themselves who were 
willing to find services for the hospital to perform in order to retain it, 
with little consideration as to whether having increased hospital services 
was the best use of those resources for their community. As a result, 
regional planning of services was much more unstructured before the 
. health reforms, and as one interviewee commented, there was not the 
same «clarity about what could be expected about access times to services" 
under the Area Health Board system.? With Planning for the South and 
the change to travelling times and population size as the critical criteria, 
the SRHA believed it could take a more consistent and structured 
approach to the purchase of services that would also attempt to redress 
some of the existing inequities in the distribution of services throughout 
the region. As an SRHA staff member commented: 
... [Planning for the South] tried to set out a structured approach to what 
should be purchased around the rural regions in the light of some considerable 
inequities around the place, and to base our purchasing, in the absence of any 
other better information, on what's a reasonable time for people to access 
something. . . So it was really saying in terms of what is the urgency of need to 
access services what's appropriate for scattered populations, recogmsmg you 
can't have everything on your door step. 8 
7Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority, staff member, 27 May 1996. 
8Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority, staff member, 27 May 1996. 
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The SRHA, however, also recognised that Planning for the South was 
only a starting point for discussions over local services, as it would be 
inappropriate to apply the framework rigidly to communities. As a 
result, the SRHA also developed the concept of locality planning, which 
was specifically intended to tailor the framework set out in Planning for 
the South to the individual needs of communities. Formally, locality 
planning comprises two parts. The first is building a picture of the 
locality through the collection of data on its geography, climate and 
. demographic characteristics, as well as on the range of health services 
currently available, the access to those services, the particular health needs 
of that community, and how the community views its present health 
servIces. Second, locality planning entails defining the standard prices 
for each component of the service the RHA wishes to purchase, 
comparing those prices witp. the actual services in the locality, and 
developing plans for any changes.9 The locality profiles were intended to 
work in conjunction with these criteria, particularly as Planning for the 
South did not cover all health and disability support services, to allow the 
SRHA to obtain a more detailed· .understanding of the health needs of 
commullities and develop precise packages of services to meet those 
needs. 
The reaction of rural communities to Planning for the South, however, 
was intense, and strongly negative. Around the region, rural 
communities perceived the SRHA's criteria would mean the closure of 
their local facilities, or the loss of vital surgical services. To some extent, 
this reaction can be attributed to the SRHA not effectively 
9Southern Regional Health Authority, Southern Regional Health Authority Draft Purchase Plan 
1994195, Dunedin: Southern Regional Health Authority, 1994, p.l13. 
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communicating the importance of locality planning to the 
implementation of the Planning for the South framework. Although 
Planning for the South had discussed locality planning and acknowledged 
that the need for in-patient beds would be discussed as part of the locality 
planning initiative, the document's focus was clearly on the levels of care 
and the SRHA's criteria for the provision of hospital services. The media 
releases accompanying Planning for the South also exacerbated this 
situation because they contained statements implying that rural hospital 
services throughout the region would be slashed, and that there would be 
no flexibility from the SRHA. As one SRHA spokesperson recalled: 
... the mistake we made in [the media releases} was not saying this is the 
interpretation for your area) it's negotiable . ... What did corr:e out was the 
appearance of a flit accompli) it was complete) that was the end of h that was 
our view) and that was it. 10 
As a result, the reaction in rural communities to Planning for the South 
was rapid and impassioned, particularly in Ashburton, Balclutha and 
Oamaru who, under the SRHA's criteria, would lose key in-patient 
surgical services. ll In spite of this public reaction to Planning for the 
South, rural communities had no means of changing the criteria of the 
SRHA, and it fell to the CHEs, as the owners of the facilities, to decide 
whether they wished to continue providing rural hospital services. In a 
fascinating contrast, however, the CHEs in Canterbury and Otago 
would react quite differently to the SRHA's criteria, and these reactions 
.10Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority, staff member, 27 May 1996. This was also mentioned 
in interviews with Canterbury Health staff. 
IlSpecifically, Planning For The South stated that it would only purchase specialist medical and surgical 
services from Class C hospitals, or those serving over 25,000 people. As Ashburton's population was 
24,700 it did not fall inside this criteria. Also, the SRHA identified in Planning For The South that for 
populations serving up to 25,000 people, (of which it identified the districts of Ashburton, Oamaru, 
Central Otago/Lakes district, Clutha and Eastern Southland), Ashburton, Oamaru and Clutha exceeded 
the proposed level of services for populations of that size, while Central Otago/Lakes district and Eastern 
Southland fell short. 
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unexpectedly became the critical factors that dictated where the SRHA 
was to focus its attention. 
Critical Role of the CHEs: Contrasting Decisions 0/ Healthcare Otago 
and Canterbury Health 
Although the design of the health reforms sought to gIve RHAs the 
ability to set the agenda for changes to services in their regions, in 
practice, often it has been the RHAs who are compelled to react to the 
decisions made in the first instance by the CHEs. In the Southern 
region, the release of the SRHA's criteria for the purchase of hospital 
services prompted two very different reactions from the CHEs in 
Canterbury and Otago. In Otago, the CHE announced an immediate 
withdrawal from Tapanui, Milton and Roxburgh hospitals,12 while 
Canterbury Health agreed to continue providing services at its four 
\. 
rural hospitals in the short term. 
In essence, the motivations for these different approaches can be traced to 
the history of the two CHEs and their financial position. In Otago, 
the CHE was based on what had b~en the Otago Area Health Board. As. 
a result, it became responsible for much of the same area, inherited the 
same problems, and employed many of the former Area Health Board 
staff. The Otago Area Health Board, however, had been wanting to 
close and downsize many of its rural hospitals for a number of years, and 
in the transfer of staff between the Board and the CHE, this "corporate 
history" surrounding rural hospitals was carried over. As that history had 
been one of wanting to reduce rural hospitals, as one interviewee 
commented, "[Healthcare Otago] just simply followed through with 
12Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
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plans that they'd had in place for a long time ... [and] Planning For The 
South gave them a bit more momentum."13 As a financially troubled 
CHE, Planning for the South allowed Healthcare Otago to reduce some 
of the financial pressure on its budget by withdrawing from rural 
hospital services, while at the same time, conveniently deflecting public 
hostility and blame towards the planning document and the SRHA. 
In contrast, the corporate history surrounding rural hospitals in 
. Canterbury was much more positive than in Otago. The 1990 review of 
rural hospitals had found they provided a valuable service, and that there 
was not a clear case for closing them. In the process that established the 
CHEs, the Canterbury Area Health Board was divided into two CHEs. 
This meant the former staff of the Area Health Board were more widely 
dispersed as they had the choice of two new CHEs and the Southern 
Regional Health AuthoritY'Jrom which to seek employment. As a 
result, the CHEs in Canterbury contained more new staff than in 
Otago, and so the depth of corporate memory that was carried over in 
Otago did not occur in Canterbury. Moreover, as the corporate history 
surrounding the rural hospitals in Canterbury was more supportive than 
in Otago, this meant Canterbury Health and Healthlink South, were 
more willing to continue providing services from rural hospitals than 
Healthcare Otago. 14 
These different approaches had enormous implications for the SRHA. 
Instead of being able to plan where changes to services would occur 
throughout the region, the SRHA was unfortunately placed in the 
position of having to address the immediate needs of the communities 
13Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 11 December 1996. 
14Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 11 December 1996. 
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in Otago affected by the CHE's withdrawaL In contrast to Canterbury, 
where there was no pressure to find an alternative provider, the SRHA 
immediately had to begin working with communities in Otago to 
identify the services it wished to purchase and contract those services out 
to a new provider. For the SRHA, the need to become involved so 
quickly with communities raised a number of very difficult issues, both 
in terms of its own role as the purchaser of services, and in 
understanding the impact of a hospital closure ona rural community. 
Together, these issues placed huge demands on the SRHA, as it had to do 
an enormous amount of learning very rapidly, while also being expected 
to develop solutions to the difficulties created by Healthcare Otago's 
withdrawal. As a result, the initial relationship between the SRHA and 
the Otago communities was characterised by confusion, frustration, slow 
. progress and poor communication. 
Although the reforms sought to empower CHEs to make decisions such 
as withdrawing from providing rural hospital services, in practice this 
power serves to create the new problems that the RHAs and 
communities must resolve. In the Southern region, when Healthcare 
Otago withdrew from Tapanui, Milton and Roxburgh hospitals, it 
meant the new SRHA had to go into .these communities without 
having its own purchasing strategies or policy positions finalised, and so 
"not really knowing what [it was] going to say."15 This lack of developed 
policy became a SIgnificant barrier to the relationship between the SRHA 
and the communities, because it meant that in the discussions held prior 
to Healthcare Otago's notice of withdrawal, the SRHA had given 
15Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. Please note the following 
. references refer to interviews conducted with different staff members on the same day. 
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communities "lots of confused messages" over the implications for 
health services of the CHE's withdrawal. I6 
This initial confusion was heightened after the CHE's decision to 
withdraw had been publicly announced. At this time, the SRHA held a 
series of public meetings to try and explain to the communities what it 
perceived to be the central issues concerning the provision of health 
services in their localities. At these meetings, however, the communities 
were met by a number of different staff, including members of the 
SRHA's Board, and representatives from each of the policy sections, all 
with different messages about how services would be purchased by their 
section. The SRHA also sought to assure the communities that services 
would be maintained in their localities, and that there would be no gap 
in the service between the CHE's withdrawal and the start of the new 
provider. The SRHA subsequently discovered, however, that 
communities did not always understand that the SRHA was referring to 
the purchase of particular health services, and consequently communities 
had misinterpreted these statements to mean that the hospital would 
remain open.!? 
Progress on determining the appropriate range and volume of services to 
be purchased in these communities was also hampered by a number of 
factors. First, the speed with which the SRHA was required to go into 
these communities meant it did not have ((clear policy" on how it was 
going to purchase particular services. 18 Without this specific knowledge 
on appropriate volumes and the price of each service, the SRHA was 
16Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
17Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
18Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
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unable to make significant progress with the communities. As one 
SRHA staff member recalled: 
. . . lots of promises had been made [and} although we knew we were going to 
buy district nursing, meals on wheels, speech language therapy, physiotherapy, 
and OT in those places, we didn't know volumes of the services we were going 
to be purchasing, nor we did know the dollar value. So at the high level, you 
had the information that they needed, but once you actually started to 
advance those discussions, you couldn't, and you just ended up tripping over 
each other. 19 
As a result, this increased the communities' feelings of frustration 
because the SRHA could not give them exact answers to their 
questions on the range and volume of services that were going to be 
available in their localities. 
Furthermore, the SRHA w~':hampered by the lack of specific data from· 
Healthcare Otago on what volume of services were currently being 
provided to those localities. As one SRHA spokesperson recalls "[t]he 
same CHE would give us three different sets of volumes for visits in the 
one community over the same period, and they would range wildly."20 
As a result, the SRHA spent considerable time deciding what would be 
an appropriate level on which to base its purchasing decisions. 
Eventually, it used a regional average as a starting point for discussions 
with communities over the level of service to be purchased, but warned 
communities that this would be only an interim level of service until the 
locality planning profiles were complete. This lack of data did, however, 
reinforce to the SRHA the importance of the locality planning profiles 
to gaining a better understanding of the health needs of communities.21 
19Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
20Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
21 Interview, Southern Regional'Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
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The SRHA considered that its progress in identifying the serVices it . 
needed to purchase was hampered by communities' misunderstanding of 
the SRHA's function. It also became clear to the SRHA how differently 
rural communities view their hospitals from RHAs, CHEs and 
government. When the SRHA began working with the Otago 
communities, it was with the intention of identifying and purchasing 
health services, but the SRHA rapidly discovered that significant parts 
of the communities were still focused on retaining the hospital. As one 
SRHA spokesperson recalled, "we were talking services and improving 
them, and they wanted to maintain a building."22 To a large extent, this 
desire to save the hospital can be attributed to the groups that the SRHA 
became involved with when it began working with the communities . 
. As a new organisation, the SRHA had no established relationship with 
these communities, and so initially worked with the groups organised 
around the hospital. Rather than understanding that the emphasis of 
the new RHAs and CHEs was on the purchase and provision of health 
services, the SRHA perceived that these community groups were still 
locked into the mode of (save the hospital' that had developed under the 
Area Health Board system. Nevertheless, the result for the SRHA was it 
had to spend considerable time explaining to communities that its focus 
was on improving services and not maintaining buildings. 
This difference il; orientation, however, was central to the way in which 
the SRHA and communities perceived each other, and to how 
successfully they were able to work together. For communities, the 
concept of health services as discrete units which can be individually 
defined, priced, and unbundled and rebundled into precise packages was 
22Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
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alien for two key reasons. The first was that treatmg serVIces as 
individual commodities is the antithes~s to the interconnectedness of 
health services that characterises many rural communities. Due to the 
small size and relative isolation of rural communities, health services are 
often highly interconnected. In a rural community, the GP will often 
rely on the hospital as a source of professional support, while the presence 
of a hospital encourages and maintains the presence of GP and 
pharmaceutical services, and supports other services like meals on wheels. 
This interdependence also extends beyond the formal health care 
providers to other areas of the community including the school, local 
businesses and other voluntary services such as ambulance and fire. It may 
also be reinforced by the duplication of roles by the local medical staff. 
This is particularly common with nurses, who may be employed by both 
. the GP and the hospital, and may also be associated with district nursing. 
For rural people, however, \these services form a complex but fragile 
network where the loss of one service may threaten the viability of 
others.23 
Rural communities also see their hospital as more than just a collection 
of services, because of the wider social and symbolic functions the 
hospital performs. As interviews in Darfield showed, rural communities 
not only have an emotional or parochial attachment to the 'bricks and 
mortar' of their hospital, but perceive the hospital as a symbol of the 
community's heritage and its contemporary identity. Particularly to the 
elderly, the hospital represents a vital source of security, that in many 
instances allows these people to feel that they can remain in the 
community. It is a very important focus for the community, 
23Por one of the best examples of this interconnectedness of health services, see Canterbury Area Health 
Board, Secondary Care Division, Repott of the Rural Hospitals and Rutal Health Needs Review, op. cit. 
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particularly in relation to the huge amount of volunteer work that local 
communities do to support the hospital. The hospital is also considered 
a vital part of the rural community's life blood, and its presence also 
allows the community to feel valued. In general, urban areas feel 
important as a consequence of being geographically and demographically 
large, but smaller communities tend to look at the facilities they can 
support to derive a sense of community worth. 
This perception of status is difficult to quantify, because it is closely 
intertwined with the feelings of rural people about the level of services 
provided in the city. In essence, rural people feel that they must fight to 
retain their health services, such as those provided by their local hospital, 
yet city people have it (all laid on for them' purely because that is where 
. the majority of the population is situated. Although rural people accept 
that more services should be,' available in the city, they also feel that in 
times of financial hardship, it always the rural areas who are the first to 
experience cutbacks to services. The smaller the community, the more 
vulnerable they feel to these losses, and so the retention· of facilities like 
the hospital, particularly because of its crucial place in maintaining other 
health services in the district, becomes an even more important means of 
protecting the community's viability.24 This reliance on the hospital as a 
valuable means of ensuring the community's survival can be seen in the 
comment of an SRHA staff member working with rural communities in 
Otago. She perceived that: 
... in Lumsden [the loss of the hospital would be) yet another indication that 
the town is dying because they've already got half of Lumsden on the market, 
24For additional detail; see NACCHDSS, Symposium on the Delivery of Health Services to Smaller 
Communities, op. cit., and Heather McCrostie Little and Nick Taylor, Means of Survival? A Study of Off-
Farm Employment, 
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and here's yet another building, and it just represents to the community that 
here's another building dying. 25 
The SRHA has «struggled" with understanding the significance of rural 
hospitals to their communities, especially as the SRHA also felt that 
communities were largely ignorant of the actual services provided by the 
hospita1.26 As an SRHA spokesperson commented 
if you CI asked Ash burton 18 months ago, when the heat was on, what services 
are actually provided in Ashburton hospital 1 think you CI be surprised at the 
level of ignorance ... it's just the fact that the hospital is there. 27 
This emotional attachment to rural hospitals has only enhanced the 
SRHA's belief that these hospitals are "grass roots security symbols" 
which not only consume a large number of resources but are often 
"totally inappropriate" for\:the health needs of the community.28 
Moreover, the SRHA also recognised that many residents in rural 
communities will not use their local hospital, but will instead travel to 
the facilities of the base hospital in the city. As rural hospitals provide 
only primary medical care, the SRHA perceived that they could be 
replaced by community based services which would not only give the 
community more services for the equivalent level of resources, but would 
also deliver services that are more appropriate to the community's needs. 
As no organisation before the SRHA had been required to work with 
rural communities experi~ncing the loss of a hospital in the same way, 
the SRHA had to grasp the significance· of the hospital to the 
25Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
26Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
27Interview, Southern "Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
28Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
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communities in a very short space of time. The lack of understanding of 
both the SRHA and the Otago communities for the position and point 
of view of the other, however, meant that their relationship became 
increasingly strained. Consequently, the SRHA found that there was 
much "cross talking" between themselves and the communities, and 
that this began to improve only when key individuals within the 
community began to see the issue from the same perspective as the' 
SRHA. As one SRHA staff member commented, 
... quite a period of cross talking [would go on} until you would find an 
advocate in the organisation who could actually understand what was going 
on, and then he or she usually became the interpreter, and 1 think of two or 
three key meetings where people have got particularly grumpy, say at the 
public meeting, and then the leader of the . .. whatever you call it, has stoo~ 
up and said look, we can't keep focusing on the past, we've just to start 
looking forward and there's been a critical turning point. 1 think at almost 
all the meetings we've been i11;) a particular person has stood up and done 
that, and that's really been where things have started to turn. 29 
As another staff member reiterated, 
once you actually get to work with those sort of people, you're talking the same 
language . . 30 
Ironically, a feature of the health reforms h~s been that a new language 
has evolved, which is often alien to those outside the system. The 
acronyms RHA and CHE, and the differences between the two 
organisations are frequently misunderstood by the public. Terrps like 
health purchasers and providers are more closely allied to the business 
world than to the language of nuture and caring associated with the 
~ ... ~~- -------
29Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
30Interview, Southern Regional Health Authoriry staff member, 28 May 1996. 
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health sector in the past. The RHA's use of words like "consultation" to 
mean "listening but not necessarily acting on" conflicts with the public 
understanding that «consultation" implies having some influence on 
the issue at hand. These disparities not only hinder effective 
communication between the two parties, but also privilege the RHA and 
the CHEs. 
Exacerbating the «cross-talking" between the SRHA and the Otago 
communities, however, was the identification by the SRHA of a grieving 
process when a hospital closure is announced, similar to that experienced 
by humans at the death of close relatives and friends. The most 
significant work on grieving has been done by Elizabeth Kubler-Ross; 
who identifies a multi stage process, where people experience the five 
. stages of denial, anger; bargaining and depression before the final stage 
of acceptance is reached.31 ,In hindsight, the SRHA realised it had not 
been sensitive to this process, and had entered into discussions with 
communities on their future health services before the communities had 
been given the opportunity to address adequately their feelings of loss. 
Initiating discussions while communities were still in the first stages of 
grie( however, meant that effective communication was very difficult, 
because, as one SRHA spokesperson commented «in the height of grief, 
people [hear] what they want to hear, or what they don't want to hear."32 
As the SRHA saw it; this grieving process also heightened the emotional 
attachment of communities to their hospital and prevented them from 
clearly perceiving the germane issues. Since their experience with rural 
communities in Otago, however; the SRHA now recognise that time is 
crucial to allowing communities the opportunity to work through the 
31Elisabeth KUbler-Ross, On Death and Dying, New York: Collier Books, 1969. 
32Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
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gnevmg process so they are able to clearly address their health service 
needs within the limits acceptable to the SRHA. 
A further unintended consequence of Healthcare Otago's withdrawal 
from rural hospital services in the Otago was to prompt the formation of 
community trusts to allow communities to be responsible for their own 
health services. In contrast to Canterbury, rural communities in Otago 
did not have the luxury of a supportive CHE, and consequently had 
little choice but to form a trust if they wished to maintain their 
hospitals. Encouraging communities to form trusts in Otago was the 
release of the Transitional Assistance Funding in August 1994. The 
transitional assistance funding consisted of $20 million, and was made 
available by the government in response to public concern about changes 
. to services such as the closure of rural hospitals being brought about by 
the health reforms. Accord~ngly, the funding was designed to ensure 
that health services would be continued during any transition to a new 
provider, and to assist with the development of new health services 
initiatives including community trusts,33 
The release of the funding, however, was described by an RHA 
employee as a "nightmare."34 As the SRHA saw it, the transitional 
assistance funding raised communities' expectations over their ability to 
form and run trusts, and increased the pressure on the SRHA "because 
there [were] a lot of communities who we hadn't been working with 
[who] suddenly got in on the act."35 Encouraging communities to apply 
for grants to investigate the option of forming trusts also provided "an 
33Minister of Health, Media Release, "Transitional Assistance For New Service Development", 19 
August 1994. 
34Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
35Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
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awful lot of income for consultants to come to us and ask us what we 
were doing."36 Unfortunately for the communities, as these consultants 
did not have the appropriate experience or knowledge to produce good 
studies, the position of the communities was not significantly advanced. 
The wish of communities to form trusts, however, raised numerous issues 
for the SRHA. The original reforms offered very little formal help for 
communities wishing to establish trusts, and eventually the role was 
passed to RHAs. As one SRHA spokesperson recalled, "[t]hey had 
someone initially in Wellington who went out to talk to local 
communities, and they found it too hard, so [it was] RHAs you take it 
up."37 Due to the high degree of community ignorance over the issues 
involved with community trusts, the SRHA found itself in a position of 
having to spend an enormous amount of time educating communities 
on very basic things such as, the working of the health sector, how to 
prepare a business plan, and how to contract for services. 
Not only did the formation of trusts in Otago require the SRHA to be 
closely involved with these communities in an advisory capacity, but the 
SRHA perceived the trusts as "significant drivers" to discussions with the 
communities over their health services.38 This is because for the SRHA 
the creation of a trust immediately establishes a formal structure at the 
local level which tends to precipitate the SRHA's involvement with these 
communities. The greater willingness to form trusts in Otago, however, 
meant that the SRHA gave more of its attention to these formal 
organisations than to communities such as Darfield where there was no 
formal structure lobbying the SRHA for a resolution to the issues. 
36Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
37Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
38Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
Unanticipated Power Relationships 140 
Being so closely involved with these organisations and the transitional 
assistance funding proved difficult for the SRHA because it reinforced 
the communities' sense that their trust would be the preferred provider, 
when at the actual negotiations for services this was not always the case. 
As a consequence, the SRHA is now careful to make the framework very 
clear to communities, whereby the SRHA will work with them, but will 
not given them preferred provider status. As one SRHA spokesperson 
poin ted out: 
.. . you can be working with a provider, and developing providers, but making 
sure the policy is still very clear and consistent about tendering for services . .. 
so you don't actually end up in the situation of where the RHA s been 
captured by one particular community group, and therefore is unable to stand 
. back and say does this look a viable business, because we like the people, or we 
spent months and months working with them, and therefore it's hard to detach 
yourself And thats why we stfli say [to the communities} we'll work with you, 
but at the end of the day, in the new world, it's got to be the best quality service 
provided by the best and most able provider. 39 
Together, the lack of effective communication and the 
misunderstandings that had strained the relationship between the 
SRHA and the rural Otago communities culminated in making the 
communities feel extremely frustrated with the SRHA. In the same 
period, the National Advisory Committee on Core Health and 
Disability Support Services recognised the problems inherent in the need 
to provide health services to rural communities, and held a national 
symposium to begin addressing the difficulties experienced by both rural 
communities and RHAs. As the SRHA saw it, this conference 
intensified the feelings of the Otago communities, and resulted in their 
39Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
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pressuring the SRHA's Board and senior management. In response to 
this pressure, the SRHA created an internal Rural Services Group, the 
objectives of which were: 
. . . to come to an arrangement in each of the rural communities we were 
working with . .. to make sure that arrangement was foir) and to apply that 
approach consistently across the region. 40 
In setting up this group, the SRHA also sought to provide a "consistent 
point of contact,» for communities.41 Prior to the rural services group, 
the SRHA had brought out representatives from each of the policy 
sections to answer communities' questions, but this only confused and 
frustrated communities because they were constantly having to deal with 
different people, whom communities often felt were ignorant about 
what had happened in the past, and knew little of the needs of their 
particular areas. 
From this rural services group, the SRHA developed a set of principles 
and a clear process which they could then apply to all rural areas. In 
essence, this approach contained faur key components. The first was to 
establish what services were to be provided in the community. For the 
SRHA, this question contained two parts: what services should be 
available to the residents of an individual community, and also what 
services should be provided for the residents of that community taking 
into account the services available to other areas in the region. The 
second component involves the level of service that should be provided; 
the third aspect is deciding who should provide those services; and the 
final element is establishing the price to be paid for the services. 
40 Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
41 Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 28 May 1996. 
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However, the SRHA has perceived that communities tend to reverse the 
order, and assumes that the SRHA starts with the price, which then 
determines the provider which in turn affects what will be delivered and 
how. 42 Such a misconception by the communities inevitably causes 
conflict with the SRHA. 
As a result of their experience with communities in Otago, the SRHA 
has been «doing quite a lot of questioning" about its approach, and seeks 
to alter it for other communities by using the information from the 
locality profiles to create a more detailed understanding of the health 
needs of communities.43 Together, the information from the locality 
profiles and'the criteria in Planning for the South will help inform the 
SRHA's decisions on what range and volume of services to purchase. In 
this way, the SRHA hopes to avoid being drawn into debates centred 
around individual facilities, hut will be better able to assess the needs of 
individual communities while also considering the needs of the entire 
region. As one SRHA spokesperson commented: 
What we want to do is avoid debates, as has tended to happen, focussing on 
particular communities. . . and actually think more holistically. So what are 
the needs of all communities in say Canterbury, not just those communities 
with a hospital . ... So we're trying to think through, lets take a position first of. 
all what are the needs of the community, and then based on that, we then 
ask the questions about where is it best to have facilities. Its seeing the big 
picture first before getting drawn into discussions about what does this mean 
for Oxford, or what does this mean for Darfield and so on. I actually think 
that is a better position to take because its more understandable. It doesn't 
avoid the tough questions.44 
42Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 27 May 1996. 
43Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 27 May 1996. 
44Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 27 May 1996. 
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Although rural communities in Canterbury may well be able to benefit 
from the SRHA's revised approach in the future, at the time they had 
little involvement with the SRHA, which was dealing with more urgent 
issues created by Healthcare Otago's withdrawal from rural hospital 
serVIces. This situation benefited the Darfield community because 
changes there were perceived by the SRHA to be of low priority, so the 
hospital was able to continue unchanged in the short term. The SRHA's 
experience in Otago was also extremely significant for communities in 
Canterbury, because it meant the SRHA had a greater understanding of 
the complexity of the. issues raised by the closure of a rural hospital, and 
so was willing to delay making changes to the hospitals in Canterbury in 
the immediate future . 
. Darfield Hospital in the Context of National Politics: 1994-1996 
In the formal design of the reforms, the government sought to insulate 
the RHAs, and to a lesser extent the CHEs, from the political pressure 
that communities had used in the past to influence the decisions of Area 
Health Boards. From 1994 to 1996, however, the events surrounding 
rural hospitals in Canterbury, such as Darfield, have shown that in spite 
of the loss of formal power endured by communities in the reforms, they 
are still able to remain key players in the debate over local services, and are 
capable of gaining some leverage over the RHA. The ability of 
communities to achieve this position, though, is dependent on the 
interplay of political factors at the local and national level, and how 
successfully communities can take advantage of those factors to fulfil 
their own goals. At the local level, these factors include the actions and 
stance of specific RHAs, CHEs and local communities, while at the 
national level they involve broader issues concerning the operation of the 
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health reforms. In contrast to similar communities in Otago, Darfield 
was very fortunate in that it was able to benefit from the support of 
Canterbury Health, as well as increasing public opposition to the health 
reforms at the national level. Consequently, the Darfield community 
was able to retain its hospital for an additional eighteen months until 
July 1997, at which time, the locality planning exercise would be 
complete, and the issue would be open to re-negotiation between the 
community, CHE and SRHA. 
It was not until July 1994, with the release of the SRHA's planning 
document Planning for the South, that Darfield hospital had the first 
indications that it was again under threat. In response to Planning for 
the South, the Darfield community mobilised very rapidly and in 
. August 1994 formed a sub committee of the SRHA's district health 
committee to co-ordinate the community's defence of the hospital. 
Although there is some minor variation in how this sub-committee was 
formed, the predominant account indicates that it was initiated by a 
small group of older women in conjunction with the principal nurse of 
the hospital who were all members of the district health committee and 
who had a long association with health issues in the community. One 
of these women was also the chairperson of the SRHA's district health 
committee, and during a meeting with the SRHA, was invited by John 
Edwards, then Chief Executive of the SRHA, to "take the lead along 
the path of consultation. "45 Accepting the SRHA's offer, these women 
called a meeting of local people who were interested and involved in 
health issues to discuss the community's response to Planning For The 
South. It was from this meeting that the group decided to form a 
45Cited in the minutes of the Sub-Committee of the Selwyn-Waimakariri District Health Committee, 
19 August 1994. 
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committee to examine the role of the hospital within the community46 
and to: 
.. . see what we could do to retain the hospital, or persuade the health 
authorities to keep it. 47 
The initial membership of the sub-committee involved people from the 
local council, including the mayor, the principal nurse of the hospital 
and the general practitioners, a member from the Darfield branch of 
Federated Farmers and one from the Women's Division of Federated 
Farmers, a representative from the Darfield Friends of the Hospital, and 
Ruth Richardson, National's former Minister of Finance. As is often 
the case in rural areas, many members of the committee represented 
more than one group. The sub-committee also expanded to include 
representatives from the SRHA and Canterbury Health. 
, ' 
Critical to understanding the importance of this sub-committee is the 
SRHA's concept of locality planning. When Planning for the South was 
released, it discussed the concept of locality planning, and stated that the 
need for in patient hospital beds in individual communities would be 
addressed as part of the locality planning process. 48 Crucially for the 
commumty, Canterbury Health was very quick to understand the' 
'strategic possibilities of locality planning, in that the concept offered the 
only means through which the community could argue for the necessity 
of the hospital in a way that would be listened to by the SRHA. Locality 
planning would identify the health needs of the community and the 
46Interview, Darfield community member, 10 May 1996. 
47Interview, Darfield community member, 31 January 1996. 
48Southern Regional Health Authority, Planning For The South, op. cit., p. 14. 
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range of services to best meet those needs, which would then be the basis 
from which a decision over the necessity of the hospital could be made. 
Canterbury Health perceived the sub-committee as representmg the 
locality planning process identified in Planning for the South. However, 
the CHE and staff at the. hospital correctly thought that many of the 
community members saw the sub-committee as not only a way of 
keeping the local community informed of events, but of saving the 
hospita1.49 In addition, the sub-committee was also intended as a forum 
to facilitate communication between the SRHA and Canterbury 
Health. The Darfield community had a clear perception that 
communication between the SRHA and Canterbury Health was 
initially very strained, and the community saw the sub-committee as a 
. way of bringing both parties together to bridge this gap. As one member 
of the sub-committee recalled: 
. . . it was acknowledged that there was a gap in communication, and then as 
we went on [in} the sub-committee, that closed, ... it had something to do with 
the personalities involved as well as, individual ways . ... we were all new 
entities and there was a need for them to come together) which we could see, 
and we brought them together. 50 
The SRHA agreed to participate m this sub-committee because they 
perceived it as part of the locality planning process, which offered the 
SRHA an opportunity to consult with the community over the need for 
hospital services. Together the locality planning and the consultation 
allow the SRHA to understand not only exactly what health services a 
community needs, but also decide whether it is willing to purchase those 
49Minutes of the Sub-Committee of the Selwyn-Waimakariri District Health Committee, 10 August 
1994 and 19 August 1994. 
50Intcrview, Darfield community member, 17 May 1996. 
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services in that community. As one SRHA spokesperson commented on 
the consultative process: 
we were trying to . . . find a way through) [to} try and understand what their 
needs are as a community and then try and fit the resources that we had 
available on an equitable basis to meet those needs)1 
The SRHA also clearly rejected any notion that consultation involved 
producing policy documents and holding a fixed view as to their 
implementation. As an SRHA spokesperson also pointed out, 
... [consultation} is . .. about hearing peoples views and going in with the 
proposition that it is possible to change. It would have been an absolute farce 
if weJd gone into places like Ashburton and Darfield with a completely fixed 
view in our minds) and so consultation in our mind was you go with a 
proposition but not with a made up mind. 52 
The first meeting of the sub-committee was held in August 1994. 
However, that first meeting highlighted the committee's lack of legal 
status. As a result, it was decided at this initial meeting to make the 
committee a sub-committee of the RHA's district health committee. 
Having legal status was important because it conferred legitimacy on the 
committee, and hence it would be recognised by both the SRHA and 
Canterbury Health. 
The sub-committee then proceeded to facilitate discussions between the 
SRHA, the CHE and the Darfield community. As with communities 
in Otago, initial progress was slow, for as one staff member at the 
hospital recalled: 
51 Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 11 December 1996. 
52Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 11 December 1996. 
Unanticipated Power Relationships 148 
... the MIA reLuctantly came forward, and reLuctantly I feLt, took part in the 
process and sent diffirent peopLe . .. every meeting we had a new face to deaL 
with) and reaLly put themseLves on a go-sLow. 53 
The former principal nurse of the hospital also commented about 
inaccuracies in data between the SRHA and herself: 
. . . the RHA came armed with statistics about our hospitaL which were 
diffirent from mine) and in fact skewed) if that's the right word) the whoLe 
picture of the activity that happened at the hospitaL) and that was reaLly 
frustrating because it appeared) well the RHA considered that our hospitaL 
didn't do any acute care work, that we basicaLly ran . . . a convaLescent 
service, and that our maternity usage was much Less than it actuaLly was. 54 
Eventually the discussions with the SRHA, Canterbury Health and the 
Darfield community reache4. a point where the SRHA and Canterbury 
Health were a willing purchaser and a willing provider, and so both 
parties entered into a negotiation process over the price to be paid for the 
hospital services. Once the issue reached this stage, however, it became a 
contracting issue between the S~A and the CHE and the community 
was excluded from the process. 
Under the direction given to them via the Health and Disability Services 
Act, however, Canterbury Health possessed a very clear sense that its role 
was a provider health services, and as such, had to take a business 
approach, where it could only provide the services if it received sufficient 
53Interview, Former staff member Darfield Hospital, 26 April 1996. 
54Interview, Former staff member Darfield Hospital, 26 April 1996. For a broader review of the RHAs 
contracting performance, see New Zealand Ministry of Health, Review of 1994/95 RHA Contracting, 
Government Printer, Wellington, 1995, and Rivers Buchan Associates, RHAs Don't Fund, They Purchase 
Services: Review of 1994/5 Voluntary Sector Contracting with RHAs to Provitk Health Services, A Report 
Commissioned by the Ministry of Health from the New Zealand Federation of Voluntary Welfare 
Organisations, March 1995. 
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payment from the SRHA.55 At the same time, Canterbury Health was 
also coming under pressure from the government to be financially 
accountable, and to exit from businesses that they could not in the long 
term operate profitably. As a Canterbury Health official comments: 
basically what [the government} were saying to us is, you don't have any 
social obligation in this, RHAs carry all that responsibility. You've got to be 
efficient as possible, and then given that you're as efficient as possible, at the 
end of the day, if you can't balance the books, then you shouldn't be in 
business. Stand aside and either the service won't be provided, or someone else 
will do it, but thats an RHA decision. 56 
The motivation for this pressure can be largely attributed to a 
government struggling to address the severe financial difficulties of the 
CHEs. In their first year of operation, CHEs made substantial financial 
losses, and accumulated debt in excess of $1 billion. 57 In October, the 
\ . 
inability of the CHEs to deliver on the efficiency gains initially expected 
of them led the government to write off $800 million of CHE debt, and 
inject a further $534 million over a period of three and a half years to 
reduce public concern over the waiting lists.58 
Some CHEs were also grappling with defining their core business, 
particularly because many communities were turning to CHEs to 
continue providing services. Canterbury Health, for example, perceived 
its core business as the provision of acute services and not community or 
rural health services. At the same time, however, it was also aware the 
Darfield community wished for them to retain services at the hospitaL 
55 Interview, Canterbury Health staff member, 9 January 1996. 
56Interview, Canterbury Health staff member, 21 May 1996. 
57Kareen Floyd, "Health Enterprise Debt Exceeds $1 billion", New Zealand Herald, 16 December 
1994; Frances Ross, "CHEs Record $ 100m Loss and $1.25b Debt", Dominion, 18 March 1994. 
58Michael Rentou!, "Health Services get $534m for 'Big Hit' on Waiting Lists", The Press, 14 October 
1994. 
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This led Canterbury Health to express their willingness to the RHA and 
the community to continue providing services at the rural hospitals if 
they would get sufficient revenue from the RHA. From the SRHAs 
point of view, however, Canterbury Health's stance sent a mixed 
message over its commitment to providing services at the rural 
hospitals. 59 
Following the discussions conducted by the sub committee, the CHE 
produced an options paper for Darfield hospital in October of 1994 
which outlined two options for Canterbury Health to pursue: withdraw 
from the provision of hospital services, or reconfigure the mix of beds to 
attract alternative types of patients and revenue streams.60 
. In the first option, Canterbury Health identified that withdrawing 
from providing services at D·arfield Hospital would increase the number 
of patients needing to be admitted to Christchurch Hospital. In essence, 
the closure of Darfield Hospital would remove the option for the local 
general practitioners to keep patients in the community, and would 
instead require GPs to send them· to Christchurch Hospital. The CHE 
estimated that at least 80 per cent of those patients would require 
admission.61 
In contrast, the second option necessitated a change to the type of 
patients admitted to Darfield Hospital. As it was, Darfield had 10 beds, 
with three designated for maternity patients, and seven for general 
medical purposes. Under Option 2, the maternity beds would be reduced 
59Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 11 December 1996. 
60Canterbury Health, Ashburton and Community Health Services, "An Options Paper: Darfield 
Hospital", Internal Report, 6 October 1994. 
61 Ibid, pp. 3-4. 
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from three to two, while the remaining beds would be divided equally to 
accommodate four long stay elderly and four general medical patients. 
Under this option, there would be a very important difference in how 
the three services would be funded by the RHA. For the general medical 
beds, the RHA was willing to pay its benchmark price per day, but it 
would fund the four beds regardless of whether they were actually 
occupied. The maternity and long stay elderly beds, however, would be 
funded according to the actual usage of the service. In other words, 
these services ,:"ould earn revenue only when they were being used by a 
patient. This meant that for Option 2 to be feasible, the hospital would 
need to maintain a high occupancy of the maternity and long stay beds, 
or find alternative sources of income to compensate for those times 
when the beds were empty. 
This second option, however~ had more serious financial implications for 
Canterbury Health. First, Canterbury Health argued it needed 
approximately $130 a day to supply general medical beds, exceeding the 
RHA's benchmark price of $120.62 The second concerned the method of 
payment· for the maternity and long stay elderly services. The CHE 
contended it needed a guarantee that a certain number of bed days would 
be purchased because of the fixed costs associated with running the 
hospitals. As a Canterbury Health spokesperson pointed out: 
. . . we need a guarantee of so many bed days per annum because we know 
our costs are basically fixed in those hospitals, and we can't get them down 
because you can't run it with fewer people, and the RlIA was saying we'll pay 
you per actual bed day, at such and such a price. 63 
62The SRHA's benchmark price quoted here was derived from interviews with the CHKand community 
representatives. The SRHA would not comment on its price for a health service. 
63Interview, Canterbury Health staff member, 21 May 1996. 
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The options paper was discussed by the sub-committee, and also 
presented at a public meeting organised by the sub-committee in 
November 1994. At that meeting, the local community indicated a very 
strong preference for the retention of Canterbury Health as the owner 
of the hospital, and again rejected the option of becoming a community 
trust. This paper was then accepted by Canterbury Health's Board as an 
appropriate basis on which to make an offer to the RHA to continue to 
provide services at Darfield hospital. No progress was made over 
December, and in February 1995, the CHE produced a second options 
paper, which essentially reiterated the contents of the October paper. It 
was on the basis of this paper that Canterbury Health then went to the 
SRHA with an offer to continue providing services at both Darfield and 
Ellesmere for a set price.64 
However, as aCHE spokesJlerson commented, "there was virtually no 
response" from the RHA, and the issue was raised in June 1995 as part of 
the contracting round for the 1995/1996 year.65 During this time, to 
ensure that it was putting forward a fair and reasonable price, the CHE 
also contracted Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu to audit their costings and 
the business plans for each of the hospitals. Once the Canterbury 
Health Board was assured the CHE had achieved its most efficient price, 
it approached the RHA in July seeking final prices for the services. The 
RHA, however, continued to offer a price that the CHE argued was 
insufficient for it to continue providing services at the four hospitals 
without exposing itself to financial risk. 
64Interview, Canterbury Health staff member, 9 January 1996. 
65Imerview, Canterbury Health staff member, 9 January 1996. 
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Because of demands on the SRHA from other issues in the region, the 
continued disagreement meant that the SRHA placed Darfield on their 
list of unresolved issues. As Canterbury Health and the SRHA were 
unable to agree on a resolution for Ashburton, or on Canterbury 
Health's total contract, this slowed progress on the rural hospitals, and so 
the hospital continued to operate as normal. Frustrated by the lack of 
progress, Canterbury Health finally decided to issue notice of intention 
to exit from the services at all four of their rural hospitals . 
. The notification of intention to exit was used as a weapon by the CHE 
against the SRHA, and was designed to highlight the seriousness of the 
CHE's financial problems concerning the rural hospitals. As a 
Canterbury Health spokesperson commented: 
. . . it was used to indicate to, the RHA that we were deadly serious about the 
'. . 
foct we weren't getting paid enough. We're so deadly serious about it we're 
prepared to issue notice of exit. 66 
The situation between the SRHA and the CHE, however, was such that 
Canterbury Health's entire contraCt was still not agreed upon, and this 
led to intervention from Wellington. Although the participants 
agreed that this intervention was crucial in allowing the stalemate to be 
overcome, they were unwilling to elaborate on what form this 
intervention had taken, or how it had been successful. A spokesperson 
from the SRHA was only willing to comment that: 
. . . a good focilitator is worth their weight in gold because they can assist to 
broker a deal that otherwise is stalemated 67 
6666Interview, Canterbury Health staff member, 21 May 1996. 
67Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 11 December 1996. 
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An interview with the Hon Jenny Shipley indicated that her role as 
Minister of Health was not to dictate how these disputes should be 
resolved, but to ensure that a proper process was conducted in which the 
key actors had to demonstrate they were behaving in a responsible 
manner and were addressing the relevant health issues: 
. . . what I say to [RHAs and CHEs} is that you can not leave an impasse. I 
will not have services shut simply because of entrenched positions. . . When 
RHAs have set rules as purchasers and locality planning is being done) I 
expect all of the parties to engage in an effictive process which both includes 
consultation and flushes out the arguments . ... and the people who I put up) 
and the process I insisted on in each of these cases) was a proper negotiated 
process. I couldn)t have people behaving in an arbitrary manner) they had to 
behave in the public interest and show that they were focusing on health issues 
and transitional management. 68 
The result of this intervention was an agreement whereby the SRHA 
\ 
'. 
would purchase services at Darfield Hospital for a further eighteen 
months and Canterbury Health would continue to provide the services. 
This agreement would give the SRHA an opportunity to complete its 
locality plans, and would allow.the SRHA and CHE to review the 
services provided by the hospitals in terms of their costs, utilisation, and 
discharge patterns. Completion of the locality plans was crucial for 
central government, because as Jenny Shipley explains: 
... [the RHAs and CHEs} have to know what they're doing. I don't expect 
anyone to shut something or indeed open something if they're not sure what 
they're using it for in health care terms. 69 
68Interview, Hon Jenny Shipley, 21 February 1997. 
69Interview, HonJenny Shipley, 21 February 1997, 
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From the CHE's point of view, this agreement was possible because it was 
going to receive a "sufficient price" from the SRHA.70 From the 
SRHA's perspective, closing the hospital would also involve the loss of 
maternity and age related services, and the SRHA felt it did not have the 
resources to manage adequately the transition to community based 
services. The SRHA also felt that: 
... when push came to shove, we probably weren't going to achieve a tot of 
health gain or benefit from pushing through change in those areas, and [it 
would be better to} concentrate on those areas where we [believed} there [was} 
potential for greater change and benefit.71 
For the Darfield community, the decision meant they would be able to 
retain their hospital for another eighteen months, at which time the 
issue would be reassessed, and potentially lead to further mobilisation. 
>. ". 
The experiences of the Darfield community show that for the SRHA, 
Canterbury Health's continued provision of services at its rural hospitals 
was equally as consequential as Healthcare Otago's decision to withdraw. 
The outcome at Darfield proved that the power of the RHAs was not as 
strong as the reformers had intended, but that the SRHA could be 
circumvented by the skilful activities of the CHE and the political 
pressure that can be generated by negative publicity over rural hospital 
closure. The mobilisation of the Darfield community was crucial to this 
pressure, because it armed the CHE with an entirely credible threat. The 
events surrounding Darfield also showed that the desire of the reformers 
to remove the spectre of 'politics' from resource decisions has been 
impossible to achieve, and that paradoxically, the intervention of central 
70Interview, Canterbury Health staff member, 21 May 1996. 
71 Interview, Southern Regional Health Authority staff member, 11 December 1996. 
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government was crucial to solving the disagreements between the RHA 
and the CHE. 
Discussion 
The success of the Darfield community in gaining a short term reprieve 
for its hospital shows that rural communities have some ability to 
overcome their lack of formal power in the health system, and achieve 
outcomes more consistent with their wishes. Their ability to do this, 
however, is limited to the strategic openings created for them in the 
system by the interactions of the RHAs, CHEs and central government 
as they jockey for position and power. Unexpectedly for the reformers, 
it has been the actions of the CHEs that have proven to be the key 
players in determining the opportunities that rural communities can 
exploit. Rather than being',inerely the servants of the RHAs, the CHEs 
have demonstrated that it is sometimes their decisions that can create the 
issues to which the RHA must respond, and that this can significantly 
enhance or weaken the position of rural communities. 
In the Southern region, it was the decisions of Canterbury Health and 
Healthcare Otago that advantaged the Darfield community by 
determining the issues the SRHA would have to address. With its 
decision to exit from rural hospital services in selected Otago 
communities, Healthcare Otago placed the SRHA in the position of 
very rapidly having to begin its role of identifying and purchasing health 
services for those communities. This task was made extremely difficult as 
the hospital closures generated a number of serious issues which the 
SRHA had not foreseen, and was poorly prepared for. As a result, the 
SRHA was required to build a relationship with these communities 
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against a background of public ignorance and hostility to the health 
reforms, and anger at Healthcare Otago's withdrawaL As a consequence, 
the SRHA was required to spend an enormous amount of time working 
with these communities to resolve the issues generated by the CHE's 
exlt. 
The implications of the SRHA's time 1ll Otago were twofold for 
communities in Canterbury. First, the willingness of Canterbury 
Health to continue providing services at its rural hospitals meant that 
the SRHA was able to defer dealing with the issues in Canterbury while 
it addressed the problems in Otago. Second, the SRHA's experience with 
the rural Otago communities made the SRHA acutely aware of the 
anger that can be generated in communities when a hospital closure is 
. announced, and the need for careful management of this anger. 
Hence, in Darfield, the SRHc.{\ was more inclined to maintain the status 
quo until it could devote more time to those communities, and so try to 
achieve a smoother transition from hospital services should Canterbury 
Health withdraw. This approach would also avoid a further public 
controversy over another rural hospital closure. 
In contrast to Otago, a crucial factor in the Darfield community's ability 
to retain its hospital for another eighteen months was the support given 
to it by Canterbury Health. In the design of the reforms, decisions over 
the mix of local services were to be determined by the contract 
negotiations of RHAs and CHEs, with communities entitled to be 
consulted by the RHA only over the range of services to be provided. In 
Darfield, the SRHA enforced the division of these two processes, and the 
community was excluded from that negotiation process. By being 
willing to continue providing services, however, Canterbury Health 
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entered into negotiations with the SRHA, which if it was able to reach a 
satisfactory agreement on prices, would mean fulfilling the 
community's desire for the hospital to be preserved. By this means, the 
community was informally given access to a negotiation process from 
which it would otherwise have been excluded. 
Through its willingness to act as the Darfield community's advocate with 
the SRHA, Canterbury Health offered the community further support. 
In the reforms, the CHEs were created with a very clear role: to provide 
health and disability support services, with the RHAs assuming all other 
responsibility for the social issues of ensuring communities have 
adequate access to health services. Despite a clear objective to operate as a 
successful business, however, the CHEs were also created with a statutory 
requirement to exhibit a sense of social responsibility to the communities 
in which they operate. In Darfield, Canterbury Health fulfilled that 
obligation by acting as an advocate for the community. In this way, as a 
Canterbury Health spokesperson commented: 
[we} ensure that the community~ arguments are heard, [and that} we try our 
best in negotiations with the RHA to bridge the gap, in other words we 
wouldn't exit from a service unless we had tried everything in our powers to 
convince the RHA that they should purchase, or pay the appropriate amount 
of money for that service. 72 
Canterbury Health has supported the rural communities by holding the 
SRHA to the concept of locality planning. As a Canterbury Health 
official explains: 
We, I personally believe, have been quite instrumental in holding the Regional 
Health Authority to that concept, because I think they've found it more 
72Interview, Canterbury Health staff member, 21 May 1996. 
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difficult that they thought it would be, but we have said we don't care how 
difficult it is, you've got to do it. . . we have said you must go through this 
process of establishing a locality plan, and you must do that in a consultative 
manner . . . We make it absolutely clear, in front of the community group, 
what the process is. 73 
By acting as an advocate for the community through holding the 
SRHA to account over locality planning, the CHE is not only advancing 
the position of the communities, but it is also advantaging its own 
position. In this situation, the CHE has the pivotal position, because if 
it supports the community, then it has the potential to extract extra 
revenue from the SRHA for the services. However, it also has the 
option of exiting from the hospital services if it cannot reach an 
agreement with the SRHA on price, and would suffer little harm by so 
. doing the blame would fallon the SRHA. 
Acting as an advocate for the rural communities, however, gIves the 
CHE the ability to mobilise significant political and institutional 
strength. When the reforms were implemented, the institutional 
position of the CHEs was much stronger than that of the RHAs. This 
was because the CHEs were created out of the public hospitals, and were 
largely perceived by the public as "inheritors of an area health board 
tradition. "74 Whereas RHAs were seen to be more remote, and their role 
was initially not well understood, CHEs could be more easily identified 
with, and as such, quickly became the focus for local interests. Moreover, 
RHAs had little time with which to establish themselves in their 
appropriate roles, with the result that CHEs "to some extent [filled] this 
73Interview, Canterbury Health staff member, 21 May 1996. 
74paullne Barnett and Ross Barnett, "Restructuring Health: Rhetoric and Reality" in Richard Le Heron 
and Eric Pawson (eds), Changing Places: New Zealand in the Nineties, Longman Paul, 1996; p.222. 
Unanticipated Power Relationships 160 
vacuum. "75 Hence, as Barnett and Malcolm identify "the status of 
CHEs as established institutions with information systems and local 
networks puts them in a strong position in relation to RHAs, not In 
terms of contracting . . . but in terms of the 'moral high ground' of 
purchasing - assessing needs and relating to the community."76 
In contrast to the CHEs, the RHAs were created with little political 
legitimacy and extremely few linkages into communities. The design of 
the reforms deliberately sought to distance RI!As from communities, so 
that they could make what were seen to be difficult rationing decisions. 
For the CHEs, however, the political strength that they can gain from 
having good relationships with local communities insulates them from 
much of the public opposition and criticism that RHAs are subject to. 
This is important because the RHAs and CHEs exist in a health system 
that has undergone rapid institutional change, and where national and 
regional health administrative organisations have little guarantee of 
survival. The tenuous position of these organisations was confirmed 
with the formation of the coalition government between the National 
and New Zealand First parties, where it was decided to abolish the RHAs 
but retain the CHEs, albeit with a new name and without their 
competitive profit focus. 
The actions of the CHEs, however, were not the sole cause of the 
Darfield community's ability to gain a reprieve on its hospital services. 
Another key factor was the intense national and local politics generated 
by other communities in the region, particularly Ashburton, who were 
threatened with the loss of hospital services. This had two primary effects 
75Pauline Barnett and Laurence Malcolm, "Beyond Ideology: The Emerging Roles of New Zealand's 
Crown Health Enterprises", InternationalJournal of Health Services, vol. 27, no. 1, 1997, p. 103 . 
. 76lbid, p. 103. 
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on Darfield. The first was to generate political pressure on the SRHA 
and central government. The Ashburton community passionately 
opposed the downgrading of its hospital facilities, and this was expressed 
through well attended rallies and public meetings with the Minister of 
Health and SRHA staff. The issue very quickly became politicised, 
partly as a result of the hospital's location within the Minister of 
Health's electorate, but also because the efforts of these communities 
threw the issue into the national spotlight. Once the issue was picked up 
by the national media, it seemed to embody everything that the public 
despised about the health reforms,' and as such threatened their fragile 
legitimacy. 
The public's reaction to what appeared to be the widespread cutting of 
. rural services only increased the pressure on a government already acutely 
conscious of the increasing failures of the health reforms. At the 
national level, the health reforms were being attacked from a number of 
different directions. The performance of the RHAs and CHEs had not 
produced the efficiency gains that had been expected of them in the 
early health reforms literature,' ,and staff resignations from senlOr 
management positions in the CHEs were very high.?7 Conflict within 
the health system was rife between RHAs and CHEs, RHAs and rural 
COmmUlllt1es, and between clinicians and senior management within 
some CHEs. Together, these factors required the government to 
intervene increasingly in the sector, either through providing additional 
funding, or through the need to resolve disputes between the key actors. 
Particularly for a government feeling increasingly vulnerable in the 
MMP electoral arena, continued conflict over rural hospitals was very 
threatening. 
77For more detail on this see, Ferguson, The Inconvenient Realities o/Health Reform, or. cit. 
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Th~ political controversy that developed in Ashburton also meant that 
negotiations between the SRHA and Canterbury Health over Darfield 
were slowed until it reached a point where intervention from central 
government became necessary to facilitate an agreement between them. 
Consequently, the politically sensitive situation in Ashburton, together 
with the need to resolve the total contract with Canterbury Health 
meant the SRHA found it politically expedient to maintain services at 
Ashburton and Darfield in the short term until it could devote greater 
resources to managing changes in those localities. 
What can be seen from this is that the strategic position of a small 
hospital like Darfield is dependent on the attention being paid to it by 
the larger actors. As Darfield represents only a tiny aspect of the SRHA 
and Canterbury Health's oveFll business, when more urgent issues arise, 
the SRHA and CHE are able to defer the issues raised by Darfield until 
a later time. This not only allows the hospital to continue as normal, but 
also gives the community the opportunity to complete the locality 
planning exercise, and assess the .need for in-patient hospital services. 
However, Darfield's small size also makes its position more precarious 
because it encourages the larger actors to perceive it as being 
ulllmportant, therefore, rendering the hospital more vulnerable to 
closure. 
Conclusions 
The working of the reforms in practice has shown that contrary to the 
intentions of the reformers, the power relationships between 
government, RHAs, CHEs and local communities have not been fixed, 
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but rather have been very fluid, with power revolving between the key 
actors according to the particular mix of national and local political at 
anyone time. For rural communities, the example of Darfield shows 
that power under the. reforms is both highly contingent and precarious. 
Power is almost totally dependent on the mix of political circumstances 
at the national and lo.cal leveL and on the ability of communities to 
exploit those circumstances. The experience of Darfield, therefore, 
offers an analytic comment on the ideas underpinning the new 
institutional literature. The new institutional framework argues for the 
primacy of institutions in shaping an actor's power, but as the health 
reforms have shown, informal relationships and political pressures can 
often be just as crucial in determining an actor's ability to make decisions 
and have control over other actors. Hence, an actor's true degree of 
power is often the product of the privileges bestowed on them by their 
formal institutional positicl.ll together with their ability to exploit 
informal relationships and political pressures. 
Chapter Six: Conclusion 
[IJnstitutional change rarely satisfies the prior intentions of 
those who initiate it. Change cannot be controlled precisely. 
Such a perspective, however, is itself misleading, for it 
presumes that intention is clear, fixed, and unitary. 
Understanding the transformation of political institutions 
requires recognising that there are frequently multiple, not 
necessarily consistent, intentions, that intentions are often 
ambiguous, that intentions are part of a system of values, goals, 
and attitudes that embeds intention in a structure of other 
beliefs and aspirations, and that this structure of values and 
intentions is shaped, interpreted, and created during the course 
of the change in the institution. 1 
In 1991, the newly elected National government embarked on a 
program of radical institutional reform of the health sector. This 
reform was undertaken with an unshakeable ideological conviction that 
the introduction of a 'mana'ged market' was the way to achieve a more 
responsive, integrated and efficient health system. The reformers had 
identified that provider and community 'capture' was a key reason 
perpetuating inefficient and inappropriate allocations of health 
resources and preventing the closet integration of primary and secondary 
care. Area Health Boards were seen as veto points that could be 
controlled by communities and doctors, and hence were the institutional 
arena through which these interests possessed a disproportionate amount 
of control in the system. Consequently, the reformers designed a new 
institutional structure where a separate purchaser and multiple, 
competing providers operating in a 'managed market' would determine 
the allocation of resources. This system would contain no veto points 
directly accessible to either communities or providers, and hence would 
enable the RHAs to rationalise and reconfigure health resources more 
1 March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, 0p. cit., p. 65. 
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effectively. In theory, this system would also significantly reduce the 
need for political interference by central government in resource 
allocation decisions. 
In practice, however, the system has only partially produced the outcomes 
anticipated by the reformers. Although some rural communities, as in 
Otago have lost local facilities, it is significant that other communities, 
as in Canterbury, have been able to resist attempts to close or downsize 
their hospitals. Accounting for these different outcomes thus presents a 
puzzle. In part, the answer can be found in the ability of local 
communities to benefit from the strategic openings in the system 
created by the interactions of RHAs, CHEs and central government. In 
the case of rural hospitals in the Southern region, it was the actions of 
the CHEs that turned out to have a pivotal role in creating the 
opportunities from which "'local communities could benefit. As the 
account of Darfield Hospital demonstrates, it was the willingness of 
Canterbury Health to continue providing services at the hospital and to 
act as an advocate for the community with the SRHA that significantly 
advantaged the community. Canterbury Health's stance not only 
prevented the community from having to form a trust to retain their 
hospital, but meant that if the CHE could successfully negotiate a price 
with the SRHA, the community's wish for the hospital to be retained 
would be fulfilled. In contrast, communities in Otago did not have a 
supportive CHE to shelter under, and were left with little option but to 
form a trust if they wished to retain their hospitals. In so doing, 
however, the communities then had to work through a complex and 
often painful process with the SRHA to become a service provider. 
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Another piece of the puzzle can be found in the ability of the Darfield 
community to benefit from local and national political factors. At the 
local level, the controversy over Ashburton Hospital was becoming 
increasingly bitter and protracted, and represented yet another issue on 
which the SRHA and Canterbury Health could not agree. Particularly 
as Ashburton Hospital was in the electorate of Health Minister Jenny 
Shipley, it was the focus of nationwide attention and was being closely 
watched by other rural communities to see how it would be resolved. 
While the situation at Ashburton diverted the SRHA and CHE's 
attention away from the dispute at Darfield, the hospital was able to 
continue operating normally. Eventually the contract dispute required 
intervention from central government, and this was very significant for 
Darfield because the government was feeling under pressure from other 
disputes over rural hospitals, and was anxious to ensure that further 
hospital closures would incur as little political fallout as possible. This 
meant that for the SRHA, which was conscious that the Darfield 
community would not give up its hospital easily, it became prudent to 
delay making changes until it could complete the locality planning 
exercise. Not only did this avoid a political controversy, but it would also 
provide better information on which. to assess the need for the hospital. 
The pleces of the puzzle that have so far been revealed also have 
implications for the 'new institutionalist' theories. Whereas these 
theories argue that an actor's power comes from their institutional 
positioning, the case of Darfield Hospital has shown that an actor's 
formal institutional position does not always constitute their true degree 
of power. Rather, informal relationships and political pressures 
intertwine with formal institutional positioning to determine an actor's 
ability to control decisions and other actors in the sector. That the 
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Darfield community could retain its local hospital stemmed not only 
from the ability of the community to benefit from the politics created by 
other actors in the system, but also from the fact that the community 
could generate its own strategic opportunities by threatening to create a 
politically difficult situation should its hospital close. By actively 
mobilising and clearly indicating that they would not exit quietly from 
the hospital, the community posed a broader political threat to the 
government in the electoral arena. This pushed the issue on to the 
national agenda, and compelled central government to become involved 
in the contract dispute between Canterbury Health and the SRHA, the 
outcome of which ultimately favoured the Darfield community. 
Consequently, contrary to the intentions of the health reforms, the 
Darfield community along with other rural communities, became 
significant actors in their own right. In the lead up to the 1996 general 
election, the issue of rural hospital closure was a political liability for the 
government. The government was feeling increasingly vulnerable in the 
health sector, and this was exacerbated by its need to contest the general 
election in the new MMP environment, where its traditional party 
support was looking insecure. The mobilisation of the community was an 
incentive for the CHE to use the community as an ally against the 
SRHA, and this contributed towards the SRHA's decision to continue 
purchasing services at Darfield Hospital at least until it could complete 
the locality planning exercise. Hence, the community not only 
benefited from favourable political circumstances generated by other 
actors, but also contributed to the success of its cause by vigorously 
contesting the loss of its local hospital. 
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Perhaps the most significant practical and theoretical lesson that can be 
learnt from the health reforms and the case of Darfield Hospital is that 
attempts to disempower key actors in the system are unlikely to be 
entirely successful. This is for a number of reasons. First, no actor exists 
in isolation, but rather is part of a complex network of interdependent 
relationships, where the actions of other actors create opportunities and 
barriers that can affect a single actor's strategic position and power. In 
the case of rural hospitals, the seemingly total power of the RHAs could 
be constrained by informal alliances between CHEs and local 
communities, and by the efforts of rural communities to thrust the issue 
of rural hospital closure onto the national agenda where it placed even 
further pressure on central government and the RHAs . 
. However, efforts to remove formal power from actors can paradoxically 
result in their gaining an increased ability to influence the outcomes of 
policy debates. This is because when an actor feels it has nothing left to 
lose, it is often able to fight more vigorously, and with less consideration 
of its formal responsibilities than opposing actors. In this regard, the 
Darfield community was significantly advantaged over the SRHA. 
Whereas the community may have felt «up to our knees in mud," they 
also had nothing to lose by using every means available to fight for the 
retention of the hospita1.2 The SRHA's actions, however, were severely 
constrained by their formal position, because they had to be seen not to 
be abusing their power. This was evident with the introduction of the 
Management of Change protocols from central government which were 
released in response to concerns that RHAs and CHEs were not 
consulting properly with communities. Crucially, attempts to remove 
power from any group with a fundamental stake in the system will 
2Interview, Darfield community member, 17 May 1996. 
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always result in that group constantly struggling to have an input into 
decisions. This will be even more apparent when those decisions have 
important consequences for that group, as in the case of rural hospitals. 
Following the 1996 general election, no single political party gained a 
majority in the House of Representatives, and a coalition government 
was formed between the National and New Zealand First parties. This 
coalition rejected the National government's emphasis on competition 
and market principles, and instead returned the focus of the sector to co-
operation) collaboration and improving health outcomes. The RHAs are 
to be abolished in 1998, with a return to a single, central funder) 
although the CHEs will remain. That the RHAs are to be abolished is 
due in part to their failure to build good relationships with the other 
actors in the sector. Although the RHAs new roles as purchasers were 
inherently difficult and contentious) they did little to help their 
position. At least initially, RHAs rigidly enforced the separation 
between the purchaser and provider which led to their adopting a 
confrontational rather than collaborative approach with providers, and 
engaged in highly legalistic contracting arrangements which delayed and 
frustrated negotiations with providers and communities} The RHAs 
could be depicted by their detractors as the epitome of unnecessary 
bureaucracy, and their general unpopularity made them vulnerable to 
abolition. In contrast, CHEs were seen to have much greater political 
legitimacy, and have been retained in the new system as Regional 
Hospital and Community Services. 
3Por more detail see Laurence Malcolm, "Govt's New Health Policy Should Build On Successful Bits of 
the Old", Christchurch Press, 7 January 1997, p. 7; Laurence Malcolm, "What Now? Coalition Health 
Policy Revisited", New Zealand Doctor, 5 February 1997; Laurence Malcolm and Mervin Shalowitz, 
"Managed/Integrated Care in New Zealand: Contrasts with the USA", forthcoming in New England 
Journal of Medicine. 
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Although this latest round of restructuring has not eliminated the 
dilemmas presented by rural hospitals, the removal of competition as a 
driving force in the sector may allow these debates to be resolved more 
smoothly. For this to happen, however, the new central funder and 
Regional Hospital and Community Service providers will need to 
reincorporate rural communities back into the decision making 
structure. Thus, the challenge for these agencies will be to create an 
environment in which rural communities can work co-operatively with 
their local health professionals and the new health bodies to determine 
how their health services may best be improved. An important first step 
in this process will be to acknowledge that rural hospitals are more than 
just symbols, but are an integral part of the health services available to 
rural communities. Therefore, for rural communities to be able to lose 
. the building without experiencing a bitter grieving process, they need to 
be able to feel secure that they will have the health services they need 
without feeling the community's sense of worth has been undermined. 
.. 
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Figure 1: Map Showing Locations of Rural Hospitals in Canterbury 
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